STUDY FINDS XENOPHOBIC ATTACKS DRIVEN BY LOCAL

UNCLAS PRETORIA 000553

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF SF
SUBJECT: STUDY FINDS XENOPHOBIC ATTACKS DRIVEN BY LOCAL
POWER POLITICS

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SUMMARY
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1. On March 11, a Wits University team unveiled the results
of their research into the direct triggers of last year's
xenophobic attacks in South African townships. Interviews
and focus groups with over 300 residents of seven areas found
the attacks were premeditated and organized by community
leaders for their own political and economic gains. Police
and other neighbors were largely passive during the attacks,
either out of sympathy with the vigilantes, or out of fear of
challenging them. Nine months later, the SAG has undertaken
no substantive initiatives for reintegration of displaced
foreigners, nor put in place any measures to prevent the
recurrence of violence, nor put a single perpetrator on
trial. In the current election season, there is little
political will to champion migrants' rights. End Summary.

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CONTEXT: Broad Social Drivers of Xenophobia
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2. Waves of xenophobic attacks against foreign migrants and
ethnic minorities in May-June 2008, causing 62 deaths and the
displacement of tens of thousands, shocked South Africa and
belied its inclusive 'rainbow nation' ethos. Analysts
generally attributed the attacks to broad economic and social
ills -- such as poverty, extreme economic inequality,
unemployment, and inadequate delivery of public services
(e.g. housing, utilities, health care),creating competition
for jobs and resources in squatter settlements. Foreigners
were further blamed for the spread of crime and drugs.
Apartheid's legacies of intolerance of alien groups, of
distrust of police and formal authority structures, and of
vigilante violence all were considered to have fed impulses
to eject non-nationals by means of mob action.

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STUDY: Direct Local Triggers of Violence
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3. On March 11, Wits University's Forced Migration Studies
Programme (FMSP; http://migration.org.za) unveiled its
research into the xenophobic attacks, the first to delve
beneath macro social factors to the direct localized triggers
of violence. The research was underwritten by the
International Organization for Migration (IOM),in turn
funded by the UK's Department for International Development
(DFID). While agreeing with the broad-brush explanations,
Wits' lead researcher Jean Pierre Misago said the study
asked: if xenophobic sentiments and tensions were pervasive
in South Africa, why did violence occur only in selected
areas? To find the answer, researchers surveyed 305 persons
(218 in one-on-one interviews, 87 in 10 focus groups) in
seven areas of Gauteng and Western Cape provinces -- five
areas that experienced violence, and two areas that did not.
Respondents spanned local residents, community leaders,
police, NGOs, foreigners targeted in attacks, and even
perpetrators of the violence.

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FINDING: Leaders Gained from Purges
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4. Wits' MSRP team found the attacks were premeditated, not
spontaneous, and organized by township leaders for their own
political and economic gains. These leaders were both formal
and informal authorities -- such as ward councilors, ANC
party "comrades," members of "street committees," and
neighborhood-watch Community Policing Forums (CPFs). Some
were directly involved in organizing attacks, as a way of
Qwere directly involved in organizing attacks, as a way of
winning the support of residents and consolidating their
control of contested neighborhoods. Such power, in turn,
commonly conferred illicit economic rents and rackets, such
as under-table fees for access to government housing,
'protection' fees, or other bribes. Some local authorities
participated in illegal practices such as limiting the number
of foreign-owned businesses. In other cases, authorities
indirectly enabled violence by being detached and passive,
failing to exert authority in areas of weak control. In such
areas, vigilantism filled a leadership vacuum, usurping
elected leaders.


5. Alexandra township, where attacks first erupted, provides
a succinct case study of how local leaders were pivotal in
opting for or against violence. Sector Two in 'Alex' was one
of the areas worst affected by xenophobic attacks, whereas
its Sector Five was spared altogether. The Wits team learned
that Sector Two ringleaders in fact traveled to Sector Five
to carry forward the attacks. Sector Five leaders, however,
were wary that the Zulu visitors might turn on them as
non-Zulu ethnic minorities after they had jointly purged the
non-nationals. Instead of allying with Sector Two in
violence, Sector Five instead negotiated to persuade
foreigners to leave by peaceable means, thereby arresting the
spread of violence.

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Police and Residents Stood By
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6. Police and other residents were largely passive during
the attacks. In some cases they were sympathetic with the
vigilante mobs, in other cases too outnumbered, intimidated,
or fearful to intervene. The identities of perpetrators --
both men and women -- were an open secret in the townships.
Misago said his team was able to list them within a few days
in each new area, and they unabashedly participated in
interviews. Police were aware of xenophobic planning
meetings in Alex hostels. Although police later claimed they
were helpless to stop the violence, Misago said attackers
claimed "they were with us all the way." Media images
encouraged the spread of attacks, as police and local leaders
were shown to be passive.

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SAG: Still No Real Action
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7. Looking ahead, the Wits team notes that the SAG has
undertaken no substantive initiatives for reintegration of
displaced foreigners, nor put in place any measures to
prevent the recurrence of violence. Indeed, the SAG's
blanket encouragement to foreigners to return to their former
homes could reignite violence where local leaders were
complicit in attacks or where neighbors have already
appropriated foreigners' property. Above all, Misago
lamented that police and government officials publicly
describe their responses as effective, in (eventually)
quelling violence (albeit helped by President Mbeki's
emergency deployment of the army after two weeks of turmoil).
Government arrested over 1,000 accused perpetrators and
established specialized courts, but not a single case has
gone to trial.

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COMMENT: No Political Will for Change
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8. The Wits draft report offers a host of constructive
recommendations to avert future xenophobia -- e.g. creation
of a commission of inquiry to formulate interventions,
effective migration management systems, positive leadership
models, and early warning systems. IOM's regional
representative Hans-Petter Boe noted that impunity for
criminals must end, and children must receive civic education
in tolerating differences. Despite much well-intentioned
guidance from civil society and international community
organizations, however, the SAG is unlikely to act. In
townships where removal of foreigners was seen as a method of
currying residents' favor, there is little political will in
the current election season to champion migrants' rights.

LA LIME