Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09RANGOON223
2009-04-10 05:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

BURMA: REVISED TRIPARTITE CORE GROUP TO HAVE NO

Tags:  PGOV PREL EAID PINR SOCI BM 
pdf how-to read a cable
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8870
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2363
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 4374
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000223 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS; INR/EAP
BANGKOK FOR USAID
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO USAID/AME

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID PINR SOCI BM
SUBJECT: BURMA: REVISED TRIPARTITE CORE GROUP TO HAVE NO
VISA AUTHORITY

REF: RANGOON 175

RANGOON 00000223 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: P/E Chief Jennifer Harhigh for Reasons 1.4 (b and d).

Summary
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000223

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS; INR/EAP
BANGKOK FOR USAID
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO USAID/AME

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID PINR SOCI BM
SUBJECT: BURMA: REVISED TRIPARTITE CORE GROUP TO HAVE NO
VISA AUTHORITY

REF: RANGOON 175

RANGOON 00000223 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: P/E Chief Jennifer Harhigh for Reasons 1.4 (b and d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) The UN Resident Coordinator in Burma has clarified
that, under new Government of Burma (GOB) rules, the
Tripartite Core Group (TCG) has no visa-authorization powers,
not even for ASEAN or the UN. All visa requests for Cyclone
Nargis related activities must now be approved by the GOB's
Foreign Affairs Policy Committee (FAPC) in Nay Pyi Taw,
although procedures for UN and ASEAN visas differ from those
for INGOs. The new policy does not specifically address
donor visas. The FAPC has been notoriously slow to process
visas in the past; so presumably the GOB's revised policy
will inhibit donor travel. Reportedly, GOB officials have
confirmed that the intent is to limit severely the ability of
foreigners to visit the Delta in the lead-up to 2010
elections. End Summary.

All visa requests to FAPC -- a slow process
--------------


2. (C) At an April 9 meeting, UN Resident Coordinator
(UNRC) Bishow Parajuli briefed donors on continuing
discussions with Burmese government officials about the
revised visa policy for Cyclone Nargis-related travel.
Parajuli said that, under the new policy, an INGO will submit
visa requests to the line ministry with which it has an MOU.
The relevant line ministry will process all supporting
documentation and endorse the visa request prior to
consideration by the FAPC, which will make a final decision.
The FAPC meets weekly. Parajuli said a GOB April 3 letter
about the procedure for UN and ASEAN visa requests is
technically accurate (reftel). All UN and ASEAN visa
requests will be "handled" by the TCG, which will process the
supporting documentation and "endorse" the visa request to
the FAPC which will make all final decisions.

Motive: restrict pre-election access for donors
-------------- --


3. (C) Subsequent to an April 6-7 TCG meeting in which UN

and ASEAN reps urged the GOB to reinstate the TCG's visa
authorities, Parajuli met with the Minister of Social Welfare
(MSW) who explicitly linked the visa policy to the regime's
desire to limit foreigners' access to and presence in the
Delta in the run-up to 2010 elections. The Minister admitted
that the new policy is in essence a reversion to pre-Nargis
procedures. He offered assurance that INGOS that have MOUs
with his ministry would receive prompt recommendations to the
FAPC. He acknowledged, though, that service would depend
greatly on an organization's relationship with its respective
line ministry. In a separate meeting, the Foreign Minister
confirmed to Parajuli that the new policy originated "from
the top" and stemmed from various line ministries' concern
that the TCG was approving visas without their input or

RANGOON 00000223 002.8 OF 002


concurrence.

Plenty of complications
--------------


4. (C) Parajuli and other UN officials continue to hope the
GOB will have to reconsider once the FAPC realizes the volume
of requests. According to Parajuli, the TCG reviewed and
approved 3,600 visa in the last ten months, approximately 12
requests per day. Current estimates of the visa backlog
since the policy change in early March range from 100 to more
than 200. The new policy requires additional paperwork and
documentation for each visa request, in addition to the FAPC
approval. Also, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has
requested staff lists and temporary duty rosters of all
Nargis-related employees from diplomatic missions, the UN,
ASEAN and INGOs. Parajuli pledged to continue to raise
concerns about the operational implications of the new
policy, and he indicated that the UN Secretary General will
raise this issue with Prime Minister Thein Sein when they
meet at the ASEAN summit.

Comment
--------------


5. (C) While initial reports of the April 3 revised policy
appeared to be a small improvement from the major setback to
TCG visa powers of early March, the new clarifications make
clear that the problem remains and the policy is indeed
intended to inhibit the ability of foreign donors to visit
the Delta, at least until the 2010 elections. It is not at
all obvious that an avalanche of additional visa-requests to
the FAPC will cause the GOB to blink. After all, the
apparent intent is to slow visa issuance. The most obvious
lever would be for foreign donors, asked via the TCG's
PONREPP process to expand funding for post-cyclone recovery
operations, to insist that the GOB relent on TCG visa powers
before new funds flow. The worry is that, given a choice
between controlling the pre-election environment and meeting
the Delta population's pressing needs, the regime would opt
for control, leaving donors no attractive options.
DINGER