PJD LEADERS DISCUSS ELECTION STRATEGY

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000286 SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/MAG NEA/IPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KISL MO SUBJECT: PJD LEADERS DISCUSS ELECTION STRATEGY Classified By: Polcouns Craig Karp for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Leaders of the "moderate faction" of the Islamist-inspired Party of Justice and Development (PJD) have acknowledged the party has been under some pressure from authorities, but emphasized that they have not been intimidated into trimming their sails. They said the PJD decision to contest just forty percent of electoral districts in upcoming municipal elections was an "internal (PJD) decision," based on the party's absence in rural areas, but the PJD will run more candidates than ever before. They described the January removal of the PJD Mayor of Meknes as a "boxing match" between the Makzhen and the PJD, but admitted that many of the party's problems stem from poor decisions by party leadership (i.e., Abdelillah Benkirane). Although the PJD had cooperated with Sheik Yassine's Al Adl Wal Ishane (AWI) in order to mobilize demonstrations against Israeli actions in Gaza, there is little contact between the two organizations. They predicted that AWI would one day enter politics in force. While they were more open to the USG than before, they were reluctant to commit to public participation in our democracy-building programs. End Summary. ¶2. (C) PolCouns and PolOffs had multiple meetings recently with PJD National Council President Saad Eddine Othmani and PJD Deputy Secretary General (and Vice President of the Chamber of Representatives--the lower house of the Moroccan Parliament) Lahcen Daoudi, considered numbers two and three in the PJD, respectively. They are also leaders of the party's "moderates." Othmani was replaced as party leader by the more hard line Abdelillah Benkirane. During an unprecedented small dinner for them at PolCouns' residence, Othmani and Daoudi implied that the change in U.S. administration had encouraged them to deepen relations with the Embassy. -------------- A Problem Finding Qualified Candidates -------------- ¶3. (C) Othmani and Daoudi called the move to contest only forty percent of electoral districts during the June municipal elections an "internal (PJD) decision," and refuted press reports that it was a response to government pressure. Daoudi explained that although the PJD hoped to sponsor candidates in all electoral districts, a shortage of qualified candidates limited their ability to contest some seats. The PJD will not sponsor low quality candidates, or those unfamiliar to the party, he emphasized, arguing (Note: correctly.) that no party can contest seats in all districts, and the PJD was particularly constrained in rural areas. ¶4. (C) Daoudi explained that although the PJD's anti-corruption stance appeals to potential candidates, as well as the public at large, many avoid running under the PJD banner because they fear recrimination from the Makzhen, or ruling power. "We have not been losing members," he emphasized, "but candidates are afraid." He expressed concern about the possibility that candidates who would otherwise run with the PJD would gravitate to the Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM),Istiqlal, and Rally of National Independents (RNI) out of fear. He described GOM pressure on potential PJD candidates as more subtle and suggestive than overtly hostile. Still, he assured us that the PJD would present more candidates for election in June than during the last municipal elections, and confirmed that the party would have candidates running in every major city. -------------- - A Boxing Match Between the Makzhen and the PJD -------------- - ¶5. (C) Daoudi explained that the Interior Ministry's decision to remove PJD Mayor of Meknes Belkora in January, and charge him with corruption, amounted to "a boxing match" between the Makzhen and the PJD. The PJD would not forcefully oppose the removal of Belkora, but his alleged misconduct amounted to "minor infractions" rather than gross corruption. This singling out of the PJD by the Minister of the Interior sends a message to the public that the PJD is the only party doing anything good. ¶6. (C) Daoudi agreed that the PJD's decision to organize rallies in January protesting Israeli actions in Gaza had angered the GOM, but explained that, "If we had crossed our arms and done nothing, other groups would have organized instead." He acknowledged that some parts of the government looked unfavorably on PJD actions, but distinguished between the King and government. He speculated that the Palace tolerates the PJD as a necessary balance to the other political parties but thought it would be "impossible" for the PJD to ever achieve a majority in Parliament "because of the French." Daoudi said he believed France views the PJD (because of its conservative views) as an obstacle to French interests and is lobbying the GOM to curtail the party's influence. ¶7. (C) Although the government was making things difficult for the PJD, Daoudi and Othmani implied that much of the PJD's recent problems resulted from errors by its leadership (Note: The current PJD Secretary General Abdelillah Benkirane unseated Othmani from the position in July 2008. Othmani and Daoudi may have been referring to Benkirane's efforts to take credit for Morocco's material support to war-torn Palestinians living in Gaza, which drew the ire of the Palace and resulted in Benkirane issuing a public apology to the government in late January. Benkirane also made a controversial call on the Venezuelan Ambassador that same month just days before Morocco removed its Embassy from Caracas in protest to the Chavez government's recognizing the Polisario-run "government" of Western Sahara. End Note.) -------------- Al Adl Wal Ihsane -------------- ¶8. (C) Daoudi and Othmani admitted they had worked with Sheik Yassine's AWI in January to mobilize demonstrations protesting Israeli actions in Gaza. However, outside of overarching and unifying causes like Palestine, the PJD has little high level dialogue with the leaders of AWI. Daoudi and Othmani confirmed that the government orchestrated the month-long shut down of AWI's websites once Rabat had discovered they were used to mobilize protests against Israel and advocate a boycott of local elections. Othmani and Daoudi speculated that an AWI election boycott would disproportionally affect the PJD, and described the AWI's potential political power as significant. They predicted that AWI would one day enter politics in force. -------------- Every Vote For Sale -------------- ¶9. (C) Othmani called corruption among the other parties (i.e., specifically vote buying) a major hindrance to the PJD at the local and national levels. Because the PJD plays by the rules, it is often beaten by less ethical competitors, he said. He asserted that vote buying is so pervasive that it might be difficult for an American to grasp, "Every vote is for sale at the right price." In such a system, only wealthy local leaders can win, he observed, accusing the Istiqlal party of recruiting wealthy candidates, regardless of their political ideology, in order to buy votes, which gave them the most seats in Parliament and thus the prime ministership. -------------- - No End Yet to Informal Boycott of USG Programs -------------- - ¶10. (C) Othmani and Daoudi were unwilling to commit to end the PJD's informal boycott of USG-funded democracy building programs, but they were reluctant to confirm its existence either. Responding to PolCouns' invitation for the PJD to participate with the other parties in the Middle East Partnership Initiative-funded training programs for women candidates, Daoudi replied, "Who needs training? Our women are already well trained and informed." According to a contractor who is conducting training for women candidates in the June elections, the PJD is the only political party that can truthfully make that claim. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) The change in administration has provided the Embassy new impetus for engagement with the PJD. Meetings with PJD officials intensified after the 2008 election, with a brief interruption during Israeli military actions in Gaza (December 2008-early January 2009). The PJD is in the right place on fighting corruption, economic development, and political reforms, although yawning gaps remain in the area of U.S. foreign policies in the region. However, even on difficult foreign policy issues, PJD officials have been less apt to devolve into diatribe. Although they got the largest number of votes in the 2007 Parliamentary elections, keeping their local election contests to 40 percent of the districts could mean that they will not seek an absolute majority in ¶2012. ***************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco ***************************************** Jackson