CZECH REPUBLIC: RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON DISCUSSION

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 000088 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2019 TAGS: MARR PINS PREL EZ NATO OSCE SUBJECT: CZECH REPUBLIC: RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON DISCUSSION OF MEDVEDEV SECURITY PROPOSAL REF: SECSTATE 11363 Classified By: Political/Economic Counselor Charles O. Blaha for reason s 1.4 (b) & (d). 1.(C) Political officer discussed the reftel points with Mr. Petr Chalupecky, the Czech MFA's Deputy Director for Security Policy, on February 11. He appreciated receiving the points and shared many of our concerns regarding President Medvedev's proposal. Chalupecky said that his department views the Russian proposal as nothing concrete. He noted that it contains a mix of language from the Helsinki Final Act and the U.N. Charter, commitments that Russia is already bound to observe. Chalupecky, one of the strongest proponents within the MFA of a hard line on Russia, believes that Russia's proposal is an example of classic Russian (Soviet) diplomacy going back decades that seeks to weaken European security structures, legitimize "facts on the ground" like Russia's August 2008 invasion of Abhazia and South Ossetia, and increase Russia's overall influence. 2.(C) Chalupecky said the Czechs do not want to rush discussions on the specific points of the Russian proposal. At the February 13 Political and Security Committee (PSC) meeting, the Czechs will advocate that the following points serve as the basis for any future EU discussions with the Russians. a) The EU should speak with one voice and closely coordinate with the U.S. and NATO. The trans-Atlantic element of European security must remain a vital source of security in Europe and North America. b) There are currently more questions than answers about the Medvedev proposal. The EU will seek clarifications on Russian ideas. The burden of specification lies on the proposing side, i.e. the Russian Federation. c) Possible discussions should take place within existing structures and involve all transatlantic partners. The OSCE is the most suitable venue. d). Common and indivisible European security must remain based on shared values. e) In the short run, the debate on European security should focus on restoring trust and providing impulses for the resolution of protracted conflicts and the resumption of key arms control and confidence building measures. f) A comprehensive and multi-dimensional approach to security stemming from the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 Paris Charter must be the main points of departure for any debate aimed to improve and strengthen European Security in Europe. g) Comprehensive security architecture as developed over the years based on existing institutions and shared commitments and principles must remain intact. The EU remains open to considering ways to improve the effectiveness of such institutions without limiting their effectiveness and scope of activities. 3.(C) Chalupecky is concerned that the French and the Italians will push for immediate discussions with Russia on the Medvedev proposal. Chalupecky said his government feels strongly that any EU discussions must not get ahead of NATO's deliberations. They do not want any EU discussions to be seen as weakening or marginalizing NATO's primary role in European security. 4.(C) Comment: We are fortunate that the Czechs now hold the presidency of the European Union. With a strong advocate for our shared positions within the EU and NATO, we have an opportunity in the remaining months of the Czech presidency to push for a joint NATO-EU strategy for dealing with Medvedev's initiative. However, within the EU, the Czechs cannot do this without the help of another large EU member state. They are a relatively small country, and, as EU president, are bound to work to achieve consensus rather than push their own viewpoint. Thompson-Jones