Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09RABAT281
2009-04-03 19:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rabat
Cable title:
MOROCCO'S ANTI-SHI'A CAMPAIGN: IRAQIS TARGETED,
how-toVZCZCXRO9402 PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHTRO DE RUEHRB #0281/01 0931907 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 031907Z APR 09 FM AMEMBASSY RABAT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9911 INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0115 RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1139 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0923
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 000281
SIPDIS
STATE FOR DRL/IRF, DRL/NESCA AND NEA/MAG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2019
TAGS: PHUM PINS PREL SCUL KIRF KISL IR MO
SUBJECT: MOROCCO'S ANTI-SHI'A CAMPAIGN: IRAQIS TARGETED,
CIVIL SOCIETY MOBILIZES
REF: A. RABAT 0200
B. RABAT 0205
C. CASABLANCA 0047
D. RABAT 0230
E. RABAT 0265
Classified By: CDA Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 000281
SIPDIS
STATE FOR DRL/IRF, DRL/NESCA AND NEA/MAG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2019
TAGS: PHUM PINS PREL SCUL KIRF KISL IR MO
SUBJECT: MOROCCO'S ANTI-SHI'A CAMPAIGN: IRAQIS TARGETED,
CIVIL SOCIETY MOBILIZES
REF: A. RABAT 0200
B. RABAT 0205
C. CASABLANCA 0047
D. RABAT 0230
E. RABAT 0265
Classified By: CDA Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: The Government of Morocco's campaign against
Moroccan Shi'a appears to have abated after delivering a
strong message to Islamic activists. The campaign included
confiscation of Shi'a books and interrogation of some Shi'a
leaders. Civil society is beginning to publicly criticize
the campaign, which has led to a marked decrease in
anti-Shi'a activity. The Iraqi Charge d'Affaires (CDA) told
our Charge that the closure of an Iraqi school in connection
with the pressure campaign came as a surprise to school
administrators and the Iraqi Embassy. He speculated that the
parental complaint of Shi'a proselytizing that sparked an
inspection may have been instigated by the GOM. He also
requested U.S. assistance in divining GOM intentions.
However, a GOM official reiterated that King Mohammed VI
himself saw growing Shi'a influence as an existential threat
and may have been worried about Moroccan Shi'a in Europe.
While GOM motivation remains subject to debate, we will
continue to engage interlocutors and urge the Department to
raise this issue with senior GOM officials. End Summary.
--------------
Background
--------------
2. (SBU) On March 6, the GOM announced a severing of
relations with Iran, ostensibly over Iranian statements on
Bahraini sovereignty and other criticisms of Morocco (Refs
A-C). On March 18, the media reported that the Government
had launched an officially sanctioned pressure campaign
against Shi'a in Morocco, seizing Shi'ite tracts from
bookstores and libraries, and mobilizing imams to preach
against Shi'ite influences. A variety of sources indicated a
broad dragnet was sweeping up individuals known or suspected
of being Shi'a adherents (Ref D). Later conversations with
human rights lawyers indicated that approximately 15 leaders
of Shi'a associations were questioned by police but then
released without charges. On March 22, the Ministry of
Education shut down a private Iraqi school, affiliated with
the Iraqi Islamist D'Awah Party, catering to Iraqi emigres
and hundreds of Moroccan children. The sudden closure came
after allegations that the school was teaching Shi'ite
principles, a charge the principal denies. On March 28, five
Western missionaries were expelled from Morocco for
proselytizing after they were found conducting a Bible study
in a private apartment (Ref E).
-------------- --------------
The Iraqi School - Mechanics of A Pressure Campaign
-------------- --------------
3. (C) In a meeting with Charge on March 30, Iraqi Charge
d'Affaires Rast Nouri Shawis (protect) said that the Iraqi
school closure came as a complete surprise to both school
officials and the Iraqi Embassy. The chain of events began
in early March when the Moroccan Ministry of National
Education (MOE) announced its intention to visit and "check
the school's methods;" with actual inspections taking place
on March 19 and 20. Despite inspectors' compliments to
school officials on how the it was being run, the MOE
abruptly announced its closure on the morning of March 21,
while classes were in session. The MOE asserted that school
officials had not obtained a license to operate in Morocco
when the institution opened in 1977, and the school,
therefore, was an illegal entity.
4. (SBU) The school's 480 students are roughly ten percent
Iraqi, 80 percent Moroccan, and ten percent from other Middle
Eastern countries. While the school is affiliated with the
Iraqi Shi'a D'Awah party, it is funded exclusively through
tuition, although the headmaster's salary is paid by the
Iraqi Government. The majority of the teachers, including
the headmaster, are Sunni, according to Shawis.
5. (SBU) Despite school officials' attempts to obtain a
operating license subsequent to the closing, and an appeal to
at least keep the school open until the end of the school
RABAT 00000281 002 OF 003
year in May, the MOE insisted on an immediate closure.
Strangely, the MOE subsequently offered to allow teaching to
continue in a different building for the remainder of the
year, provided the name of the school, i.e., The Iraqi
Baghdad School was not used and its headmaster be removed.
(Note: Parents and students, who subsequently protested the
closure, collectively rejected this offer. End Note.)
6. (SBU) Shawis said that the initial inspection may have
been prompted by complaints from a parent, a Middle East
Broadcasting television correspondent, who asserted that his
three children attending the school had been verbally and
physically pressured to adopt Shi'a teachings - a charge
Shawis called false. While denying that the closure was
directly related to the break in Iranian relations, Shawis
allowed, given the high profile nature of the parent's
complaints, i.e., use of the internet, etc., that the
parent's actions may have been encouraged by the GOM as part
of a broader strategy. The headmaster and teachers have
hired a lawyer and petitioned a local court to keep the
school open; a decision is pending the case. Shawis
requested embassy help in soliciting a clear answer from the
GOM on what its intentions and expectations are regarding the
school.
--------------
Civil Society and the Media Speak Out ...
--------------
7. (SBU) The centrist Moroccan Organization for Human Rights
(French acronym OMDH) distributed a strongly worded statement
in Arabic critical of the government pressure campaign. At
its core, the statement highlighted the fact that the GOM has
signed international agreements guaranteeing freedom of
religion. The document also underscored that Article 6 of
the Moroccan Constitution enshrines Islam as the state
religion and charges the state with protecting its practice.
The statement was unusual in that the OMDH is close to the
Palace, making its direct criticism especially piquant. The
leftist Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH) has made
similar statements, also focusing on the constitutional
aspect.
8. (SBU) In a private conversation with PolOff at OMDH's
annual congress on March 27, Abdelaziz Nouyaidi (protect),a
prominent human rights attorney, asked for direct embassy
intervention to convince the GOM to change course. In a
subsequent April 3 conversation, Nouyaidi said that the
government campaign appeared to be slowing, although he
encouraged continued USG back-channel pressure.
9. (SBU) A series of articles in major print and media
outlets either directly or implicitly criticized the
campaign. One in the French-language weekly Le Journal,
asked, "What's next?" "Christians, Jews, a hunt for
sorcerers?" and proceeded to assail the government's case by
citing the Moroccan Constitution's protection of religion.
--------------
... And the Government Counters
--------------
10. (C) Abdelaziz Taleb (protect),the secular Chief of
Staff to the Secretary General of Government (SG) (a
ministerial-level position combining attributes of the White
House Chief of Staff and Office of Management and Budget
Director) cautioned Emboffs on April 2 not to mistake
Morocco's religious tolerance for weakness. He said the King
saw increasing Shi'ite activity in Morocco as a direct
challenge to his religious authority, as well as an
existential security threat. Taleb also alluded to pressure
from European countries which were worried about Moroccan
Shi'ites being radicalized by Iranians in Morocco before
being sent north to join an approximately 20,000 other
Moroccan Shi'ites in Europe to "create trouble." His
comments reflect what we hear from diplomats in Rabat as well.
11. (C) Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Chief of Staff
Nasser Bourita told PolCouns on April 2 that recent events
were a deliberate government policy focused on a security,
not religious, threat. OMDH President Amina Bouyach told
PolCouns on April 2 that Iran and Shi'ites were active on
campuses, and contributed to the GOM's sense of worry. She
also suspected that the campaign was obliquely directed at
RABAT 00000281 003 OF 003
dissident Islamic group Adl wa Ihsan (Justice and Good Works
Organization or JCO) (Ref C),which has been making noises
about seeking more legitimate political status.
12. (C) Comment: The events leading up to the Iraqi school
closure appear to indicate that it was part of a broader
strategy that may have been in planning for a period of time.
Civil society criticism and expressions of puzzlement are
encouraging. OMDH's reliance on the Moroccan Constitution
and international conventions to which the GOM is a signatory
afford a solid and effective way to make an argument for a
return to tolerance. We will continue to engage the GOM
vigorously on this issue. If the GOM is intending to send a
message to Islamist conservatives, this is a blunt and coarse
way in which to do it. We recommend the Department prepare
contingency guidance in case of a press inquiry and raise the
crackdown in conversations with GOM officials (see proposed
points in Ref D). End Comment.
*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
*****************************************
Jackson
SIPDIS
STATE FOR DRL/IRF, DRL/NESCA AND NEA/MAG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2019
TAGS: PHUM PINS PREL SCUL KIRF KISL IR MO
SUBJECT: MOROCCO'S ANTI-SHI'A CAMPAIGN: IRAQIS TARGETED,
CIVIL SOCIETY MOBILIZES
REF: A. RABAT 0200
B. RABAT 0205
C. CASABLANCA 0047
D. RABAT 0230
E. RABAT 0265
Classified By: CDA Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: The Government of Morocco's campaign against
Moroccan Shi'a appears to have abated after delivering a
strong message to Islamic activists. The campaign included
confiscation of Shi'a books and interrogation of some Shi'a
leaders. Civil society is beginning to publicly criticize
the campaign, which has led to a marked decrease in
anti-Shi'a activity. The Iraqi Charge d'Affaires (CDA) told
our Charge that the closure of an Iraqi school in connection
with the pressure campaign came as a surprise to school
administrators and the Iraqi Embassy. He speculated that the
parental complaint of Shi'a proselytizing that sparked an
inspection may have been instigated by the GOM. He also
requested U.S. assistance in divining GOM intentions.
However, a GOM official reiterated that King Mohammed VI
himself saw growing Shi'a influence as an existential threat
and may have been worried about Moroccan Shi'a in Europe.
While GOM motivation remains subject to debate, we will
continue to engage interlocutors and urge the Department to
raise this issue with senior GOM officials. End Summary.
--------------
Background
--------------
2. (SBU) On March 6, the GOM announced a severing of
relations with Iran, ostensibly over Iranian statements on
Bahraini sovereignty and other criticisms of Morocco (Refs
A-C). On March 18, the media reported that the Government
had launched an officially sanctioned pressure campaign
against Shi'a in Morocco, seizing Shi'ite tracts from
bookstores and libraries, and mobilizing imams to preach
against Shi'ite influences. A variety of sources indicated a
broad dragnet was sweeping up individuals known or suspected
of being Shi'a adherents (Ref D). Later conversations with
human rights lawyers indicated that approximately 15 leaders
of Shi'a associations were questioned by police but then
released without charges. On March 22, the Ministry of
Education shut down a private Iraqi school, affiliated with
the Iraqi Islamist D'Awah Party, catering to Iraqi emigres
and hundreds of Moroccan children. The sudden closure came
after allegations that the school was teaching Shi'ite
principles, a charge the principal denies. On March 28, five
Western missionaries were expelled from Morocco for
proselytizing after they were found conducting a Bible study
in a private apartment (Ref E).
-------------- --------------
The Iraqi School - Mechanics of A Pressure Campaign
-------------- --------------
3. (C) In a meeting with Charge on March 30, Iraqi Charge
d'Affaires Rast Nouri Shawis (protect) said that the Iraqi
school closure came as a complete surprise to both school
officials and the Iraqi Embassy. The chain of events began
in early March when the Moroccan Ministry of National
Education (MOE) announced its intention to visit and "check
the school's methods;" with actual inspections taking place
on March 19 and 20. Despite inspectors' compliments to
school officials on how the it was being run, the MOE
abruptly announced its closure on the morning of March 21,
while classes were in session. The MOE asserted that school
officials had not obtained a license to operate in Morocco
when the institution opened in 1977, and the school,
therefore, was an illegal entity.
4. (SBU) The school's 480 students are roughly ten percent
Iraqi, 80 percent Moroccan, and ten percent from other Middle
Eastern countries. While the school is affiliated with the
Iraqi Shi'a D'Awah party, it is funded exclusively through
tuition, although the headmaster's salary is paid by the
Iraqi Government. The majority of the teachers, including
the headmaster, are Sunni, according to Shawis.
5. (SBU) Despite school officials' attempts to obtain a
operating license subsequent to the closing, and an appeal to
at least keep the school open until the end of the school
RABAT 00000281 002 OF 003
year in May, the MOE insisted on an immediate closure.
Strangely, the MOE subsequently offered to allow teaching to
continue in a different building for the remainder of the
year, provided the name of the school, i.e., The Iraqi
Baghdad School was not used and its headmaster be removed.
(Note: Parents and students, who subsequently protested the
closure, collectively rejected this offer. End Note.)
6. (SBU) Shawis said that the initial inspection may have
been prompted by complaints from a parent, a Middle East
Broadcasting television correspondent, who asserted that his
three children attending the school had been verbally and
physically pressured to adopt Shi'a teachings - a charge
Shawis called false. While denying that the closure was
directly related to the break in Iranian relations, Shawis
allowed, given the high profile nature of the parent's
complaints, i.e., use of the internet, etc., that the
parent's actions may have been encouraged by the GOM as part
of a broader strategy. The headmaster and teachers have
hired a lawyer and petitioned a local court to keep the
school open; a decision is pending the case. Shawis
requested embassy help in soliciting a clear answer from the
GOM on what its intentions and expectations are regarding the
school.
--------------
Civil Society and the Media Speak Out ...
--------------
7. (SBU) The centrist Moroccan Organization for Human Rights
(French acronym OMDH) distributed a strongly worded statement
in Arabic critical of the government pressure campaign. At
its core, the statement highlighted the fact that the GOM has
signed international agreements guaranteeing freedom of
religion. The document also underscored that Article 6 of
the Moroccan Constitution enshrines Islam as the state
religion and charges the state with protecting its practice.
The statement was unusual in that the OMDH is close to the
Palace, making its direct criticism especially piquant. The
leftist Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH) has made
similar statements, also focusing on the constitutional
aspect.
8. (SBU) In a private conversation with PolOff at OMDH's
annual congress on March 27, Abdelaziz Nouyaidi (protect),a
prominent human rights attorney, asked for direct embassy
intervention to convince the GOM to change course. In a
subsequent April 3 conversation, Nouyaidi said that the
government campaign appeared to be slowing, although he
encouraged continued USG back-channel pressure.
9. (SBU) A series of articles in major print and media
outlets either directly or implicitly criticized the
campaign. One in the French-language weekly Le Journal,
asked, "What's next?" "Christians, Jews, a hunt for
sorcerers?" and proceeded to assail the government's case by
citing the Moroccan Constitution's protection of religion.
--------------
... And the Government Counters
--------------
10. (C) Abdelaziz Taleb (protect),the secular Chief of
Staff to the Secretary General of Government (SG) (a
ministerial-level position combining attributes of the White
House Chief of Staff and Office of Management and Budget
Director) cautioned Emboffs on April 2 not to mistake
Morocco's religious tolerance for weakness. He said the King
saw increasing Shi'ite activity in Morocco as a direct
challenge to his religious authority, as well as an
existential security threat. Taleb also alluded to pressure
from European countries which were worried about Moroccan
Shi'ites being radicalized by Iranians in Morocco before
being sent north to join an approximately 20,000 other
Moroccan Shi'ites in Europe to "create trouble." His
comments reflect what we hear from diplomats in Rabat as well.
11. (C) Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Chief of Staff
Nasser Bourita told PolCouns on April 2 that recent events
were a deliberate government policy focused on a security,
not religious, threat. OMDH President Amina Bouyach told
PolCouns on April 2 that Iran and Shi'ites were active on
campuses, and contributed to the GOM's sense of worry. She
also suspected that the campaign was obliquely directed at
RABAT 00000281 003 OF 003
dissident Islamic group Adl wa Ihsan (Justice and Good Works
Organization or JCO) (Ref C),which has been making noises
about seeking more legitimate political status.
12. (C) Comment: The events leading up to the Iraqi school
closure appear to indicate that it was part of a broader
strategy that may have been in planning for a period of time.
Civil society criticism and expressions of puzzlement are
encouraging. OMDH's reliance on the Moroccan Constitution
and international conventions to which the GOM is a signatory
afford a solid and effective way to make an argument for a
return to tolerance. We will continue to engage the GOM
vigorously on this issue. If the GOM is intending to send a
message to Islamist conservatives, this is a blunt and coarse
way in which to do it. We recommend the Department prepare
contingency guidance in case of a press inquiry and raise the
crackdown in conversations with GOM officials (see proposed
points in Ref D). End Comment.
*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
*****************************************
Jackson