NRC DISCUSSES 2007 PELINDABA SECURITY INCIDENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRETORIA 000173 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/S, EEB/ESC, ISN DOE FOR M. SCOTT, T.SPERL, G.PERSON, A.BIENAWSKI, L.PARKER E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2019 TAGS: ENRG TRGY KNNP PREL BEXP IAEA SF SUBJECT: NRC DISCUSSES 2007 PELINDABA SECURITY INCIDENT WITH SOUTH AFRICA REF: 07 PRETORIA 3962 Classified By: ACTING ECONOMIC COUNSELOR BRUCE NEULING FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: South African officials attribute the November 2007 Pelindaba break-in to criminal - rather than terrorist - intent. The police have not arrested the culprits. Officials stress that facilities containing nuclear materials were not threatened or impacted by the attack. Officials assert that security measures have been improved as a result of the incident. The USG has offered its cooperation on enhancing the security of nuclear and radiological sites. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Background: On November 8, 2007, South Africa's Pelindaba facility suffered a security incident involving compromise of the exterior perimeter fence and an emergency response control room. The Pelindaba site includes the 20MW Safari nuclear reactor, which produces medical radioisotopes and houses significant spent and active Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) fuel, and Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) testing facilities. The Nuclear Energy Company of South Africa (NECSA),which operates Pelindaba, determined that there was no breach of any high security areas and believes that the incident was a criminal attack, all too common in South Africa. The South African Police Service (SAPS) investigated the incident, but has not been able to arrest the culprits. NRC Commissioner Peter Lyons visited South Africa January 18-24 to discuss cooperation with the nuclear regulator and to gain general familiarization of nuclear activities in South Africa (septels). The visit also focused on testing and research facilities conducted by PBMR. ¶3. (C) National Nuclear Regulator (NNR) CEO Guy Clapisson told Commissioner Lyons that their investigation of the incident concluded that there was no threat to the HEU and the motive of the attack was criminal, rather than targeted to the uranium. The criminals appeared to have limited knowledge of the site and some security systems. Clapisson said the compromised areas - the exterior perimeter fence and the emergency response control room - did not contain any radioactive materials. High security around interior radioactive sites was not threatened or impacted. Clapisson later told Lyons that there are legal limitations to the lethality of exterior perimeter electric fences in South Africa (please protect). Another NNR official said there was a current perception of a reduced threat to Pelindaba - compared to the old days before the abandonment of the nuclear weapons program and nuclear fuel enrichment at the facility, and the military command then at the site had since been removed. ¶4. (C) NECSA CEO Rob Adam repeated these general conclusions to Commissioner Lyons, labeling the incident as related to a criminal motive, rather than related to targeting HEU. He said NECSA continued to work with SAPS, but noted that no arrests had been made. Adam said NECSA had reassessed its security posture and had implemented changes in response to the incident. He said NECSA was working to inculcate a more Qthe incident. He said NECSA was working to inculcate a more robust "security culture" and to make security an integral part of operations. NECSA has taken most of its security back in-house. (Outside contractors provided most of the security at the time of the incident.) Adam said NECSA had worked with the IAEA on a "collegial study" of the incident. He said NECSA collaborated with various global groups on security, including the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in the U.S. ¶5. (SBU) Commissioner Lyons told NNR and NECSA that he hoped their institutions could cooperate more closely on security issues, sharing best practices, and offered to facilitate NNR observation of a force-on-force security exercise at a U.S. facility. (Note: DOE has separately offered to work with the SAG on enhancing the security of nuclear and radiological sites in the run-up to the 2010 FIFA World Cup.) ¶6. (C) Commissioner Lyons also observed security at the French-built Koeberg Nuclear Power Plant near Cape Town later in the visit. His general assessment was that the security level was comparable to French standards, but not as high as U.S. standards. The first perimeter security entrance - to the surrounding game reserve - was not as imposing as a typical external perimeter entrance in the U.S. Lyons was able to visit the crisis management room and the security command center at Koeberg and was generally impressed with the capabilities, including video capture capacity. Koeberg officials told Lyons that the plant had augmented sea-side security a few years ago after Greenpeace was able to make a peaceful invasion to hang a protest banner on the reactor tower (guards were instructed not to shoot). ¶7. (C) Comment: South Africa is sensitive about its nuclear security and the recent 60-Minutes expose, in which senior Department of Foreign Affairs and NECSA officials were interviewed, has got their back up. This may make it more dificult for South African officials to pursue the U.S. offer for assistance on enhancing the security of nuclear and radiological sites. If the perpetrators of the Pelindaba breach did indeed have simple criminal intent, rather than specifically targeting radioactive materials or HEU for terrorism or profit, the breach nevertheless displayed worrisome vulnerabilities. Hopefully, NECSA's new security policies have significantly lessened that vulnerability. ¶8. (U) NRC Commissioner Lyons cleared this cable. BALL