WESTERN SAHARA: SAHRAWI ACTIVISTS CONCERNED ABOUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000977 SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA, IO/UNP, NEA/MAG, AND DRL/NESCA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2019 TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREF PREL UN MO WI SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA: SAHRAWI ACTIVISTS CONCERNED ABOUT AMINATOU HAIDAR AND INCREASED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS REF: A. RABAT 0908 ¶B. RABAT 0915 ¶C. RABAT 0935 ¶D. RABAT 0941 ¶E. RABAT 0849 Classified By: DCM Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In the wake of King Mohammed VI's stern November 6 speech, Sahrawi pro-independence and human rights activists report a tangible uptick in police harassment and decreased tolerance for freedom of expression in Western Sahara. They have refrained from organizing demonstrations or rallies, in effect placing self-restrictions on their own freedom of assembly. Pro-independence Sahrawi civil society had greeted the appointment of Christopher Ross as the UNSG's Personal Representative with optimism. However, the mood has now changed to bitter disappointment, with the Aminatou Haidar case and the GOM's reaction to it appearing to have scuttled any chance for near- or medium-term resumption of the UN process. Civil society activists also warn that if Haidar were to die or become otherwise incapacitated, massive Sahrawi demonstrations would spontaneously erupt -- and would likely prompt a violent GOM response. Our contacts also provided an update on the seven Sahrawi activists whom the GOM arrested in October and who are now awaiting trial before a military tribunal. While the specific details of the Haidar case remain murky, we find our Sahrawi contacts' human rights concerns -- and their fears of what might happen if Haidar dies -- to be credible and worrisome. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) PolCouns and PolOff traveled to Laayoune, Western Sahara, and met with pro-independence Sahrawi activists and human rights NGOs on December 8. Vice Chairman Brahim Elansari represented the Collective of Sahrawi Human Rights Defenders (CODESA),in the absence of CODESA Chairwoman Aminatou Haidar, who remains in the Canary Islands (reftels). Djimi Elghalia, Vice-Chairwoman of the Sahrawi Association of Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations (ASVDH),hosted the meeting at her home. Also present were ASVDH Chairman Mustapha Dah, Mohamed Mayara, Dahha Rahmooni, Fadel Hairach, Bachir Lahkfanoui, and Saltana Khaya, most of whom are members of both ASVDH and CODESA. -------------- The Negative Impact of the King's Speech -------------- ;¶3. (C) Our interlocutors were unanimous in emphasizing that King Mohammed VI's November 6 speech (on the anniversary of the Green March -- Ref A) had tangibly damaged both the human rights environment in Western Sahara and the prospects for resuming UN-led negotiations. According to Elansari, Sahrawis greeted the naming of UN Personal Envoy for the Western Sahara, Christopher Ross, with optimism. However, the king's speech -- in which he rejected a referendum to allow Sahrawis to decide their own future and divided them into "patriots" or "traitors" -- obstructed any positive momentum. Elansari further interpreted the king's speech to be an acknowledgment that the GOM's much-touted autonomy plan was a failure, in that -- contrary to their repeated claims -- it did not correspond to their desires for and vision of self-determination. Other interlocutors agreed, adding that the king's November speech gave further proof that the GOM was not really interested in resolving the Sahara question through the UN process. In one way, said Mayara, the king's harsh rhetoric -- including his "racist" labeling of Sahrawis as either patriots or traitors -- was welcome, in that it demonstrated to the world the GOM's preference for the status quo -- and its willingness to resort to repression in Western Sahara to maintain it. -------------- Human Rights Implications -------------- ¶4. (C) In addition to putting a chill on efforts to resolve the Western Sahara standoff on the international level, CODESA and ASVDH members stated that the king's speech had also prompted a measurable uptick in repressive police behavior towards independence activists. In the eyes of Sahara-based security forces, the king's speech legitimized increased suppression of Sahrawi activities and emboldened local authorities to further repress freedom of speech and assembly, Dah and Elghalia said. For example, they described a recent event in which plain-clothed and uniformed police came to Elghalia's home -- the very place we were sitting -- to break up a meeting between ASVDH members and Spanish journalists, who had also sought to meet with Haidar's children. In an unrelated incident, other journalists had received approval for a meeting with CODESA from one government entity, but police prevented the meeting, saying that they now needed approval from additional local authorities. Elansari conceded that, technically, foreign journalists are required to receive approval from three different Ministry of Interior (MOI) and/or local government offices before meeting with pro-independence NGOs -- a requirement he described as an abuse in and of itself. However, prior to the king's Green March speech, police often looked the other way if journalists had obtained at least one authorization. Now, suddenly, the restrictions were being enforced to the letter, our contacts said. They added that in at least one of these cases foreign journalists were ultimately expelled from Morocco, but they did not provide further details. ¶5. (SBU) Our contacts also lamented an increased disregard for freedom of assembly. Ever since a violent GOM crackdown on a demonstration to mark International Human Rights day in 2006, Sahrawi activists had held no significant sit-ins or other such public gatherings, Elansari said. Until recently, he continued, this unofficial "self-imposed limitation" was not based on a fear of GOM reprisal, but rather the result of Sahrawis' simply having resigned themselves to fact that local authorities never granted them the necessary legal permits to hold public events. However, again in the wake of the king's speech, there had been a change. For example, Elansari and Elghalia reported, when Haidar's family and various ASVDH and CODESA members gathered at the airport to welcome her home in November, police met them at the airport and demanded that they return home under threat of force or arrest. Later, when the Spanish government attempted unsuccessfully to send Haidar back to Laayoune aboard a charter flight on December 4, at least one activist received a threatening phone call from police, again warning him not to organize any sort of gathering at the airport. -------------- Aminatou Haidar: A Worse-Case Scenario -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Turning more specifically to the case of Aminatou Haidar, Elghalia and others expressed grave concerns about her health and disputed the official version of events we have repeatedly heard from GOM sources (Refs B-D). CODESA members insisted that Haidar did not renounce her passport, and offered evidence to suggest that the authorities had decided to expel her even before her plane landed. ¶7. (C) Unlike our GOM contacts, however, the Sahrawi activists were less concerned about the technical and legal aspects of the case and far more worried about the "devastating" developments they believe would follow if Haidar's hunger strike actually resulted in her dying or becoming seriously incapacitated. In such an event, they warned, thousands of Sahrawi activists would take to the streets in spontaneous demonstrations that could involve violence. Dah and Mayara noted that there existed a great mass of Sahrawis who were not politically active and were generally apathetic regarding the question of whether the territory remained under Moroccan administration or became independent. However, many of these same people view Haidar as a human rights defender and a leader among the Sahrawi tribes, they said, and their response to her passing would be significant. They also predicted that the GOM's response to any spontaneous outbursts would be firm, rapid and even more violent. ¶8. (C) Outside of Moroccan-administered territory, Dah continued, the Sahrawi response would be equally dramatic, and her death would place significant pressure on the Polisario to respond. In a best case scenario, he warned, this would involve the Polisario rejecting the UN process for an indeterminate period of time. At the worst, it could lead to Polisario acts of war or other violence. While they hesitated to otherwise predict events, all our interlocutors all agreed that Haidar's public comments -- in which she has stated that she planned on returning to Western Sahara "with or without passport, dead or alive" -- should not be taken lightly. -------------- Update on the Seven Arrested Sahrawis -------------- ¶9. (SBU) ASVDH and CODESA representatives also provided us an update on the seven pro-independence Sahrawi activists arrested in October and charged with "intelligence cooperation with a foreign entity" (Ref E). While they did not accuse the GOM of committing gross human rights violations against the seven, ASVDH and CODESA members held that the case illustrated the GOM's newly restrictive and intolerant attitude toward pro-independence activities. They also offered some disturbing evidence to suggest that while the GOM's treatment of the seven might be in keeping with the letter of international human rights laws and standards, it was not in keeping with the spirit. For example, while the GOM has permitted all seven detainees family visits (as required by Moroccan law),our contacts said that authorities are permitting only one 15-minute visit per week -- something not easily achieved for families in Laayoune who live 1,200 kilometers from the Sale prison, where the seven are currently being held. Moreover, these visits are tightly controlled, Elghalia said, and the prisoners were never are allowed to talk privately to family members. Worse, the seven have had access to a lawyer, but only once since their arrests. In addition, Elghalia expressed particular concern for Idagja Lachgar, the only female amongst the seven arrested. Her family had reported that she was being held in solitary confinement and was not reacting well to the isolation. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (SBU) CODESA and ASVDH have a stated pro-independence agenda and -- like our GOM contacts -- a clear political bias that colors their interpretations of the Aminatou Haidar case. Nevertheless, we find their wider allegations regarding an uptick in repressive police response and the curtailment of freedom of assembly to be credible and sincere. Likewise, if the worst were to happen and Haidar were to pass away, we do not doubt the likelihood of our contacts' dire predictions regarding potential outbursts of Sahrawi violence -- and an even more violent GOM response. We will continue to urge restraint on all sides, but if the GOM does not find a way to resolve the Haidar's case peacefully and soon, our urgings could be in vain. 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