BURMA: A HEART-TO-HEART WITH THE WA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000704 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, DRL, INL AND IO PACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SNAR PINR BM SUBJECT: BURMA: A HEART-TO-HEART WITH THE WA REF: A. RANGOON 573 AND PREVIOUS ¶B. RANGOON 447 RANGOON 00000704 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: P/E Chief Jennifer Harhigh for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) During a two-hour meeting on October 21, a representative of the United Wa State Army (UWSA) told us that the Wa did not participate in the August conflict between the Burma Army and the Kokang. The UWSA is shoring up its defenses but does not expect imminent conflict with the Burma Army. The Wa remain firmly opposed to participation in the Government's planned Border Guard Force (BGF) and seek to preserve autonomy while remaining part of Burma. The Wa political wing, the United Wa State Party (UWSP),reeling from the recent death of its leader, has not yet decided a position on the 2010 elections. ¶2. (C) For the Wa, retention of the UWSA is non-negotiable and leaders are prepared to abandon all legitimate economic interests throughout the country -- estimated by the Wa as over USD 2 billion -- if necessary to preserve their right to arms. Our contact said the UWSA currently includes approximately 30,000 active duty troops and an additional 10,000 youth and "auxiliary" members. They reportedly are well-armed, including with U.S.-manufactured grenade launchers and shoulder-mounted surface-to-air missiles and launchers provided by Russia. End summary. Kokang Conflict -------------- ¶3. (C) UWSA Deputy Liaison Officer Soe Than (aka Aik Sao Than) on October 21 said that there were many "hidden" aspects of the recent conflict between the Burma Army and the Kokang (Ref A). Ethnic ceasefire groups, including both the Wa and the Kokang ("comrades" since the days of the Burma Communist Party),had informally consulted to ascertain responses to the GOB BGF proposal and "everyone" had decided to refuse it. The SPDC, for its part, was actively looking to find faults with the ethnic groups and had found a victim in the Kokang region. The "factory" targeted by Burmese authorities was not an official Kokang business and was merely an arms repair shop, Soe Than claimed. (Note: During a GOB-organized diplomatic tour of the facility in September, Embassy officers observed hundreds of new gun parts in stock, as well as manufacturing equipment. End note.) When Kokang leader Peng Jiasheng did not accept the raid on the facility and when a five-hour negotiation broke down, Peng fled. "Red Alert" -------------- ¶4. (C) Soe Than said the Wa did not become involved in the armed conflict, but did go on "red alert," which remains in effect. SPDC troops did not enter the Wa-controlled area. Wa leaders summoned all commanders and many Wa business people back to Pangsan, where they remain. According to Soe Than, the UWSA is not worried about an impending conflict with the Burma Army but maintains a ready position should conflict start. On Drugs: "Everyone Works to Support His Family" -------------- --- ¶5. (C) Soe Than labeled the Burmese authorities' drug seizures in August and September as an attempt by the SPDC to cut off the main source of Wa funds and to tar reputations. (Note: If, as Soe Than claims, the Burmese are attempting to cut off the main source of Wa funds, this is a good thing. As far as tarring reputations, - the Wa already are known narcotics traffickers. End note.) In a somewhat weak defense, Soe Than added that the official Wa organization and leaders are not involved in the drug trade, although it is possible "associates" and family members, in pursuit of personal greed, do engage in such activities. "Everyone RANGOON 00000704 002.2 OF 003 works to support his family," he concluded. (DEA notes that senior leadership of the UWSA are heavily and directly engaged in narcotics trafficking. End note.) Opposition to Border Guard Force -------------- ¶6. (C) Soe Than said the UWSA was shocked by Military Security Affairs (MSA) Chief Lieutenant General Ye Myint's proposal that the Wa agree to join a BGF under the control of the Burma Army by October 18 (Ref A). (Note: This was not a surprise. We believe ceasefire groups have been aware of this GOB demand for some time, though the deadline may have been news.) UWSA Central Executive Committee members consulted widely with troops and family members in a General Assembly and all agreed the proposal is unacceptable. Ye Myint traveled to Pangsan in September to meet with UWSA Commander Pao Yu Hsiang, who avoided him for two days. Eventually, UWSA Liaison Officer (and UWSP Office Chief) Aung Myint persuaded Pao Yu Hsiang to agree to meet Ye Myint. They met for thirty minutes and reached no solution. The Good Old Khin Nyunt Days -------------- ¶7. (C) When asked to compare Ye Myint with former Prime Minister and MI Chief Khin Nyunt, Soe Than said UWSA Commander Pao Yu Hsiang respected Khin Nyunt, who was warm and friendly, had organizational skills, and was empowered to make his own decisions. He kept promises. In contrast, it appears Ye Myint must submit all matters to his superiors for approval. Ultimate Goals -------------- ¶8. (C) Soe Than said that Burma's ethnic Wa population, which he estimates is one million, strives to maintain autonomy and authority. They have no intention to secede from Burma. They like some aspects of the constitution, such as the preservation of a "self-administered area." They most want a federal system in which they can retain control over their economy and local affairs, including education, etc., while accepting a central government based in Nay Pyi Taw. However, the Wa cannot, and will not ever sacrifice their army. UWSP: No Decision on Elections -------------- ¶9. (C) The United Wa State Party (UWSP) has not taken a position on the elections. The party did participate in Burma's National Convention process; but it is still reeling from the September 8 death of party leader Chao Nyi Lai (aka Kyaut Nyi Lai) and has yet to discuss how it will approach the elections. A Vast Business Network -------------- ¶10. (C) Soe Than observed that the growing Wa economic clout and military strength deeply concern the SPDC. He detailed a vast network of legitimate businesses in Burma under Wa control, including at least twenty official companies in Rangoon. (Note: The stress on "legitimate" investment suggests he is well aware of Wa illegal businesses/economic interests as well. End note.) Soe Than claimed the UWSA has over USD 2 billion invested in transportation (including Yangon Airways),hotels (including Yangon City Hotel),restaurants, gems, mining, teak, road/building construction, property development, manufacturing (including of the ubiquitous plastic rice bags),wood processing (including a facility at the Mingaladon Industrial Estate near Rangoon's airport),massage parlors, and music recording studios (including "NASA" Studio--NFI). According to Soe Than, Hong Pang Company, based in Tachilek, is the parent company for many of the Wa investments. Centers of Wa economic activity include RANGOON 00000704 003.2 OF 003 Rangoon, Mandalay, Mogok, and Mine Hsu, and there is a communications hub in Lashio, Shan State. Current Strength of the Wa Army -------------- ¶11. (C) Turning to military might, Soe Than described how the UWSA, officially prohibited from increasing its numbers under the ceasefire agreement, has found clever workarounds, including by dispatching numerous "liaison" and business officers throughout Burma and filling their slots with new recruits. He said current active-duty troops number 30,000, with an additional 10,000 youth and auxiliary forces, many of whom are enrolled in training or engaged in agriculture. UWSA Commander Pao Yu Hsiang brags that the UWSA can defeat 10 times as many Burma army soldiers. ¶12. (C) Soe Than denied the UWSA is manufacturing armaments. (Note: DEA has information that the UWSA produces arms and munitions in Burma, primarily in Special Region 2. End note.) Soe Than claims it is easy to purchase arms from Thailand, China (including Hong Kong),and Singapore. He boasted the UWSA uses U.S.-made grenade launchers. (Note: Any U.S. weapons were likely seized during the UWSA's conflict with the Mong Tai Army circa 1996. Some U.S.-manufactured weapons might also have originated from Thailand. End note.) Soe Than suggested the only threat the UWSA is not prepared to face is major airstrikes by the Burma Army, although he claimed the UWSA purchased shoulder-mounted surface-to-air missiles and launchers from Russia in 2005 or 2006. (DEA notes the UWSA receives weapons and military training and advice from China.) Soe Than told us he personally trained in China. End note.) Reactions to U.S. Policy Review -------------- ¶13. (C) Soe Than said his superiors are extremely interested in the new USG Burma policy. He has provided reports (NFI) about the U.S. policy review conclusions to the UWSA commanders, who he said are cautiously optimistic about the outcomes. Nonetheless, Soe Than assesses the Burmese generals have been vague about what they are prepared to offer and are likely ultimately to "cheat" the U.S. He added that the Wa were grateful that the U.S. provided assistance to Burma after Cyclone Nargis and were baffled by the GOB's initial refusal to permit humanitarian assistance by the U.S. military. Comment -------------- ¶14. (C) Soe Than seemed eager to talk with us. He said he had sought prior permission from the second rung of Wa leadership (NFI),as he was worried the top leaders might not agree. His depiction of the UWSA as a formidable, organized, and well-financed organization that would present a real challenge if the Burma Army should provoke a conflict fits with other accounts. ¶15. (C) The Wa position is clear; they value the status quo -- autonomy and an army to protect Wa interests. The Wa may or may not agree to participate in 2010 elections, but it appears they have no interest in compromising on core issues affirmed at the time of ceasefire, such as their right to bear arms. ¶16. (C) The conversation highlights the complex nature of the regime's relations with domestic constituencies, including ethnic-minority ceasefire groups. The traditional democratic opposition ) Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD - is only one aspect of the picture. The plethora of ethnic groups and interests also loom large. It is always possible elections could be postponed past 2010 if the regime is not satisfied it has sufficient control over ethnic minority groups and interests. DINGER