XENOPHOBIA IN SOUTH AFRICA: ROOT CAUSES REMAIN,

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 PRETORIA 001740 SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM SF SUBJECT: XENOPHOBIA IN SOUTH AFRICA: ROOT CAUSES REMAIN, UNCHECKED REF: A. 08 PRETORIA 1544 ¶B. 08 PRETORIA 1549 ¶C. 08 PRETORIA 1563 ¶D. 08 PRETORIA 2174 ¶E. 08 PRETORIA 2014 ¶F. 08 PRETORIA 2379 ¶G. PRETORIA 553 ¶H. PRETORIA 1455 -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. South African townships remain at risk of renewed xenophobic violence, such as was seen in the mid-2008 mob attacks on African migrants. Foreigners make easy scapegoats for enduring grievances of poverty, unemployment, housing shortages, and poor public services, and the SAG has not taken deterrent steps to enforce the rule of law or provide constructive outlets for conflict resolution. Politicians have largely ducked the issue, and the SAG has dragged its feet on a promised inquiry into the sources of violence and prevention strategies. Civil society organizations and church groups have launched small grass-roots initiatives of community reconciliation, to fill the leadership vacuum left by the government. End Summary. -------------- Recap: Violence of May - June 2008 -------------- ¶2. In mid-May 2008, xenophobic attacks against foreign African migrants and ethnic minorities broke out in poor squatter settlements near Johannesburg, then escalated into a wave of violence in townships across the country. The attacks were brutal and destructive. Some victims were beaten to death, others stabbed, while their shacks and small shops were looted and burned. An estimated 62 persons were killed, 670 persons seriously injured, and as many as 80,000 migrants displaced. Although the SAG never published final statistics, it estimated that as many as 70,000 foreigners (mostly Mozambicans and Zimbabweans) fled South Africa. Rioters vocally blamed immigrants for shortages of jobs and housing, and for increases in crime. The events shocked South Africans, affronting their post-1994 ethos as an inclusive "rainbow nation," and led to wide public debate and soul-searching over national values, social ills, and historically ingrained habits of violence and intolerance (refs A, B). This year, NGOs have publicly warned that the SAG has made negligible effort to avert a repetition of last year's horrors. -------------- Rule of Law: Too Late, Too Little -------------- ¶3. Law enforcement's ineffectual actions during the attacks will serve as scant deterrent in future. Field reports indicated police officers were often late on the scene, allegedly waiting for the worst to subside, or else impotently observing at the sidelines. In the worst cases, police who were residents of affected townships were rumored to sympathize with their neighbors' violent ejection of foreigners, or at least to feel powerless to oppose popular mobs. One cop was famously captured in a news photo gesturing a "thumbs up" to attackers. Despite lofty national goals of inclusivity, front-line government workers are commonly said to treat foreigners with resentment and hostility. Many police view foreigners with suspicion, as sources of crime and targets for exploitation and/or deportation. Only the Army, deployed by President Mbeki after nearly two weeks of unrest, had the capacity and credibility to restore order. ¶4. Public prosecutors were slow, weak, and superficial in Q4. Public prosecutors were slow, weak, and superficial in punishing perpetrators, sending a message of impunity to ringleaders. The Department of Justice recorded about 1,300 arrests, with a total of 1,446 charges brought against 421 persons in seven of the nine provinces (mainly in Western Cape, Gauteng, and Kwa Zulu Natal). Although provinces created special courts for these cases, months passed before PRETORIA 00001740 002 OF 003 the first case went to trial. Wits University's Forced Migration Studies Project (FMSP) reported that only 70 convictions had been achieved by year-end. Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR)'s Jacob van Garderen adds that these convictions are for relatively light offenses of public violence, none for murder, and no jail sentences have been handed down. Further, as FSMP's Dr. Loren Landau notes, those arrested were mostly minor thugs, the visible direct agents of attacks, while the planners remained at liberty. Field research by the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) and the FMSP (ref G) have implicated local ward politicians in orchestrating attacks to gain political clout with residents. FSMP found the identities of those responsible are common knowledge in their communities, but not one has been accused. -------------- SAG Reluctant -- to Admit, and to Assist -------------- ¶5. Politicians of the governing ANC party have adopted various forms of denial over the xenophobic motivations of the violence, and a promised official inquiry has yet to begin. Slow to acknowledge the attacks, then President Mbeki did not interrupt his travels to address them, even when they were headline news at home and abroad. ANC leaders variously characterized the attacks as isolated incidents of criminality, denied their linkage to poverty and social welfare grievances, and even fed speculation that a covert right-wing "third force" was at work to tarnish the government's image before 2009 elections. (This is despite the ANC's identifying xenophobia as an impending national threat at its party conference in December 2007.) Pressed by refugee rights NGOs, the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) promised in late 2008 a thorough inquiry into the violence, but to date no investigation has been launched. Over the last year, the SAG has been quick to attribute any isolated cases of violence against foreigners to random criminality, unrelated to any xenophobic trend, evidently wishing to bury the issue from public debate. ¶6. The SAG dragged its feet on offering humanitarian assistance to foreign victims, acting only under heavy pressure from the media and rights NGOs. Temporary shelters for displaced foreigners were grudgingly provided by provincial governments (ref C),explicitly on a short-term and exceptional basis, and ultimately with a determined effort to shut them down and disperse migrants (refs D, E). The SAG's very liberal stance on immigration and its loosely managed asylum process are normally a boon to migrants, who enjoy freedom of movement and license to work here -- compared to other African countries where they would be confined to camps. A reaction to apartheid restrictions, the SAG's approach is one of integration of newcomers, with an upside of minimal constraint and a downside of minimal protection. Pressured by UNHCR (ref F),NGOs, and the public to provide temporary refuges, provincial governments yielded slightly on their initial end-August limit but then battled in the courts to shut them by the end of September. -------------- Community Outreach: A Missed Opportunity -------------- ¶7. The SAG has undertaken no proactive campaign of community Q7. The SAG has undertaken no proactive campaign of community outreach to address turmoil in the townships and create non-violent channels of conflict resolution. Members of the ANC's national executive committee visited hotspots to encourage tolerance, but there was no concerted political response beyond these brief walkabouts. Migrants have successfully reintegrated in many areas, but on the basis of individual efforts, unfostered by any new policies or programs, and often under continued threat. As the country whose Truth And Reconciliation Commission was a world model of bridging deep national divides, South Africa has the experience to lead initiatives in church groups and town halls to mend rifts between locals and migrants. In March 2009, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) launched the "One" campaign (funded by State/PRM) of youth role models, township activism, and radio programs (with popular station Metro FM),with messages of "tolerance, human dignity and unity in diversity." This campaign, and others underway by LHR and church groups, are civil society PRETORIA 00001740 003 OF 003 undertakings attempting to fill the vacuum of SAG inaction. -------------- Outlook: Violence Set to Recur -------------- ¶8. COMMENT. Most observers expect attacks against foreigners will inevitably flare again, since their underlying causes persist, and the SAG has not taken deterrent steps. Migrants are easy scapegoats for the frustrations of poverty, unemployment, housing shortages, and poor public services -- widespread grievances which remain unresolved. Recent protests against lack of service delivery are an echo of similar 2008 demonstrations which preceded attacks, giving some observers a worrying sense of deja vu. Isolated incidents against foreigners (especially Somalis) are a regular part of life in South Africa. Tensions are most acute in the poorest shantytowns, where police control is more tenuous, and where some cops may share gangs' worst prejudices against non-nationals. The political economy documented by ISS and Wits, of petty officials exploiting xenophobic prejudices for personal or party gain, remains intact. The root causes of township violence cut widely across SAG ministries, yet no agency advocates for the rights and protection of foreign migrants. Conditions are little changed from last year and are ripe to re-erupt. One small consolation is that the horrific experiences of 2008, coupled with the SAG's heightened sensitivity to world opinion before the 2010 World Cup, might prompt faster SAG responses the next time around. End Comment. GIPS