MONTHS SINCE PIETERMARITZBURG COURT DECISION TEST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRETORIA 000021 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2019 TAGS: KJUS PGOV KDEM SF SUBJECT: MONTHS SINCE PIETERMARITZBURG COURT DECISION TEST ZUMA'S LEADERSHIP REF: PRETORIA 2576 PRETORIA 00000021 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: DEPUTY POLITICAL COUNSELOR MADELINE Q. SEIDENSTRICKER FO R REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The months since Pietermaritzburg High Court Judge Chris Nicholson handed down his verdict declaring the state's case against African National Congress (ANC) President Jacob Zuma invalid have been among the toughest times in the ruling party's history. The split between rival ANC factions, which has its roots in former President Thabo Mbeki's 2005 decision to fire Zuma as Deputy President and widened after the December 2007 party congress, brought down a national leader and drove long-time party leaders to form a new organization. Zuma, as leader of the ANC during this tumultuous period, has had his leadership skills tested as no party leader has before him. Given the challenges facing the movement in the time left before the election, now is a good time to take stock of the ANC's leadership -- and especially of Zuma. End Summary. -------------- Zuma Faces Tumultuous Period -------------- ¶2. (C) Zuma has faced one of the toughest periods in ANC history, as the aftermath of the December 2007 ruling party congress has been anything but easy. Immediately after his victory, Zuma had difficulty getting his "team" of top six national executive (NEC) members to work together, according to informal adviser Mo Shaik. Moreover, Zuma and his allies for months had difficulty convincing Mbeki to allow ANC Deputy President -- and current national President -- Kgalema Motlanthe into the Cabinet as a Minister in the Presidency. Mbeki finally relented in June 2008, but there were few signs Molanthe's admission to the Cabinet made it easier for Zuma and his allies to influence policies. Zuma spent most of his time after Polokwane working to ensure unity in the movement and convincing business leaders and international investors his economic policies would pay heed to market forces and would align with the principles espoused by Finance Minister Trevor Manuel and Mbeki. University of South Africa professor Dirk Kotze told Poloff in a December 5 meeting that "he would hate to be Zuma right now." Kotze said, "Even though he may be the next leader of the country, he was the man who oversaw the split of the movement." Moreover, Kotze thought the split has more to do with Zuma as an individual than it does with underlying forces within the ANC. Kotze said, "The bottom line is that there are many that simply hate Zuma." The struggles Zuma has faced in the months since the Pietermaritzburg ruling raises the question of whether the ANC President has been right in the middle of key ruling party decisions, has been fully in command, or has been marginalized. -------------- Theory #1: Zuma Right in the Middle -------------- ¶3. (C) The most probable interpretation of Zuma's leadership since the Nicholson verdict is that Zuma has led the ANC by being heavily involved in all party -- and government -- decisions even when not directing them. This would mean he has at times provided his leadership vision for how a problem should be handled and at times been in backseat when a situation is addressed. This would mean he has provided input to Motlanthe on key decisions while letting the Qinput to Motlanthe on key decisions while letting the national leader or the ANC make the final call. Also, it would mean Zuma remains the face of the party even if he does not make every decision. Such a characterization fits in with a lot of the scholarship and stories about Zuma over the years. Jeremy Gordin's biography of Zuma describes numerous scenes where Zuma was present at key moments in ANC history even though he did not direct decisions. Gordin noted that close ties between Zuma and Mbeki made it easy for Zuma to be a part of decisions while not directing them himself. Zuma has been present for many of the seminal decisions in the movement's history. His presence suggests he has been included more often than not. PRETORIA 00000021 002.2 OF 004 ¶4. (C) There are several signs Zuma has been right in the middle of key decisions in recent months, and in many ways Zuma and Motlanthe appear to be balancing the decision-making to politically benefit the ANC. For instance, Motlanthe took the lead in making public statements about the recent unrest in Guinea while Zuma took the lead offering condolences following the Mumbai bombings. (Note: Zuma and the ANC probably calculated by offering condolences to the victims of the Mumbai massacre Zuma would appear more favorable to his Indian supporters. End Note). Motlanthe and Zuma have made some statements about the situation in neighboring Zimbabwe, but neither one has sought to upstage the other, suggesting the two may be willing to follow the ANC's decision to keep Mbeki on as the government's facilitator there. Motlanthe won praise from political analysts and the public for his Cabinet and Constitutional Court appointments, which were interpreted as an effort to show a clear break from many of Mbeki's most controversial (or ineffective) policies. Zuma would have had difficulty making some of the same appointments without implicating himself in these policies since he served as Mbeki's deputy for six years. In the end, several prominent political analysts say it may look like Zuma is marginalized, but they are not buying it. Kotze told Poloff in the December 5 meeting that "everyone knows Zuma will be the next leader of the country." He said, "It does not matter how good a job Motlanthe does, it will be Zuma." University of Witswatersrand professor Daryl Glaser in a meeting with Poloff late last year agreed with that assessment. Glaser said, "It has been a horrible few months for Zuma, but I would still trade places with him. I mean, he will be the next leader of the country and he has the movement behind him." -------------- Theory #2: Zuma in Command -------------- ¶5. (C) Another interpretation, although less likely, of the months since the Nicholson verdict is that Zuma has been the mastermind behind all of the ANC's actions. For this interpretation to be stronger than the first, Motlanthe's decisionmaking role as national president would have to be discounted. This would mean Zuma orchestrated the recall of former President Thabo Mbeki. Second, it would mean Zuma directed the ANC to insert President Kgalema Motlanthe and Deputy President Baleka Mbete into power. Third, it would mean Zuma has been driving the ANC's response to the opposition. (Note: For more information about the ANC's response to the opposition see Reftel. End Note.) There are plenty of signs Zuma is in command. Some local newspapers reported Zuma met with Mbeki before the ANC's National Executive Committee (NEC) meeting to discuss the former President's dismissal. At the meeting, Zuma reportedly told Mbeki that he would not back the South African leader's interests in the meeting. (Note: There were also press reports suggesting that the two met and the exact opposite happened, with Zuma telling Mbeki he would support his interests. End Note.) Nevertheless, given the outcome of the meeting and the fact Zuma leads the ANC, it would be a solid assumption Zuma was at the very least complicit in the party's decision to recall Mbeki. ¶6. (C) The ANC's decision to select Motlanthe as the Q6. (C) The ANC's decision to select Motlanthe as the country's next leader also showed elements of Zuma being in control. Motlanthe was chosen as the ANC's choice for the presidency for at least reasons -- one, because he was the candidate who fit the bill, having already having been in Parliament, and two, because he posed less of a threat to Zuma's interests than Matthews Phosa or Gwede Mantashe, who both serve in the ANC's upper echelon. Zuma was immediate in telling those within the party and in the international community, including the business community in the United States, that Motlanthe was "a caretaker leader." Whether that characterization came from Zuma or from the party is debatable given Zuma says he listens to the ANC before making decisions. However, Zuma's statements make it clear Motlanthe was chosen because he does not pose a threat and will not serve longer than necessary. Although there are serious questions whether Zuma is driving the ANC's response to the Congress of the People (COPE),he has been out front in publicly asking ANC supporters to let COPE organize peacefully and to hold rallies. Moreover, there are rumors suggesting he is using the ANC's Youth League as a mouthpiece to keep the heat on COPE and ANC detractors. If he is using leaders such as Julius Malema as mouthpieces, it would surely PRETORIA 00000021 003.2 OF 004 support the argument that Zuma is in command of ANC rhetoric and the party's stance on the opposition. -------------- Theory #3: Zuma Marginalized -------------- ¶7. (C) A third interpretation, although probably the weakest, is that the ANC's national executive committee, especially the leadership of the party's top six, has been behind the ANC's decisions since the Nicholson verdict. For this interpretation to be stronger than the first two, Motlanthe's role as national president would have to be overstated and the influence of key ANC leaders and their allies would have to be greater than Zuma's. This would mean the NEC, the trade unions, and the communist party are making decisions that do not reflect Zuma's wishes or goals. Also, it would mean Zuma's voice has mattered less with the emergence of Motlanthe as national leader. Zuma's oft repeated mantra since he was elected party leader in 2007 is "I do not drive policy, the ANC drives policy." As many signs as there are of Zuma being in command, there also are some signs the ANC President has been marginalized by those seeking to advance their own agendas. Many prominent ANC officials, particularly Secretary General Gwede Mantashe, Treasurer General Matthews Phosa, and NEC member Jeff Radebe have been more outspoken about issues than has Zuma. Moreover, the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the South African Communist Party continue to call for their own candidates on ANC party lists and their own economic programs to be implemented should Zuma assume office. ¶8. (C) Mantashe especially has emerged as a key leader at the top. The Secretary General told Independent Newspapers Corporation the ANC (not Zuma) would fire politicians whose performances are questioned by the party. Mantashe also noted the party would review government structures and place the "right people in the right positions." In a statement clearly noting where Zuma stands, Mantashe said, "The ANC must be able to engage public deployees, including the President ... and be able to say ... we think this should be attended to. It is the ANC that that is in government that will be judged by the electorate. It's not individuals." Policy analyst in the Presidency's Policy Unit, Thabileng Mothabi, has told Poloff Zuma's leadership role is undermined by leaders such as Mantashe. Mothabi has said, "Zuma is an idiot ... I mean really, really dumb on how policy is implemented. You notice that every time he is asked a question he just laughs and smiles and then quietly leans toward Gwede Mantashe (ANC Secretary General) so he can get the answer." Mothabi said, "Everyone knows that when Zuma was Deputy President he spent more time walking the halls of the Union Buildings than he did helping to form policy. It is very easy to see how he could be left out in decisions." Some academics such as University of Pretoria political scientist Roland Henwood, University of Johannesburg political scientist Yolanda Sadie, and University of Witswatersrand sociologist Roger Southall see Zuma being marginalized as a sign that he can be a "serious political liability" for the party going into elections. Henwood in a meeting with Poloff last year said the ANC would have a hard time portraying the steady hand of President Kgalema Motlanthe while encouraging voters to accept Zuma as a force QMotlanthe while encouraging voters to accept Zuma as a force for change in the polls next year. Henwood said, "In many ways he is the perfect face for the organization, but in many ways pushing him into the background on decisions suits the ANC better right now." -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) The most likely interpretation of Zuma's leadership in the months since the Pietermaritzburg court ruling is that the ANC President has been heavily involved in key decisions, although sometimes in command and sometimes marginalized by those advancing a political point. Zuma's role in the movement in the past has been one of soliciting advice and leading from the margins whenever possible (or more politically expedient). Such a style, along with the unpopularity of Mbeki, brought him into power last year. However, few could argue that the party has been well-run in recent months. The irony now is that the style that brought Zuma to power may not be the right one for the ANC as it faces its toughest challenge since assuming power in 1994. PRETORIA 00000021 004.2 OF 004 The months since Nicholson handed down his verdict declaring the state's case against Zuma invalid have been among the toughest times in the ruling party's history. The ANC President will need to balance being in the middle of key decisions, being in command, and being marginalized to keep his party together -- and strong -- ahead of the election. Now is the time when Zuma's true mettle will be proved. BOST