MONTHS SINCE PIETERMARITZBURG COURT DECISION TEST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRETORIA 000021

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2019
TAGS: KJUS PGOV KDEM SF
SUBJECT: MONTHS SINCE PIETERMARITZBURG COURT DECISION TEST
ZUMA'S LEADERSHIP

REF: PRETORIA 2576

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Classified By: DEPUTY POLITICAL COUNSELOR MADELINE Q. SEIDENSTRICKER FO
R REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


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Summary
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1. (C) The months since Pietermaritzburg High Court Judge
Chris Nicholson handed down his verdict declaring the state's
case against African National Congress (ANC) President Jacob
Zuma invalid have been among the toughest times in the ruling
party's history. The split between rival ANC factions, which
has its roots in former President Thabo Mbeki's 2005 decision
to fire Zuma as Deputy President and widened after the
December 2007 party congress, brought down a national leader
and drove long-time party leaders to form a new organization.
Zuma, as leader of the ANC during this tumultuous period,
has had his leadership skills tested as no party leader has
before him. Given the challenges facing the movement in the
time left before the election, now is a good time to take
stock of the ANC's leadership -- and especially of Zuma. End
Summary.

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Zuma Faces Tumultuous Period
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2. (C) Zuma has faced one of the toughest periods in ANC
history, as the aftermath of the December 2007 ruling party
congress has been anything but easy. Immediately after his
victory, Zuma had difficulty getting his "team" of top six
national executive (NEC) members to work together, according
to informal adviser Mo Shaik. Moreover, Zuma and his allies
for months had difficulty convincing Mbeki to allow ANC
Deputy President -- and current national President -- Kgalema
Motlanthe into the Cabinet as a Minister in the Presidency.
Mbeki finally relented in June 2008, but there were few signs
Molanthe's admission to the Cabinet made it easier for Zuma
and his allies to influence policies. Zuma spent most of his
time after Polokwane working to ensure unity in the movement
and convincing business leaders and international investors
his economic policies would pay heed to market forces and
would align with the principles espoused by Finance Minister
Trevor Manuel and Mbeki. University of South Africa
professor Dirk Kotze told Poloff in a December 5 meeting that
"he would hate to be Zuma right now." Kotze said, "Even
though he may be the next leader of the country, he was the
man who oversaw the split of the movement." Moreover, Kotze
thought the split has more to do with Zuma as an individual
than it does with underlying forces within the ANC. Kotze
said, "The bottom line is that there are many that simply
hate Zuma." The struggles Zuma has faced in the months since
the Pietermaritzburg ruling raises the question of whether
the ANC President has been right in the middle of key ruling
party decisions, has been fully in command, or has been
marginalized.

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Theory #1: Zuma Right in the Middle
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3. (C) The most probable interpretation of Zuma's leadership
since the Nicholson verdict is that Zuma has led the ANC by
being heavily involved in all party -- and government --
decisions even when not directing them. This would mean he
has at times provided his leadership vision for how a problem
should be handled and at times been in backseat when a
situation is addressed. This would mean he has provided
input to Motlanthe on key decisions while letting the
Qinput to Motlanthe on key decisions while letting the
national leader or the ANC make the final call. Also, it
would mean Zuma remains the face of the party even if he does
not make every decision. Such a characterization fits in
with a lot of the scholarship and stories about Zuma over the
years. Jeremy Gordin's biography of Zuma describes numerous
scenes where Zuma was present at key moments in ANC history
even though he did not direct decisions. Gordin noted that
close ties between Zuma and Mbeki made it easy for Zuma to be
a part of decisions while not directing them himself. Zuma
has been present for many of the seminal decisions in the
movement's history. His presence suggests he has been
included more often than not.


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4. (C) There are several signs Zuma has been right in the
middle of key decisions in recent months, and in many ways
Zuma and Motlanthe appear to be balancing the decision-making
to politically benefit the ANC. For instance, Motlanthe took
the lead in making public statements about the recent unrest
in Guinea while Zuma took the lead offering condolences
following the Mumbai bombings. (Note: Zuma and the ANC
probably calculated by offering condolences to the victims of
the Mumbai massacre Zuma would appear more favorable to his
Indian supporters. End Note). Motlanthe and Zuma have made
some statements about the situation in neighboring Zimbabwe,
but neither one has sought to upstage the other, suggesting
the two may be willing to follow the ANC's decision to keep
Mbeki on as the government's facilitator there. Motlanthe
won praise from political analysts and the public for his
Cabinet and Constitutional Court appointments, which were
interpreted as an effort to show a clear break from many of
Mbeki's most controversial (or ineffective) policies. Zuma
would have had difficulty making some of the same
appointments without implicating himself in these policies
since he served as Mbeki's deputy for six years. In the end,
several prominent political analysts say it may look like
Zuma is marginalized, but they are not buying it. Kotze told
Poloff in the December 5 meeting that "everyone knows Zuma
will be the next leader of the country." He said, "It does
not matter how good a job Motlanthe does, it will be Zuma."
University of Witswatersrand professor Daryl Glaser in a
meeting with Poloff late last year agreed with that
assessment. Glaser said, "It has been a horrible few months
for Zuma, but I would still trade places with him. I mean,
he will be the next leader of the country and he has the
movement behind him."

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Theory #2: Zuma in Command
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5. (C) Another interpretation, although less likely, of the
months since the Nicholson verdict is that Zuma has been the
mastermind behind all of the ANC's actions. For this
interpretation to be stronger than the first, Motlanthe's
decisionmaking role as national president would have to be
discounted. This would mean Zuma orchestrated the recall of
former President Thabo Mbeki. Second, it would mean Zuma
directed the ANC to insert President Kgalema Motlanthe and
Deputy President Baleka Mbete into power. Third, it would
mean Zuma has been driving the ANC's response to the
opposition. (Note: For more information about the ANC's
response to the opposition see Reftel. End Note.) There are
plenty of signs Zuma is in command. Some local newspapers
reported Zuma met with Mbeki before the ANC's National
Executive Committee (NEC) meeting to discuss the former
President's dismissal. At the meeting, Zuma reportedly told
Mbeki that he would not back the South African leader's
interests in the meeting. (Note: There were also press
reports suggesting that the two met and the exact opposite
happened, with Zuma telling Mbeki he would support his
interests. End Note.) Nevertheless, given the outcome of
the meeting and the fact Zuma leads the ANC, it would be a
solid assumption Zuma was at the very least complicit in the
party's decision to recall Mbeki.


6. (C) The ANC's decision to select Motlanthe as the
Q6. (C) The ANC's decision to select Motlanthe as the
country's next leader also showed elements of Zuma being in
control. Motlanthe was chosen as the ANC's choice for the
presidency for at least reasons -- one, because he was the
candidate who fit the bill, having already having been in
Parliament, and two, because he posed less of a threat to
Zuma's interests than Matthews Phosa or Gwede Mantashe, who
both serve in the ANC's upper echelon. Zuma was immediate in
telling those within the party and in the international
community, including the business community in the United
States, that Motlanthe was "a caretaker leader." Whether
that characterization came from Zuma or from the party is
debatable given Zuma says he listens to the ANC before making
decisions. However, Zuma's statements make it clear
Motlanthe was chosen because he does not pose a threat and
will not serve longer than necessary. Although there are
serious questions whether Zuma is driving the ANC's response
to the Congress of the People (COPE),he has been out front
in publicly asking ANC supporters to let COPE organize
peacefully and to hold rallies. Moreover, there are rumors
suggesting he is using the ANC's Youth League as a mouthpiece
to keep the heat on COPE and ANC detractors. If he is using
leaders such as Julius Malema as mouthpieces, it would surely

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support the argument that Zuma is in command of ANC rhetoric
and the party's stance on the opposition.

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Theory #3: Zuma Marginalized
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7. (C) A third interpretation, although probably the
weakest, is that the ANC's national executive committee,
especially the leadership of the party's top six, has been
behind the ANC's decisions since the Nicholson verdict. For
this interpretation to be stronger than the first two,
Motlanthe's role as national president would have to be
overstated and the influence of key ANC leaders and their
allies would have to be greater than Zuma's. This would mean
the NEC, the trade unions, and the communist party are making
decisions that do not reflect Zuma's wishes or goals. Also,
it would mean Zuma's voice has mattered less with the
emergence of Motlanthe as national leader. Zuma's oft
repeated mantra since he was elected party leader in 2007 is
"I do not drive policy, the ANC drives policy." As many
signs as there are of Zuma being in command, there also are
some signs the ANC President has been marginalized by those
seeking to advance their own agendas. Many prominent ANC
officials, particularly Secretary General Gwede Mantashe,
Treasurer General Matthews Phosa, and NEC member Jeff Radebe
have been more outspoken about issues than has Zuma.
Moreover, the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the
South African Communist Party continue to call for their own
candidates on ANC party lists and their own economic programs
to be implemented should Zuma assume office.


8. (C) Mantashe especially has emerged as a key leader at
the top. The Secretary General told Independent Newspapers
Corporation the ANC (not Zuma) would fire politicians whose
performances are questioned by the party. Mantashe also
noted the party would review government structures and place
the "right people in the right positions." In a statement
clearly noting where Zuma stands, Mantashe said, "The ANC
must be able to engage public deployees, including the
President ... and be able to say ... we think this should be
attended to. It is the ANC that that is in government that
will be judged by the electorate. It's not individuals."
Policy analyst in the Presidency's Policy Unit, Thabileng
Mothabi, has told Poloff Zuma's leadership role is undermined
by leaders such as Mantashe. Mothabi has said, "Zuma is an
idiot ... I mean really, really dumb on how policy is
implemented. You notice that every time he is asked a
question he just laughs and smiles and then quietly leans
toward Gwede Mantashe (ANC Secretary General) so he can get
the answer." Mothabi said, "Everyone knows that when Zuma
was Deputy President he spent more time walking the halls of
the Union Buildings than he did helping to form policy. It
is very easy to see how he could be left out in decisions."
Some academics such as University of Pretoria political
scientist Roland Henwood, University of Johannesburg
political scientist Yolanda Sadie, and University of
Witswatersrand sociologist Roger Southall see Zuma being
marginalized as a sign that he can be a "serious political
liability" for the party going into elections. Henwood in a
meeting with Poloff last year said the ANC would have a hard
time portraying the steady hand of President Kgalema
Motlanthe while encouraging voters to accept Zuma as a force
QMotlanthe while encouraging voters to accept Zuma as a force
for change in the polls next year. Henwood said, "In many
ways he is the perfect face for the organization, but in many
ways pushing him into the background on decisions suits the
ANC better right now."

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Comment
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9. (C) The most likely interpretation of Zuma's leadership
in the months since the Pietermaritzburg court ruling is that
the ANC President has been heavily involved in key decisions,
although sometimes in command and sometimes marginalized by
those advancing a political point. Zuma's role in the
movement in the past has been one of soliciting advice and
leading from the margins whenever possible (or more
politically expedient). Such a style, along with the
unpopularity of Mbeki, brought him into power last year.
However, few could argue that the party has been well-run in
recent months. The irony now is that the style that brought
Zuma to power may not be the right one for the ANC as it
faces its toughest challenge since assuming power in 1994.

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The months since Nicholson handed down his verdict declaring
the state's case against Zuma invalid have been among the
toughest times in the ruling party's history. The ANC
President will need to balance being in the middle of key
decisions, being in command, and being marginalized to keep
his party together -- and strong -- ahead of the election.
Now is the time when Zuma's true mettle will be proved.
BOST