Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09RIYADH1080
2009-08-19 15:38:00
SECRET
Embassy Riyadh
Cable title:  

AFGHANISTAN - MANAGING THE NEIGHBORS: SAUDI ARABIA

Tags:  PREL PGOV SA AF 
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VZCZCXRO6368
PP RUEHSL
DE RUEHRH #1080 2311538
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 191538Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1417
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 4791
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0295
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE
S E C R E T RIYADH 001080 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV SA AF
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN - MANAGING THE NEIGHBORS: SAUDI ARABIA

REF: A. SECSTATE 85136

B. RIYADH 01070

Classified By: CDA Ambassador Richard Erdman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
)

S E C R E T RIYADH 001080

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV SA AF
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN - MANAGING THE NEIGHBORS: SAUDI ARABIA

REF: A. SECSTATE 85136

B. RIYADH 01070

Classified By: CDA Ambassador Richard Erdman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
)


1. (S) The following responses are keyed to questions in ref
A and based in part on the August 16 meeting between Charge
and Ambassador Khalid Al-Jindan (ref B).

a) Analysis of Saudi Arabia's likely strategic interests in
Afghanistan's election: On multiple occasions, Saudi
officials have told us that a stable Afghanistan is in their
vital interest, and that there is no purely military solution
to Afghanistan's problems. There must be a political
component as well. In this regard, they believe we should
look for opportunities to weaken the Taliban/Al-Qaeda
alliance and peel away "moderate Taliban" who may be uneasy
about Al-Qaeda's agenda and more nationalist in their
orientation. They are supportive of the elections as a means
to this end. While they have no stated preference for a
particular candidate, they believe success in Afghanistan is
impossible without Pashtun buy-in and thus look favorably
upon candidates who have the potential, in their view, to
"deliver" this ethnic group. The Saudis would prefer to see
a stable, nationally-oriented government in Afghanistan,
capable of resisting pressure from Iran and Al-Qaeda and
willing to reach out to moderate Taliban elements.

b) Assessment of whether Saudi Arabia would be likely to
urge restraint and play a positive role, publicly or
privately: The Saudis are usually reluctant to comment
publicly on the internal situation of other countries.
However, given their long-standing interest and ties to
Afghanistan, we would not exclude their using their private
channels to assist behind the scenes in encouraging calm and
unity and in driving a wedge between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

c) Advice on how we could best encourage Saudi Arabia to
play such a role: The Saudis have told us that they share
U.S. assessments and goals with respect to Afghanistan, and
that they have been, and will remain, engaged in discussions
with Afghan leaders as part of their overall Afghanistan
strategy to promote stability and prevent further
radicalization in the country. As such, they would likely
act on their own in the event serious election-related
violence appeared ready to destabilize the country. By
continually communicating our interest and concerns to the
Saudis in the lead-up to and during the elections, and
emphasizing the critical role the Saudis have to play, they
might be persuaded to exert this private pressure even before
the situation visibly deteriorated.
ERDMAN

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