PART 1 OF 3: SCENESETTER FOR SOUTH AFRICA'S APRIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PRETORIA 000664

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2019
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL SF
SUBJECT: PART 1 OF 3: SCENESETTER FOR SOUTH AFRICA'S APRIL
22 NATIONAL ELECTION

REF: A. PRETORIA 000543

B. PRETORIA 000544

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Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR RAYMOND L. BROWN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)
AND (D).

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Summary
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1. (C) South Africa on April 22 will hold its fourth
national election since the end of apartheid in 1994. From
all indications, the government and its institutions are
ready for this poll, and turnout is expected to be the
highest since former President Nelson Mandela's victory 15
years ago. The election will begin to provide answers to a
number of key questions such as whether Mosiuoa Lekota's
newly formed Congress of the People (COPE) is a viable
opposition, whether the ruling African National Congress
(ANC) will hold onto governing the Western Cape, whether the
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) will remain relevant in KwaZulu
Natal, and whether the tripartite alliance's staunch support
of ANC President Jacob Zuma will be vindicated with a
resounding victory -- and a better than two-thirds majority
in Parliament. However, even as the vote answers a number of
key questions, new ones will arise that will set the tone for
the new administration. Questions such as whether the ANC
President can govern successfully for a full presidential
term in the face of wide-ranging corruption charges, whether
the ANC will drastically overhaul former President Thabo
Mbeki's policies, and whether Zuma and his ANC will soften
the party's stance in support of fellow liberation movements
will feature prominently in the months ahead. This election,
through the questions it answers, will mark a seminal moment
in this country's rich history and will speak volumes about
where this nation is after 15 years of multi-racial,
multi-party democracy. Yet, as the election illuminates
where the country is today, the uncertainties that remain
will make it hard to say with full confidence where South
Africa is going next. This cable is part 1 of 3 on the South
African election. End Summary.

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From Polokwane in 2007 to Present
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2. (C) The ANC remains the strongest political party in the
country and has dominated the electoral scene since its
national congress held in Polokwane in December 2007. In
many ways, the political infighting within the ANC over
whether to support Mbeki's bid for a third term as the
party's leader or to support the formerly discredited and
discounted Zuma colors the prism through which this poll can
be viewed. At the congress in Polokwane, Zuma soundly
defeated Mbeki for the party presidency with the backing of
the ANC's Youth League, the ANC's Women's League, the
Congress of South African Trade Unions, and the South African
Communist Party. Scholars and political analysts have noted
that Zuma's victory came about through the unity of the
former Deputy President's allies and attracting those
disenchanted by Mbeki's leadership style and direction.
After his defeat, Mbeki held onto the South African
presidency while the newly-elected, Zuma-allied National
Executive Council (NEC),which also was elected at Polokwane,
sought to consolidate Zuma's victory. The decision by the
National Prosecuting Authority to re-file corruption charges
against Zuma days after his electoral victory instantly
intensified the polarization between Zuma's and Mbeki's
Qintensified the polarization between Zuma's and Mbeki's
factions within the party. Many ANC supporters accused Mbeki
of politically interfering to carry out his grudge against
Zuma. While stopping short of declaring him innocent of any
crime, Zuma supporters ardently accused Mbeki of fomenting a
political conspiracy to "persecute" Zuma with new corruption
charges designed to deny his national presidential
aspirations. In subsequent months, the NEC led a campaign to
realign and purge the party of Mbeki's allies and replace
them with Zuma loyalists. At the national, provincial, and
local levels, Mbeki's allies were shown the door. This
process further polarized the ANC as members coalesced around
these two leaders. The ANC,s new Deputy President Kgalema
Motlanthe was positioned by the NEC to take a seat in
Parliament, then elevated to the cabinet as a second deputy
president with the unofficial portfolio to oversee the smooth
presidential transition from Mbeki to Zuma.

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3. (C) The anxiously awaited start of Zuma's criminal trial
in August 2008 was again put on hold as Zuma's legal team
filed a petition at the Pietermaritzburg Regional Court.
This petition asked that the charges be dropped because the
NPA failed to consult with Zuma before re-filing corruption
charges in December. Zuma's lawyers further claimed that
their client was a victim of a political conspiracy led by
the SAG with the goal of precluding Zuma's "rightful"
elevation to the state presidency. Legal proceedings were
suspended until mid-September when the ruling on Zuma's
petition was expected. In the following weeks, the ANC
alliance partners -- led by Julius Malema of the ANC Youth
League, Blade Nzimande of the South African Communist Party
(SACP),and Zwelinzima Vavi of the Congress of South African
Trade Unions (COSATU) -- engaged in a national campaign of
direct action and intimidation in Zuma's defense. They
declared that: Zuma was innocent until proven guilty; they
were prepared to die or kill for Zuma; he was a victim of
political persecution; he could not get a fair trial; the
courts were corrupted by political influence; those opposed
to Zuma's aspirations for national leadership were
"counter-revolutionaries" and "would be crushed"; and a
political solution (often defined as dropping all charges)
should be found for this political trial. Most alarming to
South Africans, several leaders of this campaign warned that
if Zuma was found guilty, they would make South Africa
ungovernable and there would be "blood on the floor."


4. (C) High Court Judge Chris Nicholson's ruling on Zuma's
appeal in September 2008 was described as a "political
Tsunami" that changed South Africa's political culture.
Within ten days, intra-ANC maneuvering resulted in Mbeki
being forced to step down just seven months before his second
term was to end. The following day, a third of his cabinet
resigned in solidarity with him. Three days later, Motlanthe
the long serving, well-respected former ANC General-Secretary
and new Deputy President, became South Africa's third
president in the post-apartheid era. Curiously, for the
first month or so of this unelected tenure, Zuma referred to
Motlanthe as the "acting president" until pundits and
editorialists pointed out that the constitution did not
provide for an "acting" president. In response to that
critique, Zuma and NEC leaders have consistently referred to
Motlanthe as a caretaker president.


5. (C) Shortly thereafter, a splinter from the ANC, led by
former Defense Minister Lekota, emerged. COPE initially
attracted many of Mbeki's closest allies into the new
breakaway party and has grown substantially since its
formation in early November by the defections of primarily
alienated and disgruntled life-long ANC members and
Mbeki-supporters from the SACP and COSATU. The question then
and now remains whether the party could draw in Mbeki
himself. So far, the former leader has remained largely on
the sidelines while rumors persist that he is a policy
consultant for COPE and could publicly join then anytime
before the election. Meanwhile, Motlanthe has overseen a
steady but lackluster ship since assuming the presidency in
September 2008. Political analysts and activists lauded his
Cabinet appointments while opposition leaders appeared
QCabinet appointments while opposition leaders appeared
generally satisfied with many of his decisions such as
offering to look into the medical parole of the convicted
former Zuma business associate Schabir Shaik. However,
Motlanthe -- and especially the newly empowered ANC and
alliance -- made it clear when he assumed office that he was
not to upstage Zuma or deviate from the ANC leader's agenda.
Even at the high mark of Motlanthe's presidency, the State of
the Nation address, the South African leader did little to
take away from the ANC's agenda or policy plans. His
steadfast loyalty and tractability to the ANC has meant a
largely smooth ride since Mbeki left office, but also it has
meant seven lost months of politically marking time, with no
major initiatives implemented from government policy.
Indeed, early in the first half of his tenure, he was invited
to the White House for an emergency summit on the global
financial crises as well as the Davos Economic Summit. He
received very favorable press coverage that raised the ire of
Zuma supporters who complained the state media was making him
look too presidential to the disadvantage of Zuma. In the
latter half of his limited tenure, we noted that Motlanthe
has not had as many opportunities to be portrayed as more
presidential than Zuma, and he has received much less public
exposure and press attention as a result.

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The Candidates: The Most Divisive ANC Leader?
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6. (C) Zuma, as leader of the ANC during a period that saw
Mbeki forcibly recalled, has had his leadership skills tested
as no party leader has before him. Zuma has combined the
force of being an affable, dancing bureaucrat with the force
of being a popular Zulu to change the face of the ruling
party. Yet, University of South Africa professor Dirk Kotze
told Poloff last year that "he would hate to be Zuma." Kotze
said, "Even though he may be the next leader of the country,
he was the man who oversaw the split of the movement."
Moreover, Kotze thought the splintering of the ANC with the
formation of COPE had more to do with Zuma as an individual
than it does with underlying forces within the ANC. Kotze
asserted, "The bottom line is that there are many that simply
hate Zuma as much as some love him." In the midst of this
splintering and anger over the rise of Zuma, the ANC has had
to carry forward an election campaign under a caretaker
leader, Motlanthe, and under the cloud of a corruption case
against the former Deputy President. Many political analysts
and pundits question whether the ANC has been wise to risk so
much in its dogged pursuit of a Zuma presidency. Yet, the
campaign from all appearances has been well-organized,
well-funded, and has touched every corner of the country.
Zuma has met with the country's traditional leaders and with
Afrikaner, Xhosa, and Zulu community groups. He also has
spoken at several of the country's largest churches and
synagogues. The ANC has received funding from prominent
backers such as Cyril Ramaphosa and Tokyo Sexwale as well as
from other businessmen and corporations. Moreover, the
Chinese Government and business contacts in eastern Europe
and the Middle East reportedly have donated money to the
ANC's election efforts. The ANC also has done a solid job of
visiting all areas of the country, even if it failed to
deliver in all areas. The ANC Youth League last week visited
the Afrikaner community of Orania in Northern Cape. Zuma and
the party have spared no effort to project a unified,
organized campaign. Despite such an effort, questions about
Zuma and his ANC remain. What leaders and policy advisers
Zuma will rely on after the election, whether the factional
polarization that exists in the organization will dissolve
after the polls, or whether Zuma will ever face a court case
related to charges of corruption, fraud, money laundering,
and racketeering probably will not be answered until after
April 22. Zuma's leadership will be tested again in the
months ahead.

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The Candidates: "Let Her Be Our Face"
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7. (C) The DA has made no secret of its campaign strategy
for this election -- put party leader, and Cape Town mayor,
Helen Zille out front. The country's strongest opposition is
seeking to build on its 2004 election results of 50 seats (12
percent of the vote),and its strategy is to win Western Cape
and then build a strong record of service delivery to win key
metropolitan areas in 2011. The party claims to be the
"trusted hand" in coalitions and would be open to working
with other parties; however, they so far have made no move to
Qwith other parties; however, they so far have made no move to
align themselves. Zille has consistently told reporters that
the DA wants to see how it can do at the polls before
committing itself to alliances with other parties. Ryan
Coetzee, number one on the DA,s Western Cape list, told Cape
Town Poloff the DA is happy to work with COPE in a coalition,
but would not align themselves with the ANC "because the
whole purpose of forming a coalition is to increase democracy
by decreasing the ANC's power." Although the DA looks
well-positioned to build off of its 2004 and 2006 election
performances in Western Cape, it may have difficulty carrying
its message forward in other provinces and outside of urban
centers for two reasons. First, the decision by Zille to
stand as the party's premier candidate -- giving up her seat
as Cape Town mayor -- means that there will be essentially
two centers of power in the party. Kotze told Poloff on
March 27 that her decision to stand as a premier candidate is
"baffling and could weaken the party's structures and its
ability to show unity in the ranks." Second, although Zille
is the face of the party's campaign, most pundits and
political analysts see the election as also being about
whether the DA's efforts to restructure and bring in new

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voters -- non-white voters -- have been successful.
By-election results in Cape Town suggest that the DA has been
somewhat successful tapping into non-white areas, but so far
this does not seem to have translated to Johannesburg,
Pretoria, or Durban. (Note: The popular perception that the
DA is a "white party" undermines its effort to diversify its
support base and the ANC opportunistically emphasizes this
distinction with claims that the DA wishes to return South
Africa to the past of white minority rule. Interestingly, it
remains hard to predict where Indian and colored voters'
support will fall countrywide in this election. End Note.)

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The Candidates: "Tired" and Tested Leadership
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8. (C) The IFP may be the opposition party most weakened
since the 2004 election. The party, led by the venerable
Mangosuthu Buthelezi, won 28 seats (6 percent of the vote)
during that poll. Parliamentarian Eric Lucas told Econoff
last year that "10 percent of the vote may be the best case
scenario." However, he admitted at the time that even that
number may be too high. He pointed to funding as being a key
problem for the IFP given that many Durban businesses are
throwing their support behind KwaZulu Natal's native son,
Zuma. What he did not point to as being a hindrance, but
what many political analysts and pundits see as the party's
biggest weakness, is the leadership of Buthelezi himself.
Showing few signs of slowing down or choosing a successor,
Buthelezi seems somewhat disconnected from party efforts to
cultivate new, talented leaders. IFP Youth Brigade President
Pat Lebenya-Ntanzi told Durban ConGen and visiting Pretoria
Poloff that succession within the party is not transparent
and that even though the party successfully listed its
provincial and national candidates, the political infighting
behind the process was "ugly." She expressed concern that
the party's leadership failed to understand just how "ugly"
the list process was because many of them had shut out those
within the party with leadership aspirations. At one point
she said that party elders often refer to those within the
youth brigade as "kids always asking for things." The party
for now remains focused on job creation, health, education,
and fighting corruption and its campaign agenda mirrors what
its leaders have both pushed publicly and shared with US
diplomats in recent months. Although the IFP's agenda may
prove attractive to some voters, the party probably will be
hindered by the decision to maintain its leadership intact as
political analysts and pundits say the IFP needs to deal with
succession sooner rather than later.

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The Candidates: The First Angry Man
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9. (C) What started off with anger directed at the ANC seems
to have quieted and turned into a disorganized and badly
funded electoral campaign. Some pundits and political
analysts initially and optimistically projected that Lekota's
COPE could win 50 percent of the vote or more -- drawing key
leaders from the ANC all along the way. In recent months,
however, those projections have continued to fall. Many
political commentators see COPE getting between 25 and 50
Qpolitical commentators see COPE getting between 25 and 50
seats (or roughly 6 to 15 percent of the vote). The reasons
for the decreased expectations are varied and include party
factionalism, poor planning, and a lack of funding. First,
there are signs of a power struggle between Lekota and
Mvumelwana "Mvume" Dandala. Lekota's personal assistant,
Tseliso Phomane, told Poloff earlier this year that Lekota's
ego was bruised following the party's decision to appoint
Dandala as the presidential candidate. Phomane added that
factions within the party are strong between those who
support Lekota and those who support former Gauteng premier
Mbhazima Shilowa. Phomane himself has been accused of being
"too much of a Lekota man."


10. (C) The manifestation of such a power struggle is
confusion and poor planning. For example, no other political
party has campaign posters featuring two different leaders as
COPE does with Lekota and Dandala both on party signs across
the country. Perhaps the most telling example of poor
planning was at a meeting held at the US Embassy with senior
COPE leaders. Despite efforts by Poloff and Econoff,
representatives both for Lekota and Dandala failed to
communicate their attendance or agendas to each other.

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Lekota was surprised to see Dandala entering the Embassy's
elevator and Dandala was equally surprised. Moreover, Lekota
spoke at length throughout the meeting, in an obvious effort
to keep Dandala from speaking. Third, funding has been an
issue. COPE's leadership has been consistent in saying that
the party could win Eastern Cape and Limpopo, but admits that
"if we had money we could compete with anyone, but funding
has not come fast enough." Funding may have been even harder
to come by given the recent global economic crisis, with many
South African businesses seeking to stay close to the known
quantity of the ANC. COPE already has had an impact in this
election -- drawing long-time ANC leaders away from their
spiritual and ideological home. Every percentage point that
COPE wins is likely to require 160,000 to 170,000 votes.
Political commentator Richard Calland notes, "5 percent would
be a solid achievement; 10 percent would be remarkable."
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