Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09RANGOON480
2009-07-31 07:14:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

BURMA: GOB REJECTS KACHIN GROUP BORDER GUARD FORCE

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM BM 
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P 310714Z JUL 09
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000480 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP AND IO; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM BM
SUBJECT: BURMA: GOB REJECTS KACHIN GROUP BORDER GUARD FORCE
COUNTERPROPOSAL

REF: A. 447

B. 478

Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Larry Dinger for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000480

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP AND IO; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM BM
SUBJECT: BURMA: GOB REJECTS KACHIN GROUP BORDER GUARD FORCE
COUNTERPROPOSAL

REF: A. 447

B. 478

Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Larry Dinger for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Burmese regime officials have rejected the Kachin
Independence Organization (KIO) "Independence Guard Force"
counterproposal to the GOB's "Border Guard Force" (BGF)
proposal and seem intent to push ahead with the original BGF.
The regime is anxious to complete negotiations with armed
ceasefire groups to transition to a BGF by October and is
hoping for the "final transformation" to be complete before
the elections. The KIO intends to meet again in early August
to discuss another counterproposal with Kachin elders,
religious figures in the community, and GOB officials. End
Summary.

Back to the Drawing Board?
--------------


2. (C) The GOB on July 9 rejected the KIO counterproposal
for a "Kachin Independence Guard Force" in lieu of a BGF
(Refs A and B). In a July 25 meeting with Poloff, Kachin
Peace negotiators Dr. Saboi Jum and his son, Zau Ma, said the
regime's rebuff has left the KIO scrambling to figure out its
next step. According to Saboi Jum, the KIO is trying to
arrange a meeting for August 9 with top Kachin community
leaders and GOB officials to get a better sense of the
make-up of the future BGF while reinforcing their proposal
and the original tenets of the 1994 ceasefire agreement.
(Note: A Thai Embassy official told us recently, following a
meeting between a visiting Thai Army official and head of
Military Security Affairs Lt. General Ye Myint, that Ye Myint
plans to embark on another mission to ceasefire groups
beginning o/a August 10. We do not know if this includes the
KIO. End note.)


3. (C) The KIO and its armed wing, the Kachin Independence
Army (KIA) have complained about the vague nature of the
regime's BGF proposal and hope the August meeting will shed
some light on the envisioned mission of the BGF and what the
future role of the KIA would be. According to Saboi Jum, the
KIO wants to circumvent the Northern Commander, Brigadier
General Soe Win, and speak with top junta leaders in Nay Pyi
Taw, as the Northern Command does not set policy. Saboi Jum
said the KIO has no contingency plan if its needs are not
satisfied at the August meeting. He added that beginning
June 20, the KIA has been mobilizing the 3rd and 4th brigades
to the front line, likely readying for a conflict should both
sides continue to disagree. (Note: He did not say if the
KIA brigades were in a defensive or offensive position. End
note.)

Details of Ceasefire Agreements Come to Light
--------------


4. (C) When asked about the original KIA ceasefire
agreement, Saboi Jum said that it is a written agreement with
the government. He said the Kachin ceasefire is the only
written treaty; the Mon, Wa, and other groups only have
verbal agreements with the government.

Comment
--------------


5. (C) The GOB's apparent reaction to the KIO/KIA, one of
the largest ceasefire groups, does not bode well for the
smaller groups seeking guarantees of political and military
autonomy as the 2010 election nears. The KIO/KIA is
interested in discussing transformation with an eye to
achieving it, but, aside from continuing to promote its
proposals, has little in the way of a backup plan if the GOB

RANGOON 00000480 002 OF 002


rejects its demands again. Still unclear is how much the
regime, intent to follow through on planned 2010 elections
under the "Roadmap to Democracy" and anxious to ensure buy-in
from the ceasefire groups, will be willing to compromise.
DINGER