PART 2 OF 2: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS AHEAD OF THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRETORIA 000544

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2019
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL SF
SUBJECT: PART 2 OF 2: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS AHEAD OF THE
SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTION: RESPONSE TO C-AL9-00425

REF: A. PRETORIA 02576

B. DURBAN 000011

C. DURBAN 000024

D. PRETORIA 000451

E. PRETORIA 000484

F. 08 PRETORIA 002624

G. PRETORIA 182

H. PRETORIA 203

I. CAPE TOWN 000019

J. PRETORIA 000067

K. CAPE TOWN 000034

L. DURBAN 000006

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M. 08 PRETORIA 2650

N. 08 PRETORIA 2576

O. 08 PRETORIA 2736

P. 08 PRETORIA 2764

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR RAYMOND L. BROWN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)
AND (D).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) This cable is part 2 of 2 in response to C-AL9-00425.
Reftels refer to parts 1 and 2. End Summary.

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(C) WHO IN THE ANC DO THE OTHER PARTY MEMBERS SUSPECT OF
SYMPATHIZING WITH COPE?
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2. (C) The ANC suspects anyone and everyone of sympathizing
with COPE despite efforts by Mantashe and others to invite
defectors back into the ruling party. (See Reftel N for more
information.) Post has described the "non-purge purge" that
the ANC has been experiencing since Polokwane many times
during the past year, and efforts to purge Mbeki supporters
in favor of Zuma supporters have continued since the
formation of COPE. In meetings with the DA, IFP, and the
UDM, party leaders have expressed little concern that their
members are planning to leave for COPE or are working for
COPE underground. In fact, most party members have expressed
the view that the formation of the new party has hurt the ANC
more than any other organization.

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(C) HOW ARE DECISIONS REACHED AND IMPLEMENTED IN COPE?
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3. (C) Despite statements to the contrary, COPE is very much
a top down organization. (See Reftels N and O for more
information.) Decisions are made by COPE's National
Executive Committee and appear to be driven by Shilowa and
Lekota. Signs vary as to who has the upper hand and most
indications suggest that power is often issue dependent. For
instance, Shilowa had the upper hand when Mvumelwana Dandala
was selected as the party's presidential candidate. (See
Reftel D for more information.) However, in a March 12
meeting with the CDA, ADCM, Polcouns, and Poloffs, Lekota
clearly had the upper hand. Lekota barely gave time for
Dandala to speak at the meeting and drove most of the agenda.



4. (C) It is unclear how decisions are implemented, but most
political commentators appear to agree that decisions by the
party have not been implemented very well ahead of the
election, and this is especially true in provinces such as
KwaZulu Natal.

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(C) WHAT ARE THE SIGNS THAT TENSIONS EXIST BETWEEN
TERROR LEKOTA AND MBHAZIMA SHILOWA?
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5. (C) There has been tension between Lekota and Shilowa
since Lekota was selected as the party's leader in December

2008. (See Reftel D for more information.)

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(C) WHAT ARE THE SIGNS THAT FACTIONS ARE DEVELOPING IN
THE COPE? IF FACTIONS ARE DEVELOPING, WHO LEADS THEM AND DO
TENSIONS EXIST BETWEEN THE VARIOUS GROUPS?
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Q -------------- --------------

PRETORIA 00000544 002.2 OF 004




6. (C) This question has been dealt with extensively in
Post's body of political reporting. (Most recently, see
Reftel D to address the question of factions developing.)
Lekota's personal assistant, Tseliso Phomane, also has told
Poloff that factions within the party are strong between
those who support Lekota and those who support Shilowa.
Phomane himself has been accused of being "too much of a
Lekota man." He noted in a recent meeting that there are
others also accused of too closely backing Lekota over the
"good of the party."

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(C) WHAT ARE THE INDICATIONS THAT THE CONGRESS OF SOUTH
AFRICAN TRADE UNIONS (COSATU) MAY SPLIT ALONG ANC AND COPE
LINES?
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7. (C) The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)
remains strongly allied with the ANC and COSATU members are
near uniform in their belief that an alliance with a Zuma-led
ANC, is the best way to shift South African politics
leftward. COSATU asserted (correctly) that Mbeki
marginalized the union organization as part of the tripartite
alliance and regards COPE as a negative extension of the
Mbeki era. COSATU leadership acknowledges that members are
unhappy with the ANC over a poor track record of service
delivery but has assessed that most members will vote for the
ANC while a few will abstain instead of switching support to
an opposition that is perceived as anti-labor. COSATU will
face a greater challenge from its members post-election when
those members expect COSATU and the ANC to deliver on
promises, made by General Secretary Zwelinzima Vavi, for a
substantial shift in South African labor law and policy.
Western Cape COSATU provincial secretary Tony Ehrenreich told
Cape Town Econoff in early March that COSATU provincial
structures are firmly behind the ANC and he gave Econoff a
copy of a COSATU-distributed pamphlet that derides COPE as
the "Black DA." See Septel for more information.

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(C) WHAT ARE THE INDICATIONS THAT COPE IS LOBBYING
COSATU MEMBERS TO LEAVE THE TRADE UNION?
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8. (C) COPE has had difficulty in launching an affiliated
trade union movement led by former COSATU President Willy
Madisha, who tops the party's regional list for Limpopo
province. Madisha, while noble in his cause, has received
little support for a parallel federation outside of his
former homes -- the South African Democratic Teachers Union
(SADTU) and the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). The
other twenty COSATU affiliates remain loyal to Vavi and RLO
has seen little evidence that this will change. COSATU's top
down and undemocratic leadership tends to quietly push out
dissenting views; yet, to date only Madisha and Ehrenreich
have been asked to leave. All other affiliate leadership
remains pro-ANC and intact.

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(C) IF ZUMA WINS THE ELECTION, WHO WILL HE TURN TO FOR
ADVICE?
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9. (C) This question has been dealt with extensively in
Post's political reporting. Zuma himself has said that he
will rely heavily on the ANC's National Executive Committee
Qwill rely heavily on the ANC's National Executive Committee
to help formulate and implement policies. Therefore,
the party's list is key to understanding which officials he
may seek advice from. In addition, Gumede told Poloff and
Econoff that Zuma's circle includes Mantashe, Mbete, Ebrahim
Ebrahim, Blade Nzimande, and Vavi. Both Gumede and
Kotze believe Zuma will look to Finance Minister Trevor
Manuel for economic advice despite how that may anger
Nzimande and Vavi. This circle will be easier to discern
once Cabinet appointments are made after the election.

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(C) WHAT IS ANC'S STRATEGY FOR KEEPING ZUMA OUT OF
PRISON?
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10. (C) The ANC's legal strategy was dealt with extensively
in Reftel K. The message from the ANC's legal adviser and

PRETORIA 00000544 003.2 OF 004


from prominent legal scholar Pierre de Vos is that the ruling
party intends to drag out the legal process as long
as possible. There are signs that the ANC could attempt to
pressure the National Prosecuting Authority to drop all
charges as not being in the best interests of the country --
or to at least float the idea publicly to see how much anger
it gets from the populace and the international community.

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(C) WHICH GOVERNMENT ENTITIES (SOUTH AFRICA RESERVE
BANK, DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, POLITICAL PARTIES,
TRADE UNIONS, ETC.) DRIVE CURRENT ECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING?
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11. (C) Economic policy is implemented by line ministries
with key policy decisions being taken by the cabinet.
The policy process is coordinated by the Presidency, with
National Treasury also playing a key coordinating role
through its influence on the budget process. The Reserve
Bank is an independent institution. Business and labor
both exert a strong influence over economic policy. By most
accounts, Mbeki provided relatively strong economic
leadership, particularly through the ASGISA framework, which
focused on removing impediments to growth (such as
infrastructure bottlenecks, poor skills, and abusive market
practices). ASGISA prompted government departments to
prioritize their efforts and report results to the Presidency
(especially to Deputy President Bulelani-Ngucka). Progress
was made in some areas (such as infrastructure),but
deficiencies remain in other areas such as skills or
electrical power. This Presidency-led process seems to have
atrophied under Motlanthe, who may feel that it
is inappropriate for him to make major policy initiatives.


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(C) WHICH INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS DOES THE ANC
ASSESS WILL PLAY SIGNIFICANT ROLES IN MAKING ECONOMIC
DECISIONS IN A ZUMA ADMINISTRATION?
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12. (C) Everything will depend on the composition of the
next cabinet, which will be selected as much on the basis
of politics as economics. There is widespread speculation
that Trevor Manuel will remain as Finance Minister during a
"transitional" period that could last for a few months or up
to a year. Pravin Gordhan and Gill Marcus have been
named as possible successors to Manuel, but this is pure
speculation; Marcus has also been cited as a possible future
SARB Governor. Phosa was touted as a possible Finance
Minister, but he seems to have taken himself out of the
running. Rob Davies is widely cited as the next Trade and
Industry Minister. Many people speculate that a union figure
will be given the top slot at Public Enterprises (Vavi was
often mentioned until he took himself out of the running);
others speculate that Public Enterprises will be abolished in
its current form. Serious plans are afoot to form a Planning
Commission, but no one knows exactly what it would do: SAG
reps recently visited Vietnam, Brazil, and Singapore to see
what their commissions do.

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(C) ARE THERE SIGNS THAT THE ANC PLANS TO IMPLEMENT THE
INDUSTRIAL POLICY LAUNCHED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND
QINDUSTRIAL POLICY LAUNCHED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND
INDUSTRY (DTI) IN 2007? IF SO, HOW?
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13. (C) The industrial policy is already being implemented,
albeit slowly, clumsily and without massive
funding. More subsidies are eligible for key sectors,
industrial policy considerations are influencing trade
policy, and emergency bail outs are going to be directed
particularly to firms in key sectors. Industrial policy was
always
going to be implemented in a fairly ad hoc way, though DTI is
reportedly disappointed that it hasn't received greater
financial resources to throw at sectors. Financial
constraints flowing from the global slowdown may constrain
the SAG's ability to pursue industrial policy under Zuma.
Davies is driving the implementation of industrial policy,
and is a likely candidate to be the next government's
Minister of Trade and Industry, according to DTI contacts.

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PRETORIA 00000544 004.2 OF 004


(C) WHAT ARE THE SIGNS THAT THE ANC PLANS TO
REINVIGORATE THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND LABOUR
COUNCIL (NEDLAC) FOLLOWING THE ELECTION?
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14. (C) The unions want NEDLAC to play a greater role in the
policy process. However, NEDLAC's mandate to operate
through consensus makes it an unwieldy policy instrument --
and that won't change under Zuma. NEDLAC probably will
remain sidelined. Chamber of Mines Economist Roger Baxter
participates in the NEDLAC meetings and seems to give it some
credit for influence and substance, but he noted that
particularly with respect to the power crisis there were
too many conflicting task forces and meetings.

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COMMENT
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15. (C) This concludes parts 1 and 2 of the response to
C-AL9-00425. Several of the questions concerning the
character of the South African vote will be answered in
future cables, as the Political Section has formed an
Election Task Force. Moreover, some of the questions
regarding the post-election situation will be answered at the
appropriate time when information is more readily available.
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