KOSOVO: SIGNS OF FINANCIAL CRISIS SURFACING

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000356 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/SCE, DRL, INL, S/WCI; NSC FOR HELGERSON, USUN FOR SGEE, USOSCE FOR AHYDE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID ECIN ECON EFIN ETRD ETTC PREL KV SUBJECT: KOSOVO: SIGNS OF FINANCIAL CRISIS SURFACING SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Kosovo's limited international financial exposure has allowed the country to remain relatively untouched by the global financial crisis. Heavily dependent on international donor assistance, rising public expenditures have managed to stave off any major decline in growth. However, there are indications that Kosovo's financial sector is starting to show some initial effects from the crisis, most apparent in declining remittances and slightly higher non-performing loan rates. Banks are planning to tighten access to capital as a precaution, anticipating tougher times ahead. To date, the Government of Kosovo (GoK) and the Central Bank of Kosovo (CBK) have consistently maintained that the country will remain immune to the crisis. Local financial institutions say this is not realistic and that the GoK should be more conservative with its spending. The concerns of the financial sector were reinforced by the IMF this past June in a Mission Aide Memoire urging more prudent public spending, given the limited financial tools at the GoK's disposal. With uncertain times ahead, and a heavy national dependence on sources of revenue outside the government's control, the GoK should approach discussions on the 2010 budget with caution and fiscal restraint, a point we have been stressing with our GoK interlocutors. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) Kosovo presents an unusual case when assessing the impact of the financial crisis. Most indicators that would signal a country is entering financial distress -- falling exports, currency problems, declining foreign direct investment -- lack utility in Kosovo. While Kosovo's exports have halved since the start of the year -- primarily due to falling metals prices -- overall exports and FDI are so small that a further drop in any other industry would have no noticeable impact. Kosovo is not subject to wild exchange rate fluctuations because it uses the euro as the national currency. While imports, private sector credit and FDI are slowing, these declines have been partially offset by rapid growth in public expenditures. This combination of factors has allowed Kosovo to remain relatively untouched by the global financial crisis so far. Although the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) revised the 
country's 2009 growth estimate from 5% to around 3.4% earlier this year, Kosovo is still one of the few countries in the region anticipating growth at all. BANKS PUT BREAKS ON LENDING AS FIRST SIGNS EMERGE -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) In July, CBK statistics revealed the first indications that the financial crisis might be surfacing in Kosovo. CBK Vice Governor Gani Gerguri told us that demands for loans are increasing, but lending has slowed. Commercial and private lending grew only 5% during the first two quarters of 2009, compared to 32% during the same period last year. Two out of eight banks have effectively stopped lending due to liquidity concerns and significant first quarter losses. Kosovo has a high loan-to-deposit ratio, nearly 85%, and Gerguri said banks are concerned about a future liquidity crisis. Banks are being much more cautious as a result, taking steps to decrease the sector's already limited international exposure, particularly in securities. ¶4. (SBU) Iliri Aliu, Deputy Managing Director of ProCredit Bank, echoed Gerguri's assessment. Aliu said that although the first two quarters of 2009 were positive for ProCredit, Kosovo's largest bank, overall growth has been much slower than in previous years, and the bank is taking precautions. Loan applications are being scrutinized much more closely, particularly from industries that have been hardest hit by the crisis, such as base metals. Aliu noted that all businesses, regardless of sector or size, have demonstrated difficulties repaying loans this year. ProCredit's default rate has increased slightly to just under two percent, which Aliu believes is too high for the local market. ¶5. (SBU) Similar sentiments were expressed by Albert Lumezi, CEO of Kosovo's third largest bank Nova Ljubljanska Banka (NLB). NLB also reported a slower pace of growth for the first half of the year, and Lumezi said the bank will tighten lending for the third and fourth quarters. He explained that NLB's non-performing loan rate increased from 3.2% to 3.8% in July, and lack of contract enforcement in Kosovo makes banks more conservative in issuing loans PRISTINA 00000356 002 OF 003 if they don't have a good feeling about a client. The performance of other banks in the sector has also been cause for concern, said Lumezi. The Turkish Economy Bank (TEB),which opened last year, has increased its share of the market by continuing to pay 7% interest on deposits despite first and second quarter losses this year. Four out of eight banks in Kosovo are reporting losses in 2009, including second-largest bank Raiffesien, which was hard hit by bad loans and falling stock prices. The other four banks are operating with very little growth or are just breaking even. DELAYED IMPACT OF REMITTANCES -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Remittances constitute a significant portion of Kosovo's economy. Financial institutions estimate that remittances through official channels, such as money transfer agencies and commercial bank transfers from abroad, comprise somewhere between 15-17% of GDP, with a larger amount coming in unrecorded. Both ProCredit and NLB expressed skepticism that Kosovo's large diaspora will be able to continue providing as much financing as they have in previous years According to Pro-Credit's Aliu, the impact of cuts in remittances to Kosovo remains to be fully felt. He elaborated that though the disapora's expenses have increased, and some have lost their jobs, social benefits have compensated for the loss of wages, continuing the flow of funds back to Kosovo. Aliu predicts that when these social benefits run out, Kosovo's citizens will begin to feel the effects of the financial crisis more concretely, probably toward the end of 2009. ¶7. (SBU) There is some indication that the effects are already beginning to be felt. Early estimates from the CBK indicate remittances are down 5-9% this year. In addition, the diaspora, which usually descends on Kosovo each summer flush with cash to spend on retail purchases and services, seems to be spending less this year than in the past. Aliu said that many businesses are already reporting lower sales this summer season, ostensibly because the diaspora is bringing back less money. BUDGET EFFECTS -------------- ¶7. (SBU) While Kosovo's financial sector remains stable, the GoK is heavily reliant on income sources that are out of the government's control, such as remittances, donor contributions and FDI. About 70% of Kosovo's budget is financed by VAT and other customs fees collected at the border, holding critical public expenditures hostage to high volumes of imports. Foreign assistance is another significant funding source and actual assistance could decrease as donor countries face liquidity issues of their own, resulting in reduced imports, decreased tax revenues, lower GDP growth, and possibly job losses. The GoK has few tools at its disposable to even address financial difficulties. While the euro provides welcome stability, Kosovo is reliant on the ECB to make sound decisions on monetary policy and the CBK pegs interest rates to ECB rates. The lack of a national monetary policy leaves Kosovo with only fiscal policy as a major macroeconomic mechanism. At this time, the GoK is not able to loan money to cover eventual liquidity issues that may arise, leaving prudent management of public funds the primary instrument at the government's disposal. This makes a stable financial sector and adequate bank reserves all the more important, in order to give the GoK some flexibility when faced with a financial crisis. ¶8. (SBU) The GoK dipped into national reserves during this year's mid-year budget review, electing to increase expenditures to over 1.5% of GDP without serious consideration of how external factors could impact future financing. If the government executes the budget in its entirety, Kosovo's fiscal deficit is likely to reach almost 11% of GDP in 2009. This, coupled with the country's enormous and growing trade deficit hovering around 45% of GDP, does not leave the GoK with many options to respond to a financial crisis. The decision to engage in deficit spending during uncertain times and without prudent fiscal policies earned the GoK harsh criticism from the IMF this past June in a Mission Aide Memoire that urged a reassessment of spending priorities to restore fiscal sustainability. Although Kosovo exports very little, poor fiscal management will harm nascent exporters and negatively impact PRISTINA 00000356 003 OF 003 employment growth in export industries. Kosovo already faces a high, but steady, unemployment rate of around 43%. Further job losses and reduced spending will lead to lower imports, directly impacting customs revenues and stagnating Kosovo's already modest economic growth, leading to even more pressure on the GoK to create jobs and increase assistance to various social groups. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Although the effects of the financial crisis have been slow to surface in Kosovo, and it is unclear what the ultimate extent of the impact will be, the country is not invulnerable. Although it has avoided the more extreme effects the crisis has wreaked on other economies, Kosovo could suffer longer-term effects that lead to a shrinking economy. Avoiding this fate will require Kosovo to attract more foreign investment and execute prudent public spending, in order to escape the whims of unpredictable revenue streams. The GoK has all but ignored IMF advice to cut back on spending and develop sound fiscal policies to inform budget decisions, insisting that Kosovo will remain immune to the financial crisis. Mr. Lumezi of NLB pointedly told us it would help if the GoK admitted there are difficulties, instead of claiming Kosovo is immune. Not only would this give foreign investors more confidence that Kosovo has prepared to address potential financial issues, it would also set the stage for a more realistic discussion on future budget spending. Ignoring possible difficulties will do the opposite. In advance of government's discussions on the 2010 budget, we and others in the international community are urging the GoK to develop and implement sound fiscal policies that exercise restraint. END COMMENT. MURPHY