Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09PRETORIA771
2009-04-17 15:08:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Pretoria
Cable title:  

SA PERMIT FOR ZIMBABWEANS (PART 2)

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREF PREL SF 
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VZCZCXRO2838
RR RUEHDU RUEHJO
DE RUEHSA #0771/01 1071508
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 171508Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8153
INFO RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1324
RUEHOR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE 5469
RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE 3832
RUEHLS/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 3777
RUEHTO/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 6065
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 6752
RUEHDU/AMCONSUL DURBAN 0868
RUEHJO/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG 9099
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PRETORIA 000771 

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF PREL SF
SUBJECT: SA PERMIT FOR ZIMBABWEANS (PART 2)

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Summary
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PRETORIA 000771

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF PREL SF
SUBJECT: SA PERMIT FOR ZIMBABWEANS (PART 2)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. There are currently more questions than answers
surrounding the SAG's implementation of a temporary permit
for Zimbabwean migrants to remain in South Africa (ref A).
The Minister of Home Affairs' (DHA) April 3 announcement of
the new policy was a surprise, albeit a welcome one, to the
rights community and apparently even to her own department.
On April 9, DHA officials discussed the permit's rollout with
UNHCR, IOM, and rights NGOs in a day-long workshop. The
frank and open exchange helped DHA to identify its own
planning gaps vis-a-vis issuance logistics and criteria,
interdependencies with police and other SAG departments,
communications with the public and migrants, and implications
for long-range immigration policies. End Summary.

--------------
SAG & NGOs Identify Planning Variables
--------------


2. (SBU) On April 9, refoff joined about 20 representatives
of UNHCR, IOM, and rights NGOs in a full-day workshop with
DHA officials to discuss the implementation of the newly
announced temporary permit for Zimbabweans in South Africa.
Hosted by Wits University's Forced Migration Studies Program
(FMSP) and local NGO Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR),the
invitation-only session was closed to the press and public,
enabling candid collaboration. Modiri Matthews, Chief
Director of the Home Affairs Inspectorate, and Burton Joseph,
Director of Immigration Policy, explained what had been
decided thus far, candidly admitted what was still uncertain,
and freely welcomed suggestions to guide their planning. The
group surfaced more questions than answers, but the session
helped DHA identify areas for further clarification.

Issuance Logistics
--------------

- Timetable: no one knew when rollout could begin, based on
planning and logistical hurdles; nor was it clear how long
Zimbabweans would be in limbo between the past and future
regimes. Would existing asylum-seekers' permits be honored
in the meantime?

- Locations: Matthews and Joseph were unsure of issuance
channels, thinking perhaps existing DHA centers would be
used. UNHCR strongly advocated for separation from the
asylum streams, to avoid competition between crowds. (Note:
in April 13 meetings with a visiting USG StaffDel, IOM told
us DHA is considering using IOM's facility at Beitbridge, on
the Zimbabwean side of the border, along with other
"satellite" permit issuance centers throughout Zimbabwe, in
an almost consular-style processing.)

Screening Criteria
--------------

- Nationality test: since all Zimbabweans are eligible, the

card is essentially a confirmation of nationality, but it is
unclear how DHA will determine this when most migrants lack
other ID's. Perhaps Zimbabweans will be recruited to conduct
screening, based on language and local knowledge? How will
Malawians long resident in Zimbabwe be discerned?

- Data capture: what information will be asked of applicants?
Will this include bio-data like fingerprints? What are the
fraud prevention measures, given DHA's acknowledged problems
of internal corruption? Will DHA's data bases be networked
nationally, in case the cards are lost?

Interagency Effects
--------------

- Deportations: LHR noted that deportations took place from
Musina even the day after DHA's announcement. (They were
QMusina even the day after DHA's announcement. (They were
still ongoing on April 16, according to IOM's officer at the
border.) A police official explained that his officers could
only change operating procedures upon receipt of formal
instruction from the Minister.

- Interagency consultation: NGOs advised DHA to coordinate

PRETORIA 00000771 002 OF 002


urgently with other SAG departments, to assess and plan for
possible implications in the areas of labor, health,
education, and children's services.

Public Relations
--------------

- Communications: workshop participants stressed the
importance of clear communications about the program, with
messages targeted to the South African public (particularly
to avoid fanning xenophobia),to prospective employers (on
document format, and work entitlements),and to Zimbabwean
migrant community itself (to defuse suspicion).

- Formalization of the policy: beyond a press statement by
the Minister, there is nothing more formal committing the
government to the new permit regime. Would any more
authoritative Act, Decree, or Order be forthcoming in writing?

Policy Implications
--------------

- Scope creep: although the card is exclusive to Zimbabweans,
it is for political purposes to be named as a permit for
nationals of the 14-state Southern African Development
Community (SADC). When, if ever, will other nationals be
able to apply? Won't other migrants also petition to be
included?

- Long-range planning: how does the stopgap solution of a
temporary permit transition to a longer-range strategy? How
does this program dovetail into discussions for eventual
freedom of movement within SADC? As FMSP's Tara Polzer
stressed, termination of the program could easily be
politicized, as it was based on subjective criteria of
normalization in Zimbabwe, and hence it was crucial to define
an end-game strategy clearly from the start. Excessive
emphasis on the "temporary" nature of the policy could create
public expectations of mass deportations at the end.
Instead, in FMSP's view, the program should be positioned as
a first step toward long-term SADC solidarity and regional
integration.

LA LIME

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