(C) HELPING CAPE VERDE MOVE FROM DATA TO INTELLIGENCE IN THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAIA 000039


EUCOM PLEASE PASS ALSO AFRICOM FOR MBAKER AND FOR CNT RSTRAYER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/3/2019
TAGS: MARR MASS SNAR PREL ETRD KJUS CV
SUBJECT: (C) HELPING CAPE VERDE MOVE FROM DATA TO INTELLIGENCE IN THE
WAR ON DRUGS AND TERROR

CLASSIFIED BY: Marianne Myles, Ambassador, AMEMBASSY PRAIA,
State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

Corrected Copy. Please discard Praia 038.


1. (C) Summary: Post has engaged the GOCV in a sweeping dialogue
on the future of GOCV interagency collaboration in interdicting
drug smuggling, combating illegal fishing, and countering arms
smuggling and related terrorist activities. At the heart of
this dialogue is a two phase USG proposal to (1) install a
robust maritime domain awareness, communications, and
intelligence sharing platform in Cape Verde, and (2) encourage
the GOCV to expand access to this capability to an interagency
group, establishing a shared platform for intelligence
collection, analysis, and dissemination. This cable details the
history and status of Phase One projects, and assesses the
prospects for Phase Two implementation. Success in this effort
would give us more than just an ally with a useful geo-strategic
location astride some of the world's principal smuggling routes;
it would give us a willing and capable partner in the fight
against smuggling of all kinds. Counter-narcotics is our number
one mission strategic priority, and we assess that GOCV
implementation of this two phase program is the most important
single medium-term contribution Cape Verde could make to that
fight. End Summary.


2. (C) Post continues to aggressively pursue -- jointly with the
United States Africa Command, Office of Counter Narco-Terrorism
(AFRICOM/CNT) -- the installation of a robust maritime domain
awareness, communications, and intelligence sharing platform in
Cape Verde. The concept, dubbed the Counter Narcotics and
Maritime Security Information Center (CMIC),involves two
distinct phases: In Phase One, technical capability will be
installed to permit the Cape Verde Coast Guard (CVCG) to
exercise improved Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and command
and control functions. Phase One began in earnest in February
2009 and completion is expected in Summer 2009. Phase Two will
seek to expand this capability to an interagency group within
the GOCV, establishing a shared platform for intelligence
collection, analysis, and dissemination. Phase Two is
contingent upon GOCV political will and leadership in
establishing the appropriate interagency climate and regulatory
frameworks. Post has already begun fruitful engagement with the
GOCV on this theme (see para 6).


3. (C) Evolution of the CMIC Concept: In June 2008, the U.S.
Coast Guard collaborated with the CVCG in an unprecedented joint
live operation in which the CVCG placed a Law Enforcement
Detachment (LEDET) aboard the USCGC Dallas and conducted live
patrols, boardings, and consensual searches of suspect vessels
for over one week. This was the first such LEDET live joint
operation conducted in sub-Saharan Africa, and built on a solid
record of joint training between the two services, notably
including the GOCV's hosting of the 2006 NATO exercise Steadfast
Jaguar (the first NATO exercise in sub-Saharan Africa). In
preparation for the Dallas LEDET, the USG (through AFRICOM/CNT)
provided laptop computers and software to permit effective shore
to ship communications, linking all participants in real time
and dramatically facilitating intelligence sharing and
decision-making.


4. (C) In discussions with CVCG leadership, EmbOffs and AFRICOM
officials identified broader CVCG communications and information
sharing needs. Using creativity and energy, officers of CNT
adapted the Information Fusion Center concept (successfully used
in over two dozen applications in the Asian AOR) to the Cape
Verde context. The Fusion Center would establish a server-based
information backbone for the CVCG, permitting interoperability
of a wide array of communications equipment, secure handling of
sensitive intelligence, and both physical and virtual meeting
spaces to conduct training exercises and live operations. The
concept was vetted via INL and AF in July 2008, and planning of
the facility begun. During the vetting process, INL
successfully lobbied for increased funding for training,
sustainment, and technical assistance with future integration of
other GOCV platforms into the Fusion Center concept. The
project budget was accordingly more than doubled from $150,000
to approximately $320,000.


5. (C) Powerful Synergies Discovered: As this concept continued
to evolve, synergies with other ongoing bilateral and
multilateral counter-narcotics and MDA efforts were revealed. A
joint U.S.-Spanish effort to provide MDA through improved
land-based sensors led early on to asking key questions about
how best to integrate allied GOCV agencies including the
Judiciary Police, the Customs police, and the Maritime Police.
A U.S. European Command (EUCOM) funded initiative to expand
maritime Automated Identification System (AIS) technology to
Cape Verde similarly touched on core Maritime and Fisheries
Institute equities. GOCV enthusiasm for standing-up its new
intelligence service (SIR) led to scrutiny of intelligence
sharing protocols, privacy laws, and regulation and protection
of state secrets. A U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation funded
effort to develop a digitized fingerprint database, and
Judiciary Police efforts to develop a similar in-house database
on criminal suspects contributed to the momentum. It quickly
became clear to all that Cape Verde was potentially at a tipping
point, in which a series of overlapping projects, if properly
aligned, could be mutually reinforcing and result in a quantum
leap forward in GOCV capabilities.


6. (C) Post launched a series of discussions with the Chief of
Staff of Defense, the Minister of Defense, the Deputy Commander
of the Judiciary Police, the Commandant of the CVCG, and others,
seeking to assess and ultimately encourage the alignment of
those interests. All GOCV officials recognized the value of a
shared interagency platform of the kind that CMIC could become.
No single GOCV agency has the critical mass or expertise to
create such an intelligence clearing house independently of the
others, but the creation of a joint platform would clearly
benefit all. The capacity to collate police and intelligence
data, track suspect persons and suspect vessels, communicate
with interdiction assets in the field, and integrate these
efforts in real time with those of partner states would allow
the GOCV to simultaneously improve and operationalize its MDA,
as well as contribute meaningfully to international
counter-narcotics and counterterrorism efforts.


7. (C) Sharing Turf and Setting Limits: For this vision to be
realized would require the settlement of certain turf disputes
(such as conflicting claims to jurisdiction over drug seizures
on the high seas by both the CVCG and the CVPJ). It would also
require sufficient dedicated funding by the GOCV (the 2008 AIS
program mentioned above was successfully installed but
operations have been hamstrung by the lack of line-item funding
in the relevant GOCV ministry budget for the required
bandwidth). Most importantly, it would require establishing key
norms and procedures to ensure protection of sources and
methods, efficient but secure distribution of intelligence
products, and a vigorous defense of civil rights that still
permits bona-fide intelligence collection and analysis.
Squaring these circles would require powerful political
leadership from within the GOCV itself by someone with the
influence and dedication to overcome these obstacles and impose
a resolution. One of the few actors who fits this description
is Minister of Defense Fontes Lima.


8. (C) Current Status of CMIC Project: On January 28, 2008,
Ambassador and DCM met with Minister Fontes Lima to seek her
agreement to lead the charge on GOCV interagency information
sharing and analysis. Though the CMIC is a key component and
the technological backbone of the proposed interagency effort,
it had by this time become the action forcing event more than
the deliverable -- a means more than an end in itself. We
encouraged the MOD to use the CMIC project to leverage movement
on the broader interagency issue. Fontes Lima grasped
immediately both the practical and political subtleties of our
message. She green-lighted CMIC Phase One, and pledged prompt
personal action on convoking discussion regarding the longer
term interagency integration both the USG and GOCV seek to
enable Phase Two. The MOD lost no time in following through on
her word. In a separate meeting with CVCG Commandant Fernando
Perreira, DCM was told the MOD had called a senior level meeting
for the week of February 9 to begin discussion of this issue.
In the meantime AFRICOM/CNT has consolidated its programs to
provide a clear focus on procurement and installation of the
CMIC equipment, and has invited three CVCG officers to extended
training on database administration and security. These classes
begin in March and will conclude concurrently with the
procurement and importation of the required equipment, allowing
the three officers to participate actively in the assembly and
activation of the network.


9. (C) Next Steps in Information Fusion: Once the identified
site is prepared (improved HVAC, security, and related upgrades
to support an information fusion center),actual installation
should proceed fairly smoothly. The real challenges will be the
political and organizational ones: determining who owns the
intelligence products that will be produced by this fusion of
data streams; who can access it; if/how it can be used in
law-enforcement or other operations; how it will be protected;
what mechanisms will be put in place for oversight; and many
other non-trivial concerns. The GOCV is receiving assistance
and advice from a wide variety of partners, including the UNODC,
partner state intelligence agencies, partner state police
agencies, and partner state militaries. These organizations
have distinct mandates, so the nascent GOCV information fusion
center will feel itself pulled in several (at times
inconsistent) directions at once.


10. (C) The most likely outcome is, in Post's view, that the
principal beneficiary of this system early-on will be the CVCG.
With a defined mission and integrated command structure, the
CVCG can most quickly make use of actionable intelligence. For
this concept to succeed, however, it is vital that other
agencies, particularly police agencies, also have input into and
access to the analysis produced. Post and AFRICOM/CNT are aware
of this dynamic and continue to stress the need for CVPJ and
other agency involvement. CVPJ participation in recent LEDET
operations with the U.S. Navy and UK Navy are positive signs,
but we must continue to press for genuine interagency
collaboration. Given its distinct mission, consumer base, and
(necessary) separation from law enforcement, the SIR is most
likely to remain only a consumer of the CMIC product, perhaps
without even an overt acknowledgment that it is reading those
reports. However, maximizing the benefit of the link between
CMIC and foreign intelligence services -- a link which is
currently envisioned to pass through SIR -- will require some
creative thinking about how to ensure urgent actionable
information reaches the operational agencies (whether military
or police) in time to be acted upon.


11. (C) Comment: The GOCV has repeatedly demonstrated, through
LEDETs and other activities, its readiness and political will to
join the U.S. and its allies in the fight against transnational
crime, especially maritime narco-trafficking. The scope and
vision of their proposed transformation in intelligence
capabilities is little short of astonishing, and offers the U.S.
and the EU an unparalleled opportunity to help them get it
right. Success in this effort would give us more than just an
ally with a useful geo-strategic location astride some of the
world's principal smuggling routes; it would give us a genuine
partner, willing and capable to assist meaningfully in
monitoring and (in due course) actively interdicting illicit
traffic in people, drugs, weapons, and worse. Counter-narcotics
is our number one mission strategic priority, and we assess that
GOCV implementation of this two phase program is the most
important single medium-term contribution Cape Verde could make
to that fight.


MYLES