ONE YEAR AFTER BREAK WITH COLOMBIA, GOE REMAINS

C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000177 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARAGRAPH 10) NOTE ADDED SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: TWENTY YEARS TAGS: PREL PTER PREF SNAR OAS EC CO SUBJECT: ONE YEAR AFTER BREAK WITH COLOMBIA, GOE REMAINS UNYIELD... id: 196401 date: 3/11/2009 23:43 refid: 09QUITO177 origin: Embassy Quito classification: CONFIDENTIAL destination: 08QUITO783|09QUITO103 header: VZCZCXYZ0009 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHQT #0177/01 0702343 ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY AD3E4B70 MSI2349-632) O 112343Z MAR 09 ZDS ZDS FM AMEMBASSY QUITO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0163 INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 8032 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 4103 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3451 RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAR LIMA 3097 RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4187 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0430 RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL -------------- header ends -------------- C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000177 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARAGRAPH 10) NOTE ADDED SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: TWENTY YEARS TAGS: PREL PTER PREF SNAR OAS EC CO SUBJECT: ONE YEAR AFTER BREAK WITH COLOMBIA, GOE REMAINS UNYIELDING REF: A. 08 QUITO 783 ¶B. QUITO 103 Classified By: Ambassador Heather M. Hodges for Reasons 1.4 (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Correa government ramped up its rhetoric against Colombia in recent weeks, spurred by a desire to defend itself against accusations of narco-politics, the first anniversary of the March 2008 Colombian attack on a FARC camp in Ecuador, and Colombian remarks. The GOE was delighted by OAS SYG Insulza's statement that there was no basis for accusations of GOE ties with the FARC. To reinforce that perception, the Correa administration agreed to an opposition proposal for an investigative commission. End Summary. CONDITIONS FOR RESTORING TIES ¶2. (SBU) A January 23 MFA press release listed five conditions Colombia must meet before Ecuador would re-establish diplomatic relations, which were broken following the March 1, 2008, Colombian attack on a Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) camp near the town of Angostura in northern Ecuador: -- Ending the "information campaign" that charged the GOE with ties to the FARC, -- Committing to an effective military presence in the border area, -- Providing the information the GOE requested regarding the March 2008 attack, -- Proceeding with the handover of information from the computers found at the site of the attack, and -- Supporting UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) efforts to assist Colombian refugees in Ecuador. ¶3. (C) These conditions are consistent with the GOE's past position. President Correa had set forth three conditions, which effectively covered the first four above, when he met with OAS Secretary General Insulza on July 30, 2008 (Ref A). GOE officials have mentioned the demand for Colombian support of UNHCR on other occasions. ¶4. (C) The third condition above, the demand that Colombia provide information on the attack, is based on GOE suspicion of U.S. involvement. Correa alluded to this when he discussed the conditions vis-a-vis Colombia in his February 28 TV/radio address, "We do not know what planes dropped those bombs, which were North American bombs." In a press interview published March 10, FM Fander Falconi was more explicit, saying that the reason for setting this condition was to establish whether there was involvement of a third country (read the U.S.). He did not reject the idea that the GOE would have to break relations if a third country were involved, depending on the extent of the involvement. GOE RHETORIC SPIKES AGAIN ¶5. (SBU) The allegations over GOE officials' and former officials' ties to the FARC (Ref B),which some of the Ecuadorian media and opposition are referring to as narco-politics, prompted President Correa in mid-February to defend the GOE by casting dispersion on Colombia. Implicitly recalling Colombian accusations last year that the GOE was linked to the FARC, Correa said those Ecuadorians who speak of narco-politics in Ecuador harmed the country and weakened its dignified position against the abuses of an aggressor neighbor country, where there was narco-politics. ¶6. (SBU) As the one-year anniversary of the attack in Angostura approached, President Correa emphasized the GOE conditions for re-establishing relations with Colombia. In his February 28 TV/radio address, he said that Ecuador "wants to renew relations (with Colombia),but only on a foundation of dignity and respect." Correa added one more condition: that Colombia pay compensation to the family of Ecuadorian Franklin Aisalla, who was killed in the attack. ¶7. (SBU) The GOE tone hardened further after Colombian Defense Minister Santos on March 1 defended attacks on terrorists in other countries as a legitimate act of self-defense, and a Colombian radio station reported that two FARC leaders lived in northern Ecuador. During a March 2 press conference with three cabinet ministers defending the GOE position, Coordinating Minister for Internal and External Security Miguel Carvajal condemned Santos' comment and blamed problems between the two countries on the GOC's reliance on "the Bush doctrine." Also on March 2, Correa reportedly stated that if Colombia continued with the policies voiced by its defense minister, that this time it would find Ecuador prepared; he told Colombia not to mess with Ecuador, saying the GOC should start in its own country if it wanted to pursue and attack terrorists. The MFA sent a diplomatic note to the OAS March 3 asking that Insulza express to the GOC the necessity of providing Ecuador precise information about the location of the FARC high command members allegedly enjoying safe haven in Ecuador. (Note: Reportedly without the benefit of specific Colombian information, the Ecuadorian National Police on March 11 announced a major success, the detention of FARC leader Sixto Cabanas, alias Domingo Biojo, in Esmeraldas province. End Note.) The GOE seemed somewhat mollified by the fact that President Uribe did not back Santos' statements, with Carvajal calling Uribe's move a positive gesture. ECUADOR PLAYS UP INSULZA STATEMENT ¶8. (C) Meeting separately on February 26 with President Correa and FM Falconi, OAS Secretary General Jose Miguel Insulza sought to find a way to maintain a channel of dialogue between the GOE and GOC, but apparently made no progress. During an event the evening of February 27 with OAS ambassadors, Insulza called the mediation effort complicated, noted that the "cartilla de seguridad" (guidelines for cooperation between the two militaries) was still functioning at certain levels, and suggested a bigger power (apparently referring to the U.S.) bring the GOE and GOC together. He told the Ambassador privately that he judged the two countries could get past some of the GOE's conditions, but not others, and that the GOE still insisted that the bombs used last March had to have come from another country (meaning the U.S.). ¶9. (C) Insulza appeared to side with the GOE earlier on February 27 at a press conference during a visit to Esmeraldas province in northern Ecuador, accompanied by FM Falconi and Minister Carvajal. According to MFA press statements, Insulza told the press he did not believe the GOE was, or had been, linked to an irregular armed group, be it the FARC or any other, and that everything that had happened since the March 2008 attack had only served to confirm that conclusion. The MFA press statements quote Insulza as stating, "This is a subject that should not be in discussion. Unfortunately, I see in this country those who still put this in doubt, but I believe it is an error. President Correa has given clear signs of his attitude and point of view with respect to the FARC and all of this type of subversive organization." According to the MFA, Insulza also credited Ecuador with making a very significant security effort in its northern border area. During the trip to the border, Insulza received a military briefing, met with a group of refugees, and overflew the region in a helicopter. ¶10. (C) The GOE sought to highlight the refuge it provided Colombian refugees during the February 19-20 visit of U.N. Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees Craig Johnstone, who met with the GOE and traveled to the northern border region. According to an MFA press bulletin, Johnstone announced that UNHCR would provide $22 million in assistance in 2009 for relief programs for Colombian refugees in Ecuador. (Note: This appears to be an MFA error, since the UNHCR Ecuador budget is significantly less. We have asked UNHCR to clarify funding levels for the MFA. End Note.) Johnstone also noted that between 2000 and 2008, Ecuador received over 56,000 requests for refugee status, primarily from Colombians, of which 20,956 have been approved. Johnstone expressed appreciation for USG contributions during a February 19 meeting with the Ambassador. NEW INVESTIGATIVE COMMISSION AND NEW CONTROLS ¶11. (C) In an effort to reduce further its political vulnerability in light of the alleged narco-political scandal, the GOE has agreed to form a new investigative commission. The idea was proposed by Cesar Montufar of the opposition National Democratic Agreement movement, who recommended formation of an independent commission of nonpartisan citizens who would investigate the March 2008 Colombian attack and alleged ties of government officials and former government officials to illegal armed groups. Candidates are to be presented by universities, the media, the Roman Catholic Church, indigenous organization, retired military, etc. President Correa will then appoint the citizens commission from among these candidates. ¶12. (C) Meanwhile, the GOE has announced steps to reinforce security in the northern border area. Minister Carvajal said March 6 that carrying arms in the five northern provinces would be forbidden until new licenses were issued, with tougher criteria to qualify. In addition, fifteen new security posts (five military and ten police) are to be established, and the number of military in the region increased significantly. The worst security situation, according to Carvajal, is in Esmeraldas province. In making this announcement, Carvajal blamed the region's security problems on individuals linked to Colombian paramilitary groups and criminal gangs, not the FARC. (Comment: The GOE likely lacks the resources to carry out the plan Carvajal announced. End Comment.) ¶13. (C) Some Ecuadorians, even those on the left, have urged a change in policy toward Colombia. One is former FM Francisco Carrion, who supported the GOE position on Colombia violating its sovereignty, but now calls for direct dialogue between the two governments. Another is Socialist Party member and Andean Simon Bolivar University professor Enrique Ayala Mora, who argues that the break in relations has been prolonged too long and that it threatens to irreversibly ruin relations with a neighbor and historical partner in the Andean Community. But these voices are few and easily ignored by the GOE. COMMENT ¶14. (C) The animosity President Correa and his ministers exhibit toward Colombia underlines how intractable this diplomatic conflict remains. The renewed allegations of FARC ties to the Correa government are adding more fuel to the fire. We doubt that the Correa government will make any effort to achieve reconciliation while it is campaigning for the April 26 election, and see appointment of the investigative commission as only another attempt to convince voters that the GOE is not hiding anything. Given that the two governments have largely isolated trade (which continues unimpeded) from other problems, Correa appears to believe he has more to gain by drawing out the dispute than seeking a meaningful resolution. HODGES =======================CABLE ENDS============================