HIGH-LEVEL CHINESE VISIT HIGHLIGHTS CLOSER TIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000178 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: TWENTY YEARS TAGS: PREL EINV EAID ETRD ENRG SMIG CVIS EC CH SUBJECT: HIGH-LEVEL CHINESE VISIT HIGHLIGHTS CLOSER TIES REF: A. GUAYAQUIL 52 ¶B. BEIJING 518 ¶C. ... id: 196570 date: 3/12/2009 14:56 refid: 09QUITO178 origin: Embassy Quito classification: CONFIDENTIAL destination: 07QUITO683|07QUITO764|08QUITO1100|08QUITO1127|09BEIJING518|09GUAYAQUIL52|09QUITO15 header: VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHQT #0178/01 0711456 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 121456Z MAR 09 FM AMEMBASSY QUITO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0166 INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0426 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 8035 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 4106 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3454 RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAR LIMA 3100 RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 0031 RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4190 RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0346 RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 0013 RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL -------------- header ends -------------- C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000178 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: TWENTY YEARS TAGS: PREL EINV EAID ETRD ENRG SMIG CVIS EC CH SUBJECT: HIGH-LEVEL CHINESE VISIT HIGHLIGHTS CLOSER TIES REF: A. GUAYAQUIL 52 ¶B. BEIJING 518 ¶C. QUITO 15 ¶D. 08 QUITO 1127 ¶E. 08 QUITO 1100 ¶F. 07 QUITO 764 ¶G. 07 QUITO 683 Classified By: Ambassador Heather M. Hodges for Reasons 1.4 (b&d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador met privately with Chinese Ambassador Cai Runguo on February 27 to discuss the February 13 visit by Vice Prime Minister Hui Liangyu in Ecuador, as well as the Ecuador-China relationship more generally. Ambassador Cai downplayed the importance of the visit, and was generally reluctant to disclose sensitive information. Nonetheless, Hui's visit was the highest-level official visit in recent memory, and followed visits by Politbureau Standing Committee member Li Changchun in March 2007, President Correa's trip to China in November 2007, and recent negotiations for increased Chinese investment in Ecuador. Ambassador Cai confirmed that the new travel document policy for Chinese tourists coming to Ecuador has been fully implemented and suggested that Chinese migration has slowed. End Summary. HIGH-LEVEL VISIT BRINGS PROMISES OF FINANCING ; ¶2. (U) Vice Prime Minister Hui Liangyu and Vice Foreign Minister Song Tao met with President Correa, Vice President Moreno and Foreign Minister Falconi on February 13 in Quito. Hui and Song stopped in Quito and then the Galapagos as part of a February 7-19 trip to Argentina, Ecuador, Barbados, and the Bahamas. Ambassador Cai said that the Chinese signed four agreements with the GOE, that included a 30 million Chinese Yuan (CNY) (USD 4.43 million) grant of economic and technical assistance, a CNY 20 million (USD 2.92 million) no-interest line of credit to the GOE, a donation of one mammogram machine and two other x-ray machines, and an agreement to invest USD $18 million in the Quitumbe Terminal (construction of a bus station in the south of Quito, delayed for approximately three years). ¶3. (SBU) Hui announced during his visit that the Chinese government is interested in financing large infrastructure projects in Ecuador, and mentioned the construction project of a new refinery on the coast of Manabi province (Ref G). However, Ambassador Cai told the Ambassador that the two governments specifically discussed Chinese investment in the Coca-Codo-Sinclaire (CCS) hydroelectric project, and did not mention any other potential project negotiations. The CCS project, located in Napo province, will generate an estimated 1,500 megawatts of electricity, making it the largest infrastructure project in the country. Ambassador Cai had announced publicly on February 25 that the Chinese Ex-Im Bank was ready to offer up to $1.7 billion to finance the project, or 85% of the total cost ($2 billion),but that the "process of negotiation of conditions had just started, and will include guarantees, interest rates and payment of the credit." Cai told the Ambassador that two Chinese companies, as well as an Iranian company (Farab) and an Italian company (Impregilo),had expressed interest in the project, but no commitments had been made. However, during a ceremony on March 3, sponsored by Coca-Codo-Sinclaire, and in the presence of the Coordinating Minister of Strategic Sections Galo Borja, only two companies presented their bids, both Chinese -- Sinohydro-Andes Joint Venture and Sino-Ecuador. VISIT NOT SIGNIFICANT? ¶4. (U) Vice Prime Minister Hui said during his visit that bilateral relations, established in 1980, had improved after President Correa's November 2007 visit to Beijing, and that "both sides are satisfied with the development of the bilateral ties because the two countries do not have political pressures and conflicts of interest." ¶5. (C) The visit by Vice Prime Minister Hui is the highest-level official visit by China to Ecuador in the last ten years. However, Ambassador Cai described the agreements as "insignificant" and that the total value of the cooperation was fairly small. He even described the trip by Hui as less politically significant than the two-day visit in March 2007 by Li Changchun, Senior Member of the Standing Committee of the Polit Bureau of the Communist Party, who stopped in Ecuador as part of a tour through Latin America. Also, Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping separately visited Mexico, Jamaica, Colombia, Venezuela and Brazil on February 8-22, 2009. INCREASED TRADE ¶6. (C) Despite Ambassador Cai's downplaying of the visit, Ecuador's economic ties to China are growing fast. According to the Ecuadorian Central Bank, Chinese bilateral trade volume with Ecuador increased to a record $1.85 billion in 2008, up from $1.06 billion in 2007, or approximately by 75%. However, while Ecuador increased its imports by approximately $441 million (still mostly electronics, steel, vehicles and machinery),Ecuadorian exports to China went up by approximately $346 million, primarly in crude oil. In fact, crude oil now represents 88% of Ecuador's exports to China. The trade balance continues to favor China heavily. Ecuadorian Vice President Moreno said during the visit that "Ecuador plans to diversify the exports of its bananas, flowers, cacao and other products to China on favorable conditions." Ambassador Cai complained privately to the Ambassador that the GOE continues to push the sale of bananas to China, but that China already has sufficient supply from Taiwan and the Philippines. Conversely, Ecuadorian trade officials privately complain about the sharp increase in imports from China, with several officials noting that rigorous certification requirements and a trade safeguard were necessary in large measure because of imports from China. Moreno also announced during Minister Hui's visit that Ecuadorian trade offices will soon be established in the Chinese cities of Shanghai and Guangzhou to further expand trade. ¶7. (C) The Chinese MFA website states that as of November 2007, Ecuador was the home of more Chinese investment than any other Latin American country. Cai noted that copper and crude oil were better investment options for China. He said that two Chinese companies pursued mine exploration and exploitation in Ecuador, and that Andes Petroleum (a joint venture between the two Chinese petroleum companies, China National Petroleum Corp. and China Petroleum and Chemical Corp, or Sinopec) was looking at its investment (it is not clear what Cai meant by this). Andes Petroleum signed a one-year transitory contract in August 2008, the first of the foreign oil companies to sign a new contract after the GOE, first under the Palacio Administration, and now under the Correa Administration, imposed a heavy windfall oil income surcharge, in part to force the companies to renegotiate contracts that were more favorable to the government (Ref F). (Andes, interestingly, lost heavily when the GOE seized the assets of U.S. oil company Occidental Petroleum, since it had bought a 40% share of Oxy's block shortly before the assets were seized.) TOURIST TRAVEL DOCUMENT FULLY IMPLEMENTED ¶8. (C) Ambassador Cai confirmed that the GOE has implemented its tourist travel document policy (Refs D and E) since mid December 2008, and that there has been a slowing of Chinese migration into Ecuador. Indeed, statistics from the Ecuadorian Immigration Police show that during the period of December 10, 2008 through January 22, 2009, 675 Chinese have entered Ecuador while 1,184 Chinese nationals exited. However, it is not clear whether the slowing of migration into Ecuador was due to China's refusal to allow any Chinese national to depart for Ecuador without a visa during the mid weeks of December 2008, or whether the new document policy is having some effect. Even if the policy has worked to slow the flow of migration, it won't be long before the Chinese smugglers learn how to duplicate the travel document. ¶9. (SBU) The flow of Chinese nationals to the U.S., however, has not subsided. DHS/ICE Quito is notified almost on a weekly basis regarding Chinese nationals coming from Ecuador who were intercepted in Panama or another Central American country traveling with Japanese or Korean passports. The receiving country's immigration authorities return the migrants to Ecuador and notifies the Ecuadorian National Police (ENP) at either Guayaquil or Quito airport. According to the ENP, the migrants cannot be prosecuted as they did not use the fraudulent passports to gain entry into Ecuador. The Panamanians also cannot prosecute since the Chinese do not apply for admission into Panama and are merely transiting to another country. ¶10. (C) When asked if the Chinese Embassy has information that could be useful in seizing human smuggling or counterfeit operators, the Chinese Ambassador said that they have information, but that "it is not official." The Embassy will follow up on a working level with our Chinese counterparts to see if some sort of cooperative effort or operation against the smugglers and/or counterfeiters might be possible. NO INTEREST IN MANTA ¶11. (C) The Ambassador inquired about Chinese interest in Manta, either in investment or administration of the airport. Ambassador Cai replied that President Correa had expressed interest in Chinese investment to convert the Manta airport and its facilities into an international airport. However, he said that the number of passengers and flights into and out of Manta would never warrant classifying the airport as "international." He added that there were no Chinese companies interested in investing in Manta, nor was the Chinese government interested in pursuing any agreement on the Manta airport. The Ambassador explained that during Embassy discussions with the GOE regarding the withdrawal of the Forward Operating Location from Manta, the Ecuadorian Air Force was surprised to learn the extent to which the USG paid for the operations and maintenance at the airport. ¶12. (C) Ambassador Cai noted that a representative from Hong Kong based Hutchison-Whampoa came from Panama to discuss the concessionary agreement upgrading the port of Manta with the GOE. The Hutchinson representative privately had told Cai that Hutchison would leave, but thereafter met with Correa. On February 27, Hutchison made an official announcement that it would leave Ecuador (Ref A). During his February 28 Saturday morning address, President Correa mentioned his prior meeting with Hutchison's representative mocking him as a "typical gringo (Note: the representative is actually British) who thinks that we (Ecuador) are a colony." Correa was particularly angry with the CEO's prior public comment that it was not possible for anyone to invest $500 million during an international economic crisis. Correa said that "if Hutchison is not able to fulfill its obligations, it should leave." Hutchison was to invest $578 million over 30 years, with the hope of transforming Manta into one of South America's largest ports and China's gateway to the Americas. NO MONEY FOR RADARS ¶13. (C) Ambassador Cai said that the latest in Ecuador's negotiation to purchase surveillance radars from the China Electronics Technology Corporation (CETC) for its northern border region was that the "Ecuadorian Air Force (FAE) does not have sufficient funds to purchase the radars," and added that the GOE had refused an offer of financing. Interestingly, the deputy FAE commander told Embassy officials in November 2008 that the FAE had allocated $21 million from the 2008 budget for the radars, that the FAE needed to commit the funds before the end of the year, and that the remaining funds to complete the radar purchase would come out of the 2009 and 2010 budgets. CETC entered into the bidding process after the original bid submission deadline with an offer to sell two long-range, two mid-range, and two short-range surveillance radars for $50 million, under-bidding Northrup Grumman and other bidders by $20 million. President Correa authorized the purchase of the radars on March 6, providing the FAE the funds necessary for a first payment. However, the local Northrup Grumman representative privately told the Embassy that the bid was declared vacant and that a commission will be formed by the Defense Ministry to determine next steps. He confirmed press reports that the transaction was halted because the CETC radars did not meet the specification requirements. COMMENT ¶14. (C) Whatever Ambassador Cai's reasons for downplaying the visit by Vice Premier Hui, the visit was apparently productive. China's investmQt in Ecuador and the rapidly increasing bilateral trade makes the relationship an important one for Ecuador. As an example, President Correa included the Chinese Ambassador in a December 30,2008, New Year's luncheon for ambassadors of six countries he referred to as a new "strategic alliance" (Ref C). The GOE often refers to China as a source of investment, as it has done repeatedly in regard to the Manta airport and Manta-Manaus link. Chinese businesses have faced some of the same tribulations that investors from other countries have faced, be it investment losses or barriers to their exports to Ecuador. Ambassador Cai privately admitted that the GOE often requests assistance from the GOC, but said that the GOE's public claims of Chinese assistance are often false. HODGES =======================CABLE ENDS============================