MOROCCO:WESTERN SAHARA/ALGERIA - NEW PRIORITIES,

S E C R E T RABAT 000541 SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA, NEA/MAG AND IO/UNP E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2019 TAGS: PREL PBTS UNSC WI AG MO SUBJECT: MOROCCO:WESTERN SAHARA/ALGERIA - NEW PRIORITIES, LOW EXPECTATIONS FOR ROSS AND UN INFORMALS Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a. i., Robert P. Jackson for reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: One June 23, before the visit of UNSYG Personal Envoy (PE) Christopher Ross, Morocco's top foreign policy officials told Charge and PolCouns they expected little progress on Western Sahara or better relations with Algeria, which now was their higher near-term priority. Foreign Minister Fassi Fihri said he was &upset8 with the Algerians, who were unresponsive to multiple GOM efforts at dialogue, including via Ross. He claimed the GOA was bent on deceiving Washington by appearing flexible but showed no give in reality. The GOM wants Algeria in the proposed informal sessions, but the parties have not yet agreed on any site for those meetings. Everything but sovereignty remained on the table. For the first time, we heard real interest in a possible track two effort. ¶2. (S) In a separate meeting, apparently choreographed at the highest level, external intelligence (DGED) chief and de facto national security advisor Mansouri, plowed the same ground, but later &informally8 added that Morocco expected the USG to be an effective intermediary. Like the Minister, he pleaded for past advances to be maintained, but also sought assistance in improving relations with Algeria. Neither responded to our suggestions to broaden human rights and the political space in the Western Sahara. End Summary. -------------- FM on Western Sahara -------------- ¶3. (C) Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Taieb Fassi Fihri, joined by Chief of Staff and Director General for International Organization Ambassador Nasser Bourita, told Charge and PolCouns that the GOM welcomed PE Ross, visit. One of Morocco's main goals was to ensure that Algeria, the real decision maker, participated in the informal discussions Ross wants to hold before convening a formal session. Looking forward to the informals, with their limited delegations, he hoped they would improve an atmosphere poisoned by rude Polisario behavior toward CORCAS Head Kalihenna. Morocco has the right to choose who sits on its delegations, he maintained. Morocco had made a major concession by agreeing to meet with the Polisario separately, but not if that meant Algeria's exclusion. ¶4. (C) Visibly fatigued from a long round of foreign travel, Fassi Fihri said there had been no agreement yet on a location for the informal meetings. Morocco is uncomfortable with Austria, due to the pro-Polisario statements in Vienna by new Minister of Social Affairs Karin Scheele, a longtime outspoken Polisario supporter, while the Polisario has nixed a Portuguese offer. The GOM could live with Switzerland. He underscored Moroccan flexibility within a framework of discussions on autonomy. Within that context, everything but sovereignty was on the table. Anything that would engage Algeria and &break the ice,8 would have Moroccan support. -------------- New Opening for Track 2 -------------- ¶5. (C) For the first time we recall, Fassi Fihri spoke with some interest in Ross mobilizing some help for a Track 2 approach, perhaps from Search for Common Ground, but he was skeptical about discussions of any involvement of Nobel Prize winner Maati Ahtissari. He was very concerned about USG backsliding on its support for Morocco and the autonomy plan in the April 30 Explanation of Vote on the Security Council resolution. (Comment: He had not explicitly raised this before, only querying the views of the new administration.) Fassi Fihri said the GOM wanted to see the USG reengaged in Sahara. Per guidance, Charge replied that the decision in New York to speak only of our support for Ross and the UN process, was tactical rather than strategic, and a detailed policy review was still pending. -------------- Upset at Algerian &Games8 -------------- ¶6. (C) Fassi Fihri said Morocco strongly supported PE Ross' dual but separate mandates from the Secretary General; to resolve Sahara and to work on Algerian-Moroccan rapprochement. This is Morocco's priority goal. He was upset with Algerian and Polisario exploitation of Western Sahara human rights issues, when the human rights situation was worse on their side of the border. The compromise models Algeria has talked about, such as Andorra, Monaco and Puerto Rico, have been on the GOA agenda for many years. They appear to exclude Moroccan sovereignty (not even the flag and postage stamp variant laid out by former King Hassan II). The Minister said he understood that new Algerian Ambassador in Washington Balli had been conveying an image of flexibility to USG interlocutors. He believed that in fact, this was far from the case. ¶7. (C) Fassi Fihri recalled that multiple Moroccan initiatives, direct, indirect, public and private have received no response from the GOA. The King sent a personal message to Bouteflika via Ross, during the latter's last visit, proposing a joint meeting of Foreign and Interior Ministers for both sides to discuss security issues, one area where there is already ongoing cooperation. &Radio silence8 from Algiers, where the generals remain in charge, characterized the Algerian response. Algeria remains petrified of the autonomy concept, he said. ¶8. (C) In response to CDA's query, Fassi Fihri denied suggestions that Rabat had not ratified the treaty demarcating its border with Algeria. The Treaty was signed in 1971 during the post-coup period of emergency rule so that parliamentary ratification was not possible at that time. Nevertheless, Morocco had carried out its formalities and had even exchanged instruments of Ratification with Algeria in ¶1989. What had not occurred was the creation of the joint commission specified in the agreement to demarcate the boundary. In the meantime, the frontier is observed de facto and when it needed small technical adjustments, such as when rains moved the river valley, the two sides had worked that out through Ambassador Belkheir in Rabat. (Comment: We see this as potentially one area in which the USG could be a catalyst for rapprochement by offering both sides technical assistance on demarcation as a confidence-building measure (CBM). End comment.) -------------- Mansouri,s More Complex Message -------------- ¶9. (S) We had arranged through indirect channels what we expected would be an informal discussion with Director General for Studies and Documentation (GED) Mohamed Yassine Mansouri. Before the meeting took place, however, the dynamics changed, apparently on instructions from King Mohammed VI. Instead of another royal intimate, whom we expected to participate, Mansouri was accompanied only by a DGED notetaker, belying his repeated assertions that the meeting would be informal. ¶10. (S) After discussing regional issues (septel),Mansouri turned to Western Sahara, generally repeating the Foreign Minister's talking points. After some time, however, Mansouri, reaffirming the informality of his comments, turned to U.S. policy. He praised former negotiator Van Walsum, but noted that his statement favoring autonomy weakened the negotiator's status and did not help Morocco. He added that the Kingdom's leadership now understood that the last U.S. administration also had appeared &too partial8 to Morocco. He believed, however, that the U.S. position was not so much pro-Moroccan as pro-solution. The new Administration would have different interests, including, he averred, in Algerian hydrocarbons. He counseled that the U.S. would be unwise to abandon its true friends in the pursuit of petroleum. ¶11. (S) Mansouri went on to explain that the GOM had told French President Nicolas Sarkozy that it would be better for France not to be perceived, as in the past, as completely pro-Moroccan on Western Sahara. It was better to be a good mediator. The Bush Administration,s strong support for Morocco had put some pressure on Algeria, which helped launch the Manhasset talks, but then they went nowhere. He said the GOM accepted there would be some adjustment in U.S. policies, and welcomed anything the USG could do to bring Morocco closer to Algeria. Still, he also pleaded for maintaining some past progress, underscoring flexibility on autonomy. Charge assured him that the U.S. was not abandoning Morocco but rather giving Ross room to maneuver by not highlighting the autonomy proposal which remains a central part of the unanimous Security Council resolution extending MINURSO for another year. ¶12. (S) Charge pressed Mansouri on continuing improvements in human rights in Western Sahara, including by possibly implementing the court decision that ordered the government to give legal status to ASVDH, a pro-self determination human rights NGO. Charge noted that Morocco could enhance its political position through more progress in this domain. However, neither Mansouri nor the Minister before him gave any sign of willingness to open up more in the territory. ¶13. (S) Comment: These were rather more mixed, but at the same time less nuanced messages from the Moroccans than we usually get on the hot-button Sahara issue. They subtly signaled that they were coordinated but left details unclear. The Minister's encouragement was the first we have really heard for a track-two effort, although we have been aware of SFCG's interest in facilitation. Mansouri's was the first GOM recognition of the potential evolution of U.S. policy, which the Moroccans have glumly pondered since the April rollover. They seem to have taken on board that enhanced USG neutrality might serve their now higher priority goal of rapprochement with Algeria, perhaps motivated by economic considerations. We will likely hear more after the Ross consultations. Discussion on the Middle East and other regional issues has been reported septel. End Comment. ***************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco ***************************************** Jackson