(C) HELPING CAPE VERDE MOVE FROM DATA TO INTELLIGENCE IN THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAIA 000039 EUCOM PLEASE PASS ALSO AFRICOM FOR MBAKER AND FOR CNT RSTRAYER E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/3/2019 TAGS: MARR MASS SNAR PREL ETRD KJUS CV SUBJECT: (C) HELPING CAPE VERDE MOVE FROM DATA TO INTELLIGENCE IN THE WAR ON DRUGS AND TERROR CLASSIFIED BY: Marianne Myles, Ambassador, AMEMBASSY PRAIA, State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) Corrected Copy. Please discard Praia 038. ¶1. (C) Summary: Post has engaged the GOCV in a sweeping dialogue on the future of GOCV interagency collaboration in interdicting drug smuggling, combating illegal fishing, and countering arms smuggling and related terrorist activities. At the heart of this dialogue is a two phase USG proposal to (1) install a robust maritime domain awareness, communications, and intelligence sharing platform in Cape Verde, and (2) encourage the GOCV to expand access to this capability to an interagency group, establishing a shared platform for intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination. This cable details the history and status of Phase One projects, and assesses the prospects for Phase Two implementation. Success in this effort would give us more than just an ally with a useful geo-strategic location astride some of the world's principal smuggling routes; it would give us a willing and capable partner in the fight against smuggling of all kinds. Counter-narcotics is our number one mission strategic priority, and we assess that GOCV implementation of this two phase program is the most important single medium-term contribution Cape Verde could make to that fight. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Post continues to aggressively pursue -- jointly with the United States Africa Command, Office of Counter Narco-Terrorism (AFRICOM/CNT) -- the installation of a robust maritime domain awareness, communications, and intelligence sharing platform in Cape Verde. The concept, dubbed the Counter Narcotics and Maritime Security Information Center (CMIC),involves two distinct phases: In Phase One, technical capability will be installed to permit the Cape Verde Coast Guard (CVCG) to exercise improved Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and command and control functions. Phase One began in earnest in February 2009 and completion is expected in Summer 2009. Phase Two will seek to expand this capability to an interagency group within the GOCV, establishing a shared platform for intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination. Phase Two is contingent upon GOCV political will and leadership in establishing the appropriate interagency climate and regulatory frameworks. Post has already begun fruitful engagement with the GOCV on this theme (see para 6). ¶3. (C) Evolution of the CMIC Concept: In June 2008, the U.S. Coast Guard collaborated with the CVCG in an unprecedented joint live operation in which the CVCG placed a Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) aboard the USCGC Dallas and conducted live patrols, boardings, and consensual searches of suspect vessels for over one week. This was the first such LEDET live joint operation conducted in sub-Saharan Africa, and built on a solid record of joint training between the two services, notably including the GOCV's hosting of the 2006 NATO exercise Steadfast Jaguar (the first NATO exercise in sub-Saharan Africa). In preparation for the Dallas LEDET, the USG (through AFRICOM/CNT) provided laptop computers and software to permit effective shore to ship communications, linking all participants in real time and dramatically facilitating intelligence sharing and decision-making. ¶4. (C) In discussions with CVCG leadership, EmbOffs and AFRICOM officials identified broader CVCG communications and information sharing needs. Using creativity and energy, officers of CNT adapted the Information Fusion Center concept (successfully used in over two dozen applications in the Asian AOR) to the Cape Verde context. The Fusion Center would establish a server-based information backbone for the CVCG, permitting interoperability of a wide array of communications equipment, secure handling of sensitive intelligence, and both physical and virtual meeting spaces to conduct training exercises and live operations. The concept was vetted via INL and AF in July 2008, and planning of the facility begun. During the vetting process, INL successfully lobbied for increased funding for training, sustainment, and technical assistance with future integration of other GOCV platforms into the Fusion Center concept. The project budget was accordingly more than doubled from $150,000 to approximately $320,000. ¶5. (C) Powerful Synergies Discovered: As this concept continued to evolve, synergies with other ongoing bilateral and multilateral counter-narcotics and MDA efforts were revealed. A joint U.S.-Spanish effort to provide MDA through improved land-based sensors led early on to asking key questions about how best to integrate allied GOCV agencies including the Judiciary Police, the Customs police, and the Maritime Police. A U.S. European Command (EUCOM) funded initiative to expand maritime Automated Identification System (AIS) technology to Cape Verde similarly touched on core Maritime and Fisheries Institute equities. GOCV enthusiasm for standing-up its new intelligence service (SIR) led to scrutiny of intelligence sharing protocols, privacy laws, and regulation and protection of state secrets. A U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation funded effort to develop a digitized fingerprint database, and Judiciary Police efforts to develop a similar in-house database on criminal suspects contributed to the momentum. It quickly became clear to all that Cape Verde was potentially at a tipping point, in which a series of overlapping projects, if properly aligned, could be mutually reinforcing and result in a quantum leap forward in GOCV capabilities. ¶6. (C) Post launched a series of discussions with the Chief of Staff of Defense, the Minister of Defense, the Deputy Commander of the Judiciary Police, the Commandant of the CVCG, and others, seeking to assess and ultimately encourage the alignment of those interests. All GOCV officials recognized the value of a shared interagency platform of the kind that CMIC could become. No single GOCV agency has the critical mass or expertise to create such an intelligence clearing house independently of the others, but the creation of a joint platform would clearly benefit all. The capacity to collate police and intelligence data, track suspect persons and suspect vessels, communicate with interdiction assets in the field, and integrate these efforts in real time with those of partner states would allow the GOCV to simultaneously improve and operationalize its MDA, as well as contribute meaningfully to international counter-narcotics and counterterrorism efforts. ¶7. (C) Sharing Turf and Setting Limits: For this vision to be realized would require the settlement of certain turf disputes (such as conflicting claims to jurisdiction over drug seizures on the high seas by both the CVCG and the CVPJ). It would also require sufficient dedicated funding by the GOCV (the 2008 AIS program mentioned above was successfully installed but operations have been hamstrung by the lack of line-item funding in the relevant GOCV ministry budget for the required bandwidth). Most importantly, it would require establishing key norms and procedures to ensure protection of sources and methods, efficient but secure distribution of intelligence products, and a vigorous defense of civil rights that still permits bona-fide intelligence collection and analysis. Squaring these circles would require powerful political leadership from within the GOCV itself by someone with the influence and dedication to overcome these obstacles and impose a resolution. One of the few actors who fits this description is Minister of Defense Fontes Lima. ¶8. (C) Current Status of CMIC Project: On January 28, 2008, Ambassador and DCM met with Minister Fontes Lima to seek her agreement to lead the charge on GOCV interagency information sharing and analysis. Though the CMIC is a key component and the technological backbone of the proposed interagency effort, it had by this time become the action forcing event more than the deliverable -- a means more than an end in itself. We encouraged the MOD to use the CMIC project to leverage movement on the broader interagency issue. Fontes Lima grasped immediately both the practical and political subtleties of our message. She green-lighted CMIC Phase One, and pledged prompt personal action on convoking discussion regarding the longer term interagency integration both the USG and GOCV seek to enable Phase Two. The MOD lost no time in following through on her word. In a separate meeting with CVCG Commandant Fernando Perreira, DCM was told the MOD had called a senior level meeting for the week of February 9 to begin discussion of this issue. In the meantime AFRICOM/CNT has consolidated its programs to provide a clear focus on procurement and installation of the CMIC equipment, and has invited three CVCG officers to extended training on database administration and security. These classes begin in March and will conclude concurrently with the procurement and importation of the required equipment, allowing the three officers to participate actively in the assembly and activation of the network. ¶9. (C) Next Steps in Information Fusion: Once the identified site is prepared (improved HVAC, security, and related upgrades to support an information fusion center),actual installation should proceed fairly smoothly. The real challenges will be the political and organizational ones: determining who owns the intelligence products that will be produced by this fusion of data streams; who can access it; if/how it can be used in law-enforcement or other operations; how it will be protected; what mechanisms will be put in place for oversight; and many other non-trivial concerns. The GOCV is receiving assistance and advice from a wide variety of partners, including the UNODC, partner state intelligence agencies, partner state police agencies, and partner state militaries. These organizations have distinct mandates, so the nascent GOCV information fusion center will feel itself pulled in several (at times inconsistent) directions at once. ¶10. (C) The most likely outcome is, in Post's view, that the principal beneficiary of this system early-on will be the CVCG. With a defined mission and integrated command structure, the CVCG can most quickly make use of actionable intelligence. For this concept to succeed, however, it is vital that other agencies, particularly police agencies, also have input into and access to the analysis produced. Post and AFRICOM/CNT are aware of this dynamic and continue to stress the need for CVPJ and other agency involvement. CVPJ participation in recent LEDET operations with the U.S. Navy and UK Navy are positive signs, but we must continue to press for genuine interagency collaboration. Given its distinct mission, consumer base, and (necessary) separation from law enforcement, the SIR is most likely to remain only a consumer of the CMIC product, perhaps without even an overt acknowledgment that it is reading those reports. However, maximizing the benefit of the link between CMIC and foreign intelligence services -- a link which is currently envisioned to pass through SIR -- will require some creative thinking about how to ensure urgent actionable information reaches the operational agencies (whether military or police) in time to be acted upon. ¶11. (C) Comment: The GOCV has repeatedly demonstrated, through LEDETs and other activities, its readiness and political will to join the U.S. and its allies in the fight against transnational crime, especially maritime narco-trafficking. The scope and vision of their proposed transformation in intelligence capabilities is little short of astonishing, and offers the U.S. and the EU an unparalleled opportunity to help them get it right. Success in this effort would give us more than just an ally with a useful geo-strategic location astride some of the world's principal smuggling routes; it would give us a genuine partner, willing and capable to assist meaningfully in monitoring and (in due course) actively interdicting illicit traffic in people, drugs, weapons, and worse. Counter-narcotics is our number one mission strategic priority, and we assess that GOCV implementation of this two phase program is the most important single medium-term contribution Cape Verde could make to that fight. MYLES