Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09RABAT517
2009-06-17 12:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rabat
Cable title:  

MOROCCO: PARTY OF AUTHENTICITY AND MODERNITY

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PINR KDEM MO 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRB #0517/01 1681248
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171248Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0284
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000517 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR KDEM MO
SUBJECT: MOROCCO: PARTY OF AUTHENTICITY AND MODERNITY
EMERGES AS FRONT RUNNER IN LOCAL ELECTIONS

REF: A. RABAT 0485

B. RABAT 0473

C. RABAT 0497

D. RABAT 0487

Classified By: CDA Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000517 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR KDEM MO SUBJECT: MOROCCO: PARTY OF AUTHENTICITY AND MODERNITY EMERGES AS FRONT RUNNER IN LOCAL ELECTIONS REF: A. RABAT 0485 ¶B. RABAT 0473 ¶C. RABAT 0497 ¶D. RABAT 0487 Classified By: CDA Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Seven million Moroccans, or 52.4 percent of eligible voters, participated in nationwide local/communal elections in Morocco on Friday, June 12, according to the Moroccan Ministry of Interior. Garnering over 20 percent of the vote, the Palace-favored Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM),in its nationwide election debut, was seen as the biggest winner with other large parties making modest gains with the notable exception of the United Socialist Forces Party (USFP),which lost ground. The election of women to over 13 percent of communal council posts was unprecedented. The voting process at the ballot box appeared professionally run and transparent although some critics question the officially reported 50 percent plus participation rate, given low numbers of voters observed at the polls. Vote buying, although invisible to our election observation teams, figured prominently in the election, according to embassy contacts and press reports. Despite its defects and a lingering skepticism about the efficacy of the election process in Morocco, the Moroccan population has largely accepted the local election results, positioning the PAM to become the emergent political force in Moroccan party politics. End Summary. -------------- Election Results -------------- ¶2. (SBU) According to official government results, slightly more than 7 million Moroccans, or 52.4 percent of eligible voters, participated in nationwide local/communal elections in Morocco on Friday, June 12th. The rate of participation was slightly down compared to the last communal elections in 2003 (54 percent),but was considerably higher than the 37 percent turnout in the September 2007 parliamentary elections, especially in light of expectations that the participation rate might be much lower. Still, an 11 percent vote spoiling rate (when voters choose no one on the ballot as a sign of protest) signaled disaffection. Women won 3,406 seats out of 27,795 (or 13 percent),up from 127 in 2003 (less than one half of one percent of the vote at that time). This exceeded the 12 percent quota set by the government through an agreement among political parti
es (Refs A and B). Eight parties won 90 percent of the seats, and 84 percent of the votes, as follows: -- Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM): 18.7 percent of votes (21.7 percent of seats); -- Party Istiqlal (i.e., Independence) (PI): 16.6 percent (19.1 percent of seats); -- National Rally of Independents (RNI): 13 percent of votes (14.8 percent of seats); -- United Socialist Forces Party (USFP): 10.8 percent of votes (11.6 percent of seats); -- Popular Movement (MP): 7.9 percent of votes (8 percent of seats); -- Party of Justice and Development (PJD): 7.5 percent of votes (5.5 percent of seats); -- Constitutional Union (UC): 5.1 percent of votes (4.7 percent of seats); and -- Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS): 4.2 percent of votes (4 percent of seats). -------------- PAM Makes its Mark -------------- ¶3. (C) The results of the election largely tracked with embassy and Ministry of Interior (MOI) predictions (Ref C). Securing 21.7 percent of communal seats in its first nationwide electoral contest, the Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM) scored a significant victory. Istiqlal was also perceived to have done well, moving up from 16.9 percent in 2003 elections to 19.1 percent of seats in this election, although it had to accept an unfamiliar second place slot behind PAM. The Islamist-inspired PJD made modest gains, as predicted, in urban areas such as Casablanca, Meknes, Tangiers, Temara, and Rabat but poorly overall. The head of the PJD's list in Rabat and number two in the party, Lahcen Daoudi, appears to have secured the support of a coalition of PI, USFP, PJD, PPS, and RNI to become Mayor of Rabat, according to press reports. As in 2007, the USFP was the biggest loser among the large parties in Morocco, skidding from 14.7 to 11.6 percent of seats. A USFP loss of a mayoral contest to PAM in the northern city of Tangier typified USFP overall loses. The Berber-oriented Popular Movement (MP) also lost ground, going from 9.8 percent of seats to 8.0 but potentially retaining key mayoral posts. -------------- Transparency at the Ballot Box -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The Consultative Council for Human Rights (CCDH), the entity in charge of electoral monitoring, declared Friday's local elections "fair and free." Collaborating with many domestic civil society associations including the Moroccan Organization of Human Rights (OMDH),the Civil Forum for Democracy, and dozens of international observer organizations, CCDH declared that the voting took place in "normal and adequate" conditions, except for some minor incidents "related to continuing campaigning during campaign silence periods and attempts by some people to destroy ballot boxes." State-run Al-Aoula television reported an assessment by the American Center for Democracy that the elections took place in "good conditions," and that its members did not record any irregularities. -------------- - What We Saw: Transparency at Voting Facilities -------------- - ¶5. (SBU) The election appears to have been run in a professional, fair, and transparent manner at the ballot locations, as reported by our 15 embassy/consulate election observation teams, which fanned out across the country to observe conditions at numerous voting facilities. The voting facilities were consistently well organized and welcoming, often inviting observer teams inside the facilities to make close observations. Election monitors from some of the political parties were consistently present and monitors from other national and international non-governmental organizations were also sprinkled across several facilities that we visited. Among the multiple reports from each of our teams, we did not observe any incidents of systemic voting irregularities, with the possible exception of lingering party posters and graffiti. Security appeared appropriate for the size of each facility with no signs of intimidation. Generally speaking, at least one uniformed police officer and an auxiliary force member were present at each voting facility entrance, occasionally augmented by plainclothes internal security officers. -------------- Voting Volume Looked Lighter than Statistics -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Embassy personnel observed light to medium voter turnout. Light is defined as ten or fewer voters in thirty minutes, and medium as 10-50 voters in thirty minutes. We observed higher volumes in rural polling stations than in city/peri-urban areas, and small increases in participation following Friday midday prayers. The observers also noted the high number of women participating and the absence of young voters. Women, who outnumbered men by two to three from our observations, may have had a greater interest in the elections because of the increase in the number of female candidates running in this election and the special woman's list (Refs A and B). -------------- Possible Explanations of Turnout Disparities -------------- ¶7. (C) The disparities between our observations and the official results of over 50 percent participation may be explained by several factors. Our teams were out in various remote spots in Morocco from 08:00 to 17:00, while most voting took place from 17:00 to 19:00. Most voters did not vote until evening, after Friday prayers, and/or after most factory workers were released from work at 17:00. Most of our teams focused on urban areas. According to MOI statistics, turnout in urban areas was lower than rural areas. The lowest percentage of votes, for example, was in Casablanca (29 percent),where several of our observer teams were concentrated. We detected some of this trend of higher rural voting in places like Ifrane, Rommani, and Maril but missed the even higher percentage turnouts areas of southern Morocco/Western Sahara (e.g., Boujdor, 69 percent; Smara, 68 percent; and Wadi Addahb, 61 percent),where we had no embassy/consulate observers. The fact that it was an exceptionally hot day in Morocco (95-105 degrees Fahrenheit), may have also diminished voter turnout. -------------- Another, More Menacing, Explanation -------------- ¶8. (C) Post observers and local contacts in Rabat, such as Associated Press correspondent for North Africa Alfred de Monteesquiou, have an uneasy feeling about the low voter turnout they witnessed and the official results published by MOI. Despite some detectable angst among the populous in Rabat and Casablanca about the reconciliation of the participation numbers, there has been nothing in the press about these concerns. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we, like the majority of the Moroccan population, accept the results as reported by MOI. -------------- Personality Matters -------------- ¶9. (C) Residents, particularly in rural areas, often told our observers that they were voting for a person rather than a party. Most residents reported that they saw little to no ideological or political difference between the parties. If an individual was perceived to have worked for a neighborhood or was well respected then he or she stood to win support. Rachid Nanae, an out-of-work resident of a shantytown in the Ben M'sik neighborhood of Casablanca, told our observers that he voted for Jawdad, Deputy Mayor of Casablanca, because he had fixed the roads and provided other public works to the neighborhood. At the same time, party affiliation as a discriminator was not completely abandoned. Also from anecdotes from voters, the PAM appeared to reap many undecided voters because of the party's "newness" and/or the closeness of defacto PAM de facto chief Fouad Ali El Himma to King Mohammed VI (Refs C and D). -------------- ... And What We Did Not See: Vote Buying Still Widespread -------------- ¶10. (C) While a handful of vote buying incidents were detected and stopped by local authorities in scattered locations, the practice, according to numerous embassy and consulate contacts, was widespread. The going rate for a vote was as high as 200 dirhams (approximately USD 24), according to an informal survey of several locals in Rabat. According to the same contacts, vote buying takes place on a systemic level, with party militants passing out largesse in neighborhoods door-to-door in the weeks and days prior to election day. ¶11. (C) In a conversation with POLOFF at a post-election reception, PJD number two Lahcen Daoudi complained that everyone was fixated on the rate of participation when leaders should be more concerned about the widespread problem of vote buying, which he described as organized, systemic, and beyond detection by election monitors and observers. One of our observers in the greater Casablanca district of Moulay Rachid overheard a conversation between two female shoppers, one of which protested to the other that she could not continue shopping because she was out of money, to which other quipped, "I take it you haven't voted yet!" ¶12. (C) Comment: "Warts and all," the election results appear to have been largely accepted by the Moroccan populous, despite lingering doubts and continued skepticism about the efficacy of the election process in Morocco. The election of women to over 13 percent of communal council posts was an unambiguously positive aspect of these elections (Ref A and B). At the party level, the PAM has been relatively quiet in the last two days; no doubt busy counting its gains and, like all other parties, engaging in the post-election lobbying process of seeking coalition partners for mayoral and communal presidential positions. The election of communal council members now forms the basis of an electorate for Morocco's indirect election system to pick communal, provincial, and regional leaders, as well as one third of the members of the upper house of Parliament (Ref D). ¶13. (C) Comment Continued: Having been in existence for just over a year, the PAM has got to be satisfied. Many see the results of this election as a harbinger of legislative elections in 2012. More immediately, the USFP is licking its wounds and considering whether to will withdraw from the government to rebuild in opposition (Ref C). Whether or not this comes to fruition and serves as a triggering event, we believe that a rumored government shakeup will come to fruition possibly after Ramadan, which ends in mid-September, to realign coalition partners and to reflect the legitimacy gains made by PAM in Morocco's political arena. End Comment. ***************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco ***************************************** Jackson

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