Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09RANGOON187
2009-03-26 01:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

BURMA: REACTIONS TO THE "AFTER THE STORM" REPORT

Tags:  BM EAID PGOV PREL SOCI 
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O 260147Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8808
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1860
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 5154
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2325
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 4339
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000187 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS; INR/EAP
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO USAID/AME
BANGKOK FOR USAID/RDMA, USAID/OFDA
PACOM FOR FPA;
TREASURY FOR OASIA:SCHUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2019
TAGS: BM EAID PGOV PREL SOCI
SUBJECT: BURMA: REACTIONS TO THE "AFTER THE STORM" REPORT

REF: A) BANGKOK 504 B) 08 RANGOON 371 C) 08 RANGOON
357 D) RANGOON 51 E) 08 RANGOON 365

RANGOON 00000187 001.4 OF 003


Classified By: Economic Officer Samantha A. Carl-Yoder for Reasons 1.4
(b and d).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000187

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS; INR/EAP
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO USAID/AME
BANGKOK FOR USAID/RDMA, USAID/OFDA
PACOM FOR FPA;
TREASURY FOR OASIA:SCHUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2019
TAGS: BM EAID PGOV PREL SOCI
SUBJECT: BURMA: REACTIONS TO THE "AFTER THE STORM" REPORT

REF: A) BANGKOK 504 B) 08 RANGOON 371 C) 08 RANGOON
357 D) RANGOON 51 E) 08 RANGOON 365

RANGOON 00000187 001.4 OF 003


Classified By: Economic Officer Samantha A. Carl-Yoder for Reasons 1.4
(b and d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Officials from the UN and international NGOs,
including International Development Enterprises (IDE),Save
the Children, and CARE, have criticized the findings of a
recent assessment of Cyclone Nargis assistance conducted by
Johns Hopkins and the Emergency Assistance Team (EAT) based
in Thailand. A number of Embassy contacts highlight flaws in
the report's research methodology and note that it fails to
demonstrate how coordination between the international
community and the GOB markedly improved after the first
month. Some argue that the report is politically motivated.
Researchers for the report seem not to have contacted any of
the major INGOs working in Burma after the storm and
reportedly have refused to discuss their findings with either
the UN or INGOs based here. UN Resident Coordinator Bishow
Parajuli laments that Johns Hopkins endorsed this biased
report, arguing that it undermines the school's credibility
to conduct fair and balanced research. The NGO community
plans to release a statement attempting to correct the report
and detailing the nuances of providing relief assistance in
Burma. End Summary.


2. (SBU) In March, Mae Sot-based NGO Emergency Assistance
Team (EAT) and Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public
Health released its report, "After the Storm: Voices from
the Delta," described to be an independent assessment of
post-Cyclone Nargis assistance (Ref A). The report, which is
highly critical of relief efforts, is based on 90 interviews
of alleged cyclone survivors and relief providers conducted
by the organizations on two separate occasions in June and
November 2008. The report concluded that the regime
confiscated assistance, obstructed relief delivery efforts,

discriminated against certain populations, forcibly relocated
cyclone survivors, and used forced labor in reconstruction
efforts.

NGOs and UN Speak Out
--------------


3. (C) INGOs and UN agency personnel based in Rangoon have
reacted viscerally to the report. Nearly all acknowledge
that the GOB unnecessarily complicated assistance delivery to
cyclone victims in the chaotic first month immediately after
the storm. However, our contacts point out that many of
these issues were resolved within the first few weeks of the
relief effort. Debbie Aung Din Taylor, Country Director of
IDE, commented that the report provides a simplistic snapshot
of early relief efforts, rather than a more accurate and
nuanced view of how those efforts progressed over time.
Several INGO managers emphasized that working in Burma can be
challenging, but it can be done without compromising the
integrity of assistance efforts or NGO standards. They
complained that the report fails to detail how the UN, ASEAN,
and NGOs worked with the GOB to resolve assistance-delivery
problems.


4. (C) Several of our NGO contacts criticized the report
methodology, noting that the organizations conducted most
interviews in Mae Sot rather than with those inside Burma.

RANGOON 00000187 002.4 OF 003


INGO representatives questioned whether "victims" living in
Mae Sot have a true grasp of the operations on the ground.
Most testimonials cited in the report date back to June 2008,
and provide a limited picture of how relief efforts have
evolved during the past 10 months. The EAT/Johns Hopkins
team claims to have interviewed 33 relief workers; however,
representatives from Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF),Save the
Children, CARE, and Pact -- four organizations that account
for more than 70 percent of relief efforts on the ground --
claim that none of their staff were interviewed for this
report. Additionally, UN Resident Coordinator Bishow
Parajuli and heads of several other UN agencies in Burma
informed us that the EAT/Johns Hopkins team did not contact
any UN officials for their perspectives on Cyclone Nargis
relief operations nor have researchers responded to UN
inquiries about the report findings.


5. (C) David Tegenfeldt, Country Director of Hope
International, suggested that several of the individuals
affiliated with the EAT/Johns Hopkins report lack objectivity
regarding Burma, and several NGOs in Burma have had negative
dealings with members of the Johns Hopkins research team.
Additionally, NGO contacts believe that Johns Hopkins'
previous research, focused on human rights abuses in Burma
(of which there are many),has influenced the report's
conclusions about humanitarian assistance. Because the
organizations involved have a political agenda, their
findings cannot be considered "independent," Tegenfeldt
stated. Parajuli lamented that Johns Hopkins School of
Public Health endorsed this report, stating that the
endorsement provides credibility the report does not deserve.


Responding to Specific Accusations
--------------


6. (C) The EAT/Johns Hopkins report asserts that no foreign
relief agencies or NGOs were able to access the Delta in May.
In reality, NGOs with established offices in Rangoon were
able to respond immediately to the cyclone: Medicins Sans
Frontieres (MSF)-Holland and PSI had doctors in the Irrawaddy
Delta within 48 hours of the storm. Andrew Kirkwood, Save
the Children Country Director, notes that while it took two
weeks to bring in international experts, NGOs were able to
send local staff to the Delta immediately. Chris Kaye,
Country Director of World Food Programme and member of the
Tripartite Core Group (TCG),told us that the UN began relief
flights by May 10. The USG air bridge began on May 12 (Refs
B and C). According to the UN, more than 3,400 visas have
been issued to relief providers through the TCG mechanism
since May 2008.


7. (C) According to ILO Liaison Officer Steve Marshall,
most reports of forced labor in the delta were anecdotal and
remain unconfirmed. During a recent trip to the Delta,
Marshall learned of two instances when local authorities
required villagers to assist with clearing debris from roads
and buildings. In both instances, the villagers refused to
file a compliant. Marshall and the Director General of Labor
conducted several successful awareness training programs in
the Delta, after which the Director General told the
participants (local authorities, police, and military
officials) that they "had been warned and had no excuse for
any future incidents" (Ref D).


8. (C) The report alleges substantial misappropriation of
relief supplies, claiming the GOB confiscated and resold many

RANGOON 00000187 003.4 OF 003


goods. In the aftermath of the cyclone, Embassy Rangoon and
USAID/OFDA officials met with NGO partners to monitor and
evaluate the provision of relief goods. We found no
misappropriation. Additionally, Embassy officers and staff
combed the Rangoon markets, where many relief goods were
allegedly being sold, but found no evidence that the GOB was
selling relief supplies (Ref E). We encouraged our contacts
to share with us any evidence of misappropriation and
received several reports. However, in each case, it turned
out that the allegedly misappropriated relief supplies were
in fact commercial products that our contacts had never seen
before. (Note: Our economic contacts believed this was likely
the result of Rangoon merchants obtaining products via new
land-based supply lines from Thailand and upper Burma while
the port was being repaired).

NGOs to Release Coordinated Response to the Report
-------------- --------------


9. (C) According to Andrew Kirkwood, Country Director of
Save the Children, NGO directors have met on three separate
occasions to discuss the best way to respond to the EAT/Johns
Hopkins report. The NGO community plans to release a press
statement by March 27, arguing that the report distorts the
truth and detailing how NGOs have been able to provide
assistance successfully to more than two million
beneficiaries in Rangoon and Irrawaddy Divisions since the
cyclone.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) The Burmese regime continues to abuse its people's
basic human rights. We frequently report instances of such
abuses. Certainly, the Burma Government's initial response to
Cyclone Nargis was deeply flawed. However, based on Embassy
Rangoon's own observations and discussions with contacts, the
EAT/Johns Hopkins report does not provide an accurate account
of the Cyclone Nargis response over time. After the initial
challenging, even chaotic few weeks, the situation improved
markedly. The Tripartite Core Group (TCG) process among
ASEAN, the UN, and the Government of Burma helped smooth
arrival of staff and delivery of goods. We have detailed in
a number of reports since May 2008 how the situation
improved. EAT and Johns Hopkins are certainly entitled to
their opinions on the Nargis relief efforts; however, it
appears they failed to consult UN organizations and INGOs
that have provided the bulk of post-Nargis assistance on the
ground. Had they researched more broadly and thoroughly, the
story in t
he report would surely have been significantly more nuanced.
Again, there is no disputing that difficulties occurred.
This is Burma after all. But the post-Nargis operation to a
large extent has been a success story, bringing essential
relief to huge numbers of desperately needy people.

DINGER