KHOJA ON LEBANON: HARIRI MUST MOVE, SLEIMAN MUST

C O N F I D E N T I A L RIYADH 001154

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV SA
SUBJECT: KHOJA ON LEBANON: HARIRI MUST MOVE, SLEIMAN MUST
RESPOND

REF: A. BEIRUT 974

B. DAMASCUS 622

Classified By: CDA Ambassador Richard Erdman for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D
)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a meeting September 1 with Charge to discuss the
stalled Lebanese government formation process, Minister of
Culture and Information Khoja acknowledged the complexity of
current political situation in Lebanon; observed it was time
for Hariri to make a decision and for Sleiman to respond; and
emphasized that improvement in Saudi-Syrian relations
remained contingent on Syria's good behavior in Lebanon.
Emphatically dismissing the idea that there might be a
trilateral Saudi/Lebanese/Syria meeting on the margins of the
September 23 KAUST University inauguration, Khoja said King
Abdullah had forbidden any Saudi engagement with Syria on
Lebanon, lest it make Saudi Arabia appear the demandeur and
strengthen Syria as a regional power-broker. In Khoja's
view, the most promising way to break the Lebanese government
formation deadlock would be for the U.S. to communicate
directly with Sleiman and urge him to accept whatever
government list Hariri ultimately proposes. End Summary.


HARIRI HAS TO MAKE A DECISION
--------------


2. (C) Khoja acknowledged the complexity of the current
situation in Lebanon, noting that Aoun remained an obstacle
but Hariri "had to take some steps and make a decision."
Hariri had two options: form a government of technocrats,
including members from outside the political parties, or form
a government that reflected his view and vision for the
country. Either option should include Hariri as PM, and
exclude Gebran Bassil, as caving in to Aoun's demands would
damage Hariri's credibility in the eyes of the Christian
community. "How could he explain including Bassil-- who lost
his election-- in the cabinet while excluding Boutros Harb,
who won?," he asked rhetorically. Hariri should present a
list to Sleiman, Khoja continued, and Sleiman should have to
make a decision.


3. (C) When asked if he or others in the SAG were advising
Hariri as to which option to pursue, he wryly observed, "we
don't like to interfere in Lebanon's internal affairs."
Referring to a telephone conversation he had with Hariri that
morning, in the wake of yesterday's meeting of majority MPs
(ref A),Khoja said Hariri "was not depressed," that he was
trying to shore up his position with his allies, but that "he
cannot go farther" to accommodate Aoun's demands. If he did,
he would face problems with his March 14 supporters. He was
constitutionally within his rights to refuse to offer a
position to Bassil, and needed to stand his ground. Asked
whether Hariri was considering Murr's proposal (Beirut 974),
Khoja responded "I don't know what Saad will do, we'll see.
If Saad can do it, I hope the President can accept it."
Regarding Jumblatt, Khoja expressed confidence he was still
supporting Hariri.


WE'RE NOT TALKING TO THE SYRIANS ABOUT LEBANON
-------------- -


4. (C) Khoja flatly dismissed the idea that the SAG was
arranging, or even considering, a meeting of King Abdullah,
President Sleiman, and Bashar Asad, along with Saad Hariri,
on the margins of the September 23 KAUST University
inauguration. "We did not think about that. KAUST is a
special occasion, it will have nothing to do with politics."
He also seemed genuinely non-plussed when asked to discuss
his August 20 trip to Damascus (reported Damascus 622),
claiming he had not traveled to Syria except "a long time
ago." When Charge probed a bit more, noting he was certain
he had seen some reference to an August visit, Khoja
emphatically denied again that he had made such a visit.
"Look," he said, "let me tell you something in confidence.
We are not talking to the Syrians about Lebanon. The King
has forbidden such discussions because the Syrians are trying
to extract more from us. They want us to come to them and
ask that they tell their allies in Lebanon to stand down and
let the cabinet formation process move ahead." "We are not
going to play this game," he continued, because it would make
us the demandeur and strengthen Syria's role in the region as
the real power-broker.



IMPROVED SAUDI-SYRIAN TIES LINKED
--------------
TO SYRIAN BEHAVIOR IN LEBANON
--------------


5. (C) Charge asked what the SAG's message to Syria was,
noting that Khoja in the past had said the SAG had made clear
there could not be progress in Saudi-Syrian relations without
good behavior vis-a-vis Lebanon. The Saudi message to the
Syrians had not changed, he said. The Syrians understood
that improvements in their relationship with Saudi Arabia
remained contingent upon good behavior in Lebanon. Despite
this, they were using Aoun-- and Aoun was very obliging-- in
order to block Lebanese government formation and put pressure
on the Saudis. But the Saudis would not play their game,
Khoja responded.


U.S.-SYRIAN ENGAGEMENT ALSO LINKED
--------------
TO SYRIAN BEHAVIOR, IN IRAQ AND LEBANON
--------------


6. (C) Charge said we were also now signaling to the Syrians
that our ability to engage with them would depend on their
behavior toward Lebanon as well as Iraq. Earlier, our focus
had been on improved Syria behavior vis-a-vis Iraq,
especially concerning the issue of foreign fighters entering
Iraq through Syria. We had given less emphasis to the issue
of Lebanon with them, because things had seemed to be moving
in a positive direction, with their acceptance of the
Lebanese election outcome, diplomatic recognition, exchange
of ambassadors, etc. But now, it was clear they were using
Lebanese allies like Aoun to prevent cabinet formation, and
the delay was becoming an increasingly serious matter of
concern. Summing up the U.S. approach, Charge said our
policy was to support Lebanon's independence and sovereignty,
to support Saad Hariri's efforts to complete the cabinet
formation process as soon as possible, but also to ensure it
was achieved in a way that did not undermine Saad's ability
to govern once in office.


U.S. SHOULD TALK TO SLEIMAN
--------------


7. (C) Asked what actions might help break the deadlock
Khoja suggested the U.S. should convey a message to Sleiman,
urging him to accept Hariri's proposal and "not let Saad
down." He said Hariri was reluctant to present a proposal
because he was not confident Sleiman- or Syria- would accept
it. The message could be conveyed by any means, he said, but
it needed to be conveyed soon. He believed that Sleiman's
acceptance of Hariri's proposal would be good for Hariri, and
by extension good for Lebanon, as it would show that he was
able to govern independently. Charge said he would pass this
suggestion on to Washington.



ERDMAN