KOSOVO: SERBIAN GOVERNMENT SHRINKS PARALLEL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000146 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, DRL, INL NSC FOR HELGERSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2019 TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KV SUBJECT: KOSOVO: SERBIAN GOVERNMENT SHRINKS PARALLEL MUNICIPAL STRUCTURES, SEEKS SOLUTION TO SERBS' ELECTRICITY PROBLEMS REF: PRISTINA 114 Classified By: Ambassador Tina S. Kaidanow for Reasons 1.4 (b),(d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Prompted at least in part by the financial crisis and the burden of subsidizing parallel structures in Kosovo, Serbian officials from the Ministry for Kosovo have taken steps to curtail the power and influence of Serbian parallel municipal governments in some southern enclaves. The parallel governments of Pristina and Peja/Pec municipalities were dissolved by Serbian government order on April 3. Assistant Minister for Kosovo Dragan Petkovic, a member of Serbian President Tadic's Democratic Party (DS), reports that five or six additional parallel governments will soon be disbanded as well. Petkovic also says he is attempting to moderate the often provocative behavior of the hardline Serb parallel municipal government in the enclave of Strpce. The Ministry continues to work with the Embassy and the Kosovo Energy Corporation (KEK) to find a solution to the long-running problem of Kosovo Serbs' electricity supply and failure to pay for this commodity. Serbian Minister for Kosovo Goran Bogdanovic (DS) met with USAID-funded KEK advisors in Belgrade on March 25; both sides said the meeting was very productive. Ministry officials in Kosovo have been meeting with KEK and local Serb communities since then with mixed, though improving, results. While these developments are encouraging, there is still no sign that this flexibility will extend to other issues, including decentralization or the practical issues of police, justice and customs that EULEX is discussing directly with Belgrade. END SUMMARY. Parallel Governments Dissolved ¶2. (C) On April 3, the Kosovo Serb parallel municipal governments of Pristina (based in the Serb enclave of Gracanica) and Peja/Pec (based in the enclave of Gorazdevac) were dissolved and replaced with small, appointed councils. A copy of the Serbian government decision regarding the Pristina government names 5 persons as members of the "temporary organs of the city of Pristina," replacing an estimated 900 people on the payroll. Serbian Assistant Minister for Kosovo Dragan Petkovic told us April 7 that the disbanded municipal governments had not complied with Serbian laws on municipal budgets and accountability and had hired many more people in excess of authorized staffing levels. ¶3. (C) Petkovic went on to say that five to six other parallel governments would be disbanded in the near future for similar reasons. According to him, the Ministry for Kosovo estimates that it can save up to 2 million Euro (roughly 800 million Serbian Dinar) per year by eliminating these extra employees. He went on to note that Minister Bogdanovic had decided to "clean out" Ministry structures, which were established under previous Minister for Kosovo Slobodan Samardzic, a close ally of former Serbian PM Vojislav Kostunica and a stalwart in Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS). (Note: Nationalist politics prevail among Kosovo Serbs. A large majority of Kosovo Serb parallel municipal officials belong to the hardline nationalist wing of Serbian politics - the DSS, the Serbian Radical Party (SRS),and even more nationalist members of the ruling coalition-Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). This puts them in opposition to the relatively more moderate policies of the DS, which runs the Kosovo Ministry. End Note.) Moderating Strpce ¶4. (C) In addition to dissolving some municipal governments, Petkovic says he has become more active in managing others. At our April 7 meeting he discussed his attempts to moderate the behavior of the parallel mayor of Shterpce/Strpce, Zvonko Mihaijlovic, an SRS party member who has undertaken provocative actions since assuming control of the Serb-majority enclave in June 2008. Petkovic reported that he had instructed Mihaijlovic to be "mindful" of the fact that Shterpce/Strpce, while a Serb area, is surrounded by PRISTINA 00000146 002 OF 003 Albanian-dominated municipalities, which should constrain more risky behavior, such as moves to openly control municipal records and stop motorists entering the "weekend zone" near Brezovica, a ski resort area on the outskirts of Strpce. (Note: Illegal construction by Albanians in the "weekend zone" has been a long-running sore point with local Serbs, including Mihaijlovic. End Note.) Electricity: Still Looking for a Solution ¶5. (C) Aside from managing local parallel structures, Petkovic has been actively engaged with both the Embassy and the Kosovo Energy Corportation (KEK) to find a solution to the long-running problem of supplying electricity to Kosovo Serbs. Network failures resulted in a wave of power outages to Serb enclaves in central and eastern Kosovo in February and March. Petkovic approached the Embassy to find a solution; we in turn placed him in direct contact with KEK. On March 25, Senior KEK Advisor (and USAID-contracted expert) Massoud Keyan met Petkovic and Minister Bogdanovic in Belgrade to discuss ways to bring Kosovo Serbs, who have not paid for electricity (while still receiving it) since 1999, back into normal, paying customer relationships with KEK. Both sides were highly satisfied with the meeting, at which Bogdanovic agreed on the need for Serbs to begin paying for electricity. On April 7, Petkovic reported that his efforts to mobilize Serb officials in the Kosovo Ministry and its Coordination Center (CCK) to convince Serbs in enclaves to sign agreements with KEK had been mixed. Citizens in a few small Serb villages have agreed to begin paying their power bills, but most communities have yet to agree to begin dealing with KEK. ¶6. (C) According to Petkovic and other sources (such as Serb contacts in the NGO sector),a large majority of Kosovo Serbs are willing to pay for electricity. However, two main obstacles have emerged: debt and community billing (i.e., an arrangement by which an entire village or enclave pays the bill to one intermediary who would then pay KEK the monthly bill of the entire area). Debts owed by Kosovo Serbs for unpaid bills since 1999 reach into the hundreds of millions of Euro, and while KEK management is fully aware that it cannot (and should not, for reasons of efficiency) pursue collection, many Serbs are afraid that signing KEK contracts and paying monthly bills will make them liable for all past debt. KEK has structured its offer to non-paying customers to account for this fear by promising to set aside the issue of debt as long as customers begin paying current bills and do so for 12 months consecutively, thus satisfying legal requirements. Petkovic told us that while he and other Ministry officials understood KEK's position on debt, many Kosovo Serbs remain afraid to sign anything without firmer assurances they would not become targets for debt collection. ¶7. (C) A related problem is community billing. Since the March 25 meeting, Petkovic and other Serbian officials have joined KEK officials in visiting many of the enclaves affected by power outages to discuss reconnection. In some places, such as the enclave of Priluzje (Vushtrri/Vucitrn municipality),there has been resistance to the idea of having all Serb residents individually sign contracts with KEK. While community billing is seen by both KEK and Serbian officials as a solution, key details remain unresolved. Petkovic told us April 7 that KEK has technical requirements for anyone who plays the role of community bill collector. Furthermore, Serbian electrical utility EPS, which maintains an unauthorized (but tolerated) presence in many Serb enclaves, is not likely to register with Kosovo authorities. EPS registration would, in theory, allow it to become a secondary provider of electricity in enclaves, and its personnel are technically qualified to fulfill all roles related to community billing. In the interim, Petkovic asked the Embassy to convince KEK to show flexibility. His ultimate aim is "to get things started," convince Serbs to start paying, and then to normalize the situation over the next 3 to 6 months, to include EPS registration in Kosovo. PRISTINA 00000146 003 OF 003 Comment ¶8. (C) It is becoming clearer to us that the Serbian government's fiscal problems, along with a modified approach to certain issues affecting the Serb community, is starting to change some things on the ground here. The sudden cuts of two parallel governments with the prospect of further action makes fiscal and political sense to the DS-run Ministry for Kosovo. They also have the potential to limit the influence of hardline troublemakers over Kosovo Serbs, which would be beneficial to the achievement of USG policy goals. However, such change comes slowly and has limits. Despite clear and sustained willingness from Petkovic and his Minister to find a solution to the electricity problem, we have yet to see significant progress, nor is there any sign that the "new approach" of the Serbian government extends farther than the electricity issue itself. We will continue to work with both Serbian officials and KEK to seek maximum flexibility in finding a lasting solution to this complex issue. We would consider potential success here as a base for further efforts to tackle other practical problems affecting Kosovo Serbs. KAIDANOW