BURMA: NLD SPOKESMAN SHARES AUNG SAN SUU KYI'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L RANGOON 000695 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP AND IO E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM BM SUBJECT: BURMA: NLD SPOKESMAN SHARES AUNG SAN SUU KYI'S VIEWS ON SANCTIONS AND ELECTIONS REF: A. RANGOON 649 ¶B. RANGOON 688 Classified By: DCM Tom Vajda for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) According to National League for Democracy (NLD) spokesman and Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) lawyer Nyan Win, ASSK is looking for ways to break the current political stalemate in Burma and is prepared to support sanctions relief if circumstances merit. She remains personally opposed to the 2008 constitution and the 2010 elections; but if the NLD chooses to contest the vote she will endorse the decision. ASSK is eager for dialogue with the regime -- preferably directly with the "decision-maker" -- Than Shwe -- before the elections, and stands ready to discuss sanctions, elections, and all other political issues without precondition. Nyan Win expects to meet ASSK October 16 to discuss her Supreme Court appeal, and promised to pass on a message from us privately concerning her requests for more information on sanctions. End summary. Passing a Message on Sanctions -------------- ¶2. (C) The Charge spoke with Nyan Win and with ASSK's personal physician Dr. Douglas the evening of October 14, flagging, per ref A, USG interest in ASSK and NLD perspectives on sanctions trade-offs and noting USG strong willingness to keep a conversation going. Nyan Win noted that he expects to meet with ASSK again on October 16 and said he would convey the USG's message. ¶3. (C) The DCM met with Nyan Win October 15 to convey more details in a private setting. The DCM noted that the U.S., UK, and Australia are collecting, at ASSK's request, a variety of reports on the economic impacts of Burma sanctions. The three governments are also considering ASSK's request for their calculations of GOB steps toward democracy that would merit an easing of sanctions. The DCM noted that, in the case of the United States, while the Executive Branch has authority to remove or adjust some Burma sanctions, others require Congressional action. There are also tactical concerns about identifying a menu of sanctions relief at the initial stage in our dialogue with the GOB. Nyan Win acknowledged these points and said he would share them with ASSK. ¶4. (C) DCM asked Nyan Win to reiterate to ASSK the U.S., UK, and Australian interest in learning her views and those of the NLD concerning what would be appropriate GOB milestones meriting an adjustment of sanctions. We recognize her reluctance to offer specifics without consulting her party; but even early thoughts would help inform each government's deliberations. DCM added that in light of the varied opinions on the Hill, clarity on ASSK's and the NLD's position would surely factor into Congressional views on sanctions adjustments if we get to that point. Nyan Win will pass this message to ASSK as well. ¶5. (C) Nyan Win told the DCM that he is able to discuss political issues with ASSK in her home without fear of government eavesdropping. The two normally move to a separate room to talk politics after she meets with her legal team. Nyan Win said government officials are unable to plant listening devices because they do not come onto her compound or into her house. During her detention at Insein Prison for her trial, two friends stayed at ASSK's residence and reported that no GOB representatives entered the house. (Note: we are not so sanguine about the GOB's listening capacities.) ASSK Prepared to Compromise on Sanctions, Elections -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Nyan Win reported that ASSK is genuinely willing to compromise and support the lifting of some sanctions through unconditional dialogue and negotiations with the regime. She is ready to engage with the GOB on other political issues as well, without preconditions. Her goal, according to Nyan Win, is to break the current political stalemate. ¶7. (C) Nyan Win said ASSK remains opposed to the regime's 2008 constitution and the elections scheduled to take place in 2010 under its auspices. However, ASSK has told him that if the NLD chooses collectively to contest the elections "for the good of the people," she will support that decision. She is eager for dialogue with the regime in advance of those elections, and would prefer to meet directly with Than Shwe, "the decision-maker." Although she sees many flaws in the constitution, revising the amendment provision is her primary concern. (Note: The 2008 constitution is extremely difficult to amend. More than 75 percent of members of parliament must vote in favor; any amendment that concerns government structure must also be approved by popular referendum. The constitution guarantees the military 25 percent of seats in parliament, providing a veto on amendments if the military group is united. End note.) Nyan Win said ASSK is committed to press for political change. If the regime disbands the NLD for rejecting the electoral process, ASSK has said she will look for other avenues to remain active in politics, including by forming another party. ¶8. (C) Nyan Win reported that he has shared the details of ASSK's election views only with Central Executive Committee (CEC) member Win Tin, whom ASSK "trusts very much." With other CEC members, including Chairman Aung Shwe, Nyan Win has characterized ASSK's views only in general terms. (Note: Win Tin appears to be one of the most hard-line CEC members on the issue of whether the NLD should participate in 2010 elections under the 2008 constitution.) Importance of Internal Dialogue -------------- ¶9. (C) DCM concluded the meeting by stressing that the U.S. will use its engagement with the regime to facilitate dialogue within Burma and has no intention to cut a deal with the SPDC that would undermine the NLD, other democratic groups, and ethnic minorities. Nyan Win welcomed the assurance, noting that ASSK has often stressed the primacy of internal dialogue. DCM said, ideally, processes would move in tandem, and he confirmed Embassy Rangoon intends to continue consultations with the NLD. Nyan Win said he would relay our messages to ASSK at their next meeting and provide us her responses. ¶10. (C) Post coordinated in advance with the UK and Australian chiefs of mission on the messages to pass to ASSK through Nyan Win. We shared the substance of the Nyan Win meeting with them afterwards. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Nyan Win presented a clear rendering of ASSK's views on the constitution and the 2010 elections. We note, though, that the NLD leadership appears divided between those favoring a more pragmatic view (Khin Maung Swe and others) and those adamantly opposed to participation (Win Tin and others). We have yet to determine where Nyan Win's personal sympathies lie. He appears to have ASSK's trust; but until ASSK can share her views directly with us, we will keep in mind that filters can distort. ¶12. (C) We are taking at face value ASSK's message to the regime that she is prepared to cooperate in finding a way forward that can bring removal of economic sanctions. We recall her comments in August to Senator Webb that she has dreams but also realizes the need for political pragmatism. Still, a number of Rangoon observers question her sincerity, seeing her message as a tactical attempt to stay relevant, to remain a key player in the discussion. Those skeptics see ASSK as tough, uncompromising, and, in the end, very unlikely to seek actual compromises with the regime on core political issues. DINGER