MEETING WITH MOROCCANS ON WESTERN SAHARA

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000291 SIPDIS STATE FOR S, P, S/P, NEA, NEA/MAG AND IO/UNP NSC FOR SHAPIRO E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2019 TAGS: PBTS PREL WI AL MO SUBJECT: MEETING WITH MOROCCANS ON WESTERN SAHARA Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1 .4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In his meeting with Secretary Clinton on April 8, Moroccan Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri will present a letter from King Mohammed VI requesting support for a resolution on the Western Sahara favorable to Morocco and rejecting a human rights monitoring role for MINURSO, the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission. The letter has or will be passed to the "P5" and other "Friends of Sahara." The Foreign Minister may complain about Algeria since the King,s overtures to Algeria have been rebuffed. Most observers believe progress on Moroccan-Algerian ties is a prerequisite for a Western Sahara deal, but no one seems to know how to strike a deal, in view of Algerian reticence. Without prejudicing a USG policy review on the issue, it would be important at least to share our support for a political solution, with autonomy as a potential basis for negotiations, and solid backing for UN Personal Envoy Christopher Ross. On human rights, it would be useful to note past progress and the need for Morocco to take additional steps to stop abuses and open up even more political space in the territory. End Summary. -------------- Answering the Moroccans on Sahara -------------- ¶2. (C) Moroccan Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri is coming to Washington with a letter from King Mohammed VI that we understand has been or will be delivered to the Governments of China, France, Russia, Spain and the United Kingdom. According the Spanish, the letter requests support for a strong resolution on Western Sahara and asks that MINURSO not get a mandate to monitor human rights. The Embassy fully understands that the Administration has not fully parsed its position on the Western Sahara issue. ¶3. (C) We believe elements of a USG response could contain: -- A strong statement of support for an agreed political solution with "autonomy" as an element, and recognition of the importance of improving Moroccan-Algerian relation; -- Recognition that Morocco can do more to build confidence by continuing to improve human rights in the territory, offering some political space to its opponents, even to those who support the Polisario. For starters, it could give legal status to Sahrawi human rights organizations sympathetic to self-determination; -- Morocco should also decisively signal its abhorrence of human rights abuses by punishing -- or at least removing from the territory -- well known security officials accused of multiple abuses. Such removals in 2008 successfully encouraged those left behind to behave better for a time; and -- On regional issues, we should listen carefully to Moroccan concerns about Algeria and ask what the Government of Morocco (GOM) would be willing to put on the table to help their friends in the international community encourage the Algerian Government to be more responsive. -------------- A Long-Simmering but Non-Violent Dispute -------------- ¶4. (C) The Western Sahara dispute has been frozen diplomatically since April 2008 when the UN Security Council mandated a 12-month rollover of the UN's peacekeeping Mission for a Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO using the French acronym) in Resolution 1813. Because of disputes over who might vote in the referendum, it has never been held and MINURSO has lost its political role. MINURSO now polices a cease-fire that has hardly seen a single shot fired since it went into effect in 1991. ¶5. (C) A year ago, Peter Van Walsum, the then Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary General, took the unusual step of tabling, outside the official report, his personal view that independence for the territory was "not realistic," because Morocco would never relinquish its control of the territory and the international community would never force it to do so. After the vote to extend MINURSO,s mandate for one year, the U.S. delegation explicitly endorsed that view, but no other member did, not even traditionally pro-Moroccan France, even though the international community, including Russia, appears to agree. ¶6. (C) Resolution 1813 recognized the four rounds of UN-sponsored talks in Manhasset, New York, since Morocco submitted its proposal for autonomy in 2007, as progress, which the GOM took as an endorsement of its efforts. In fact, the talks were sterile, with the Polisario unwilling to discuss the Moroccan proposal and the GOM delegation under strict orders to discuss nothing else. ¶7. (C) After the vote, Algeria and the Polisario refused to deal with Van Walsum, calling him partial, and UN Secretary General (SYG) Ban Ki-Moon did not renew Van Walsum's contract. This deeply upset the GOM, which dragged its heels into 2009 before accepting the appointment of new envoy, former U.S. Ambassador to Algeria Christopher Ross. Ross, one of our own and among the world experts on the region, recognized that resolution of the Sahara problem remained linked to ameliorating the dispute between Morocco and Algeria, and he obtained a mandate from the UNSYG to address it. ¶8. (C) The term "unrealistic" was never used by Ross, who considered it unbalanced. The term also disappeared from the last administration's discourse, with Secretary Rice's visit to North Africa in September 2008. The GOM has continued to seek its enshrinement in USG policy and UN documents. ¶9. (C) Ross believes that one provocative element of the Moroccan approach is the inclusion in the delegation of Kalihenna Ould Er Rachid, a Sahrawi who headed the local government when the Spanish left and is current Chairman of the Royal Advisory Council on Sahara (CORCAS). The Ould Er Rachid clan controls much of Sahrawi politics through the best developed political machine in the Moroccan system, but he is unpopular, even among many Sahrawi supporters of Moroccan sovereignty. His political machine won seats in the Sahara that gave Prime Minister Abbas El Fassi,s Istiqlal (Independence) party its margin of victory in the September 2007 parliamentary elections. There have been signs recently, however, that the GOM may be distancing itself from Ould Er Rachid. -------------- The Algeria Factor -------------- ¶10. (C) The closed Moroccan-Algerian border has stifled trade, growth and regional integration and remains a major political blockage. In early 2008, King Mohammed VI made an initially clumsy, but apparently sincere, effort to reach out to Algiers, and has continued to pursue this. Unfortunately, for reasons possibly inked to internal dynamics and President Bouteflika,s re-election, Algeria rebuffed these overtures. It is clear there are personal tensions, perhaps generational, between him and Mohammed VI. Several world leaders, including the French, Spanish and even Russian (i.e., Prime Minister Putin),have attempted to mediate, without success. Algeria declined Secretary Rice's invitation for a trilateral meeting on the margins of the UN General Assembly last September. However, it did participate in Secretary Clinton,s Sharm el Sheikh meeting with the Moroccans and Tunisians. Nonetheless, a modest USG initiative begun at the "P-level" in 2007 to encourage regional stability by supporting North Africa's Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) appears to be derailed. -------------- In the Western Sahara -------------- ¶11. (C) The Western Sahara territory itself is mostly calm, and has been since the autonomy offer was tabled. Morocco has poured both people and money into the territory since it won control in 1975 and overall social conditions are better than in most of Morocco, although limited resources and local industry constrain employment. ¶12. (C) A majority of the current population of some 400,000 appears to have migrated from the north of the territory or are children of migrants, but this is complicated by the fact that many of them are themselves ethnically Sahrawi, a culturally distinct people who speak a separate dialect of Arabic, i.e., Hassani. Sahrawi tribes are the majority in and rule Mauritania, and traditional tribal territory extends well into southern Morocco and western Algeria. Unlike with the Kurds, whose situation is similar, neither the Polisario nor any Sahrawi has laid claim to any lands outside the Western Sahara, suggesting the dispute may be more a product of regional state politics than ethno-nationalism. -------------- - Human Rights Improving but Still a Major Issue -------------- - ¶13. (C) The Western Sahara experienced severe repression during the "years of lead" under the late King Hassan II. The security force profile and human rights violations, both high, declined since disorders in 2005. By the end of 2008, as noted in the annual Country Report on Human Rights Practices, beatings and physical abuse had largely stopped. Political rights remain sharply constrained, however. Supporters of independence/self-determination can meet and organize, and restrictions on their overseas travel disappeared in 2008. They may not, however, hold public meetings or demonstrations or publicize their views. Carrying a Polisario flag or literature will mean arrest and confiscation. The Embassy has pushed the GOM to allow full political rights and freedom of assembly. Morocco could give legal status to Sahrawi human rights organizations whose members are sympathetic to self-determination. In one case, this was already ordered by Moroccan courts, but never implemented, and then later appealed by the Ministry of Interior (MOI). ¶14. (C) The Embassy saw a spike in early 2009 in the number of credible reports of abuses from contacts in the Western Sahara. This coincided with both the change in local governor and the visit of an EU parliamentary delegation. That visit represented an unprecedented lifting of restrictions on the ability of activists to publicly meet international observers, although some of those activists were later briefly detained. There were several allegations against specific officers for physical and other abuses, including a February report of sexual abuse, vehemently denied by authorities, although Ministry of Justice contacts told us they have opened an investigation. The Charge bluntly raised the increased abuses with the Foreign Minister on February 25, and we have also expressed direct concern to the MOI. Whether there is a linkage or not, the reports of abuses appear to have dropped dramatically since these demarches. Although some abuses continue, reports of abuse appear to be often exaggerated by pro-Polisario activists. ¶15. (C) Human rights monitoring is a major issue. The Polisario, with some support from international human rights organizations and from some Members of Congress, has asked that MINURSO do the monitoring. Morocco opposes this proposition. Ambassador Ross believes that monitoring may be useful, but MINURSO should not be the vehicle, suggesting a possible role for UN human rights entities. The Mission believes that Morocco can best address this question by improving the situation and continuing its opening to international monitoring. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶16. (C) In sum, we believe that the Secretary,s April 8 meeting with Foreign Minister Fassi Fihri affords an opportunity to press Morocco to show greater respect for human rights in Western Sahara, explore ways to improve Moroccan-Algerian relations, and support Personal Envoy Ross, efforts to get Morocco, Algeria and the Polisario to talk as equals )- even if they are not. The meeting could also encourage the GOM to have more regular meetings with the Algerian Government on issues of mutual concern and interest, such as counterterrorism, energy, and production of cheaper fertilizers using Moroccan phosphates and Algerian gas. End Comment. ***************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco ***************************************** Jackson