COUNTER-INSURGENCY DOCTRINE COMES TO RIO'S FAVELAS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RIO DE JANEIRO 000329

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2019
TAGS: PINS SOCI SNAR ECON PBTS PREL BR
SUBJECT: COUNTER-INSURGENCY DOCTRINE COMES TO RIO'S FAVELAS

Classified By: Principal Officer Dennis W. Hearne. Reasons (1.4 b,d)

SUMMARY


1. (SBU) Beginning in December 2008, Rio de Janeiro Governor
Sergio Cabral, with support from Rio Mayor Eduardo Paes,
launched a comprehensive program to "pacify" Rio de Janeiro's
violent favelas (i.e., vast shantytowns that are spread
around the city's core) by establishing and maintaining a
sustained police and state presence. The key component of
the Favela Pacification Program is the Pacification Police
(UPP),whose ranks number approximately 500 officers. From a
security perspective, the Favela Pacification Program has
thus far been successful in the four Rio favelas under UPP
control, but the subsequent delivery of basic services and
social assistance programs has reportedly been uneven. In
addition to the obvious security factors involved with the
pacification program, there are also significant economic
interests at stake, with some analysts estimating Rio de
Janeiro's economy would grow by 38 billion Brazilian Reals
(21 billion USD) should favelas be reincorporated into
mainstream society and markets. The Favela Pacification
Program shares some characteristics with U.S.
counter-insurgency doctrine and strategy in Afghanistan and
Iraq. The program's success will ultimately depend not only
on effective and sustained coordination between the police
and state/municipal governments, but also favela residents'
perception of the legitimacy of the state. End Summary.

FAVELA PACIFICATION PROGRAM


2. (U) Beginning in December 2008, Rio de Janeiro Governor
Sergio Cabral, with support from Rio Mayor Eduardo Paes,
launched a comprehensive program to "pacify" Rio de Janeiro's
violent favelas by establishing and maintaining a sustained
police and state presence. To date, police units have
entered four such favelas - City of God, Jardim do Batan,
Santa Marta, and Chapeu Mangueira/Babylonia - and continue to
maintain a presence within them. While Rio's favelas have
often been a target of police operations with a goal of
disrupting narco-trafficking activities, the Favela
Pacification Program marks the first time that state,
municipal, or federal authorities are attempting a "clear and
hold" approach, the success of which is predicated upon
pushing criminal elements out of the community, establishing
a permanent police and government presence, then providing
basic services and civic privileges to favela residents.
This approach closely resembles U.S. counter-insurgency
doctrine in Afghanistan and Iraq, and highlights the extent
to which favelas have been outside state authority. Favelas,
which first emerged in the late 19th century and grew
extensively in Rio de Janeiro over the past three decades,
are urban communities of varying size whose residents
generally do not hold title to their homes. Due to the
inherently marginalized nature of favelas, various criminal
elements have historically flourished within them, using the
communities as platforms from which to conduct drug
trafficking activities, pirate services for its residents,
and launch other criminal activities throughout the city.
There are approximately 1,000 favelas in Rio de Janeiro, with
an estimated 1 million inhabitants.

RIO SECURITY CHIEF: "WE ARE AT WAR"


3. (C) In a September 22 meeting with Principal Officer,
State Secretary for Public Security Jose Beltrame explained
the Favela Pacification Program and its importance to Rio de
Janeiro's overall security. "You cannot imagine what
government neglect of the favelas have done to this city. It
is a failure of public service," he said. Stating the Rio
government was now "at war," Beltrame explained, "We have a
few hundred criminals causing terror in a few million."
Stating the state needed to act, he emphasized the goal of
the program is not to eliminate all violence and drug
trafficking in the favelas, but rather to establish a state
presence that can allow for the delivery of basic services,
such as trash collection, and social programs, such as health
attention and education. Under the program, state police
special operations units (BOPE) enter a favela by force.
Once criminal elements that control a favela are purged,
state-administered pacification police units (UPP) then
replace traditional police forces, in order to maintain
order, foster long-term ties between the state and the
community, and assist with the delivery of basic services to
the favela.


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PACIFICATION POLICE CHIEF: "WE DO NOT NEED A RAMBO"


4. (C) The key component of the Favela Pacification Program
is the Pacification Police (UPP). There are currently 500
pacification police (UPP) officers in the four "pacified"
favelas, with the number of officers assigned to each favela
depending on levels of existing criminal activity. For
example, only 55 UPP officers are required to maintain order
in the favela of Jardim do Batan which has approximately
40,000 residents, while 160 UPP officers are required in the
favela Santa Marta, which has only 3,000 residents. UPP
commander Colonel Jose Carvalho - a former United Nations
Peacekeeping Commander - told us on August 25 that only new
police academy recruits are selected into the UPP program.
"We need fresh, strong minds, not a Rambo," Carvalho stated.
"The older generation of cops is more oriented to kicking
down doors and shooting people." Following acceptance into
the UPP, officers receive additional training in human rights
and community outreach, in addition to community profile
briefings specific to the officer's assigned favela.
Carvalho said active UPP officers are also subject to
internal affairs undercover operations, to ensure UPP
officers are not abusing their power within the favelas.

PROGRESS, BUT MANY CHALLENGES


5. (C) From a security perspective, the Favela Pacification
Program has thus far been successful in the four Rio favelas
under UPP control, but the subsequent delivery of basic
services and social programs appears to be uneven. BOPE
Lieutenant Wolney Francisco de Paula told us on August 19
that BOPE units entering the favelas encountered no
resistance from the narco-trafficking gangs that had de facto
control of the communities, while UPP Colonel Carvalho
claimed there have been no UPP-related fatalities in the
favelas under pacification. That said, the delivery of basic
services and implementation of social programs are reported
to be uneven among the four favelas. Carvalho explained, for
example, that his officers had to quell a near riot in the
Chapeu Mangueira/Babylonia favela, after its residents
protested that they were not receiving equal benefits as
other "pacified" favelas. Carvalho blamed the Rio de Janeiro
state government for failing to provide essential services,
stating "There are no services there, and the state is not
organized enough to provide them." Favela representatives,
while generally supporting the pacification program,
universally cite the need for more social programs and basic
services. During a September 18 symposium on favela
development sponsored by the BNDES - the Brazilian
development bank - Rio favela resident association
representatives recognized efforts by the state, municipal,
and federal governments to address the plight of the favelas,
but voiced concerns over how money was being spent. For
example, a community leader from pacified favela Santa Marta,
Jose Mario dos Santos, questioned why state money was being
used to construct a wall around that community. Rosino de
Castro Diniz, president of the Federation of Favela
Associations in Rio de Janeiro, told us the pacification
program could not succeed without a concerted effort to
provide jobs and social services to residents.


6. (C) Another significant factor for the project's success
will be how receptive favela residents are to assuming civic
responsibilities, such as paying for legitimate services and
taxes. BOPE Lieutenant Francisco de Paula, who is also a
resident of the Jardim de Batan favela, told us many in his
community were resistant to the idea of having to switch from
paying pirated sources of services, such as electricity and
water, to higher-priced legitimate providers. Carvalho also
said his officers encountered wide-spread confusion among
residents that, until now, have been paying for electricity
and cable TV service through pirated sources. "It is very
difficult for them to all of a sudden have to pay for
services they previously received for less or even free," he
said. Carvalho also lamented the overall mentality of favela
residents who lived for decades under the sway of
narco-trafficking groups. "This generation is lost," he
said. "We need to focus on children through providing sports
and education programs."


7. (SBU) Security experts see a possible link between the
pacification program and an increase in crime in Rio de
Janeiro's more affluent neighborhoods, such as Ipanema,
Leblon, and Copacabana, collectively known as "Zona Sul."
Rio de Janeiro's Public Security Institute (ISP) reported a
50 percent increase in residential theft and a 52 percent in

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robberies of businesses in Zona Sul from December 2008 to
July 2009, compared with the same period the year prior.
Julita Lemgruber, director for the Center for Security and
Civics (CESEC) and a former police ombudsman, said this
increase was due to drug traffickers - forced out of the drug
trade in UPP-occupied favelas - now branching out into other
criminal activities outside of the favelas. Beltrame had a
similar theory, explaining the structure of narco-trafficking
networks played a role in the increase. "When we hit these
guys at the top, they lose jobs at the bottom. This results
in more street crime."


8. (C) Wilson Carlos Carvalho, a senior adviser to Governor
Cabral on security matters, told us on August 28 that the
federal government needed to do more to assist with the
favela problem and the crime increasing in other parts of the
city, highlighting the large flow of arms and drugs into Rio
de Janeiro. "We do not have any arms factories or coca
fields in Rio de Janeiro. More needs to be done to control
the borders," he said (Note: Beltrame also expressed concern
over the proliferation of military-grade weapons in Rio de
Janeiro, and said most illegal arms were of American origin
and issued to foreign armies, such as Colombia, Bolivia, and
Paraguay. End Note).

EXPANDING THE PACIFICATION


9. (C) State Security Secretary Beltrame offered to share the
strategic plan for the favela program with Consulate officers
and to take the PO into a "pacified" favela in the near
future. Beltrame stated of the 50 favelas he envisions
pacified by the end of 2010, "Complexo de Alemao" was the
principal target. The Complexo de Alemao is an enormous
favela with over 200,000 residents and heavily armed criminal
groups entrenched. The scope of an operation into Complexo
de Alemao would be vast and the scale of violence potentially
"traumatic," Beltrame said. Beltrame seemed determined,
however, noting the operation would likely take place in
early 2010. "This favela is totally outside of state
authority, and it is the epicenter of the fight," he stated.
Although Wilson Carlos Carvalho, the Cabral adviser, told us
that the Intelligence Branch of the State Secretariat for
Public Security had mapped more than 90 favelas in the city
for eventual UPP operations, Beltrame said only 10-12
favelas, including Complexo de Alemao, would be critical to
the program. "We do not need to take over 100 favelas. The
real violence is concentrated in only about a dozen," he
explained. In order to meet the manpower requirements for
extending the pacification program, Wilson Carlos Carvalho
said the Military Police would recruit 7,000 new police
officers, 3,500 of whom would join the UPP ranks by next
year. Beltrame's estimate of police recruitment was more
expansive, with a projection of 30,000 new police officers on
Rio's streets by 2016.

ECONOMICS OF FAVELA PACIFICATION


10. (SBU) In addition to the security factors involved with
the pacification program, there are also significant economic
interests at stake. Some economists have forecast an
increase of 90 million Brazilian Reals (45 million USD) in
new property and service taxes that would go towards the Rio
municipal government, should all favelas come under the
authority of Rio state. The president of Rio electricity
provider "Light" estimated the economy of Rio de Janeiro
could grow by around 38 billion Brazilian Reals (21 billion
USD) through increased commerce and new jobs. According to
Andre Urani, an economist with the Institute of Labor and
Social Research (IETS),Light loses at least 200 million USD
per year due to pirated electricity in the favelas (Note:
Light donated 600 low energy consumption refrigerators to
residents in Santa Marta favela, in order to encourage their
integration as utility customers. End Note). Emphasizing
the potential market in favelas, Urani stated, "Imagine the
revenue increase if Light could successfully turn the one
million illegal users of its services into customers."
According to data provided by the Rio State Secretariat for
Security, operations to fully pacify and reintegrate favelas
would cost the state between 90 million to 340 million
Brazilian Reals (48 million to 183 million USD).

COMMENT


11. (SBU) The Favela Pacification Program shares some
characteristics with U.S. counter-insurgency strategy in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Like counter-insurgency, the

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population is the true center of gravity, and the program's
success will ultimately depend not only on effective and
sustained coordination between the police and state/municipal
governments, but on favela residents' perception of the
legitimacy of state. One of the principal challenges in this
project is to convince favela populations that the benefits
of submitting to state authority (security, legitimate land
ownership, access to education) outweigh the costs (taxes,
utility fees, civil obedience). As with American
counter-insurgency doctrine, we should not expect results
overnight. If the program is limited to Governor Cabral's
2010 reelection campaign or constitutes little more than an
initiative crafted to bolster Rio de Janeiro's 2016 bid for
the Olympics, as some critics have charged, it offers little
chance of success. If, however, the program wins over
"hearts and minds" in the favelas, and continues to enjoy
genuine support from the governor and the mayor, bolstered by
private enterprise lured by the prospects of reintegrating
some one million favela residents into mainstream markets,
this program could remake the social and economic fabric of
Rio de Janeiro. Post will work closely with the relevant
state authorities to facilitate exchanges, seminars, and
institutional partnerships towards this end. End Comment.











HEARNE