CZECH REPUBLIC: RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON DISCUSSION

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 000088

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2019
TAGS: MARR PINS PREL EZ NATO OSCE
SUBJECT: CZECH REPUBLIC: RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON DISCUSSION
OF MEDVEDEV SECURITY PROPOSAL

REF: SECSTATE 11363

Classified By: Political/Economic Counselor Charles O. Blaha for reason
s 1.4 (b) & (d).

1.(C) Political officer discussed the reftel points with Mr.
Petr Chalupecky, the Czech MFA's Deputy Director for Security
Policy, on February 11. He appreciated receiving the points
and shared many of our concerns regarding President
Medvedev's proposal. Chalupecky said that his department
views the Russian proposal as nothing concrete. He noted that
it contains a mix of language from the Helsinki Final Act and
the U.N. Charter, commitments that Russia is already bound to
observe. Chalupecky, one of the strongest proponents within
the MFA of a hard line on Russia, believes that Russia's
proposal is an example of classic Russian (Soviet) diplomacy
going back decades that seeks to weaken European security
structures, legitimize "facts on the ground" like Russia's
August 2008 invasion of Abhazia and South Ossetia, and
increase Russia's overall influence.

2.(C) Chalupecky said the Czechs do not want to rush
discussions on the specific points of the Russian proposal.
At the February 13 Political and Security Committee (PSC)
meeting, the Czechs will advocate that the following points
serve as the basis for any future EU discussions with the
Russians.

a) The EU should speak with one voice and closely coordinate
with the U.S. and NATO. The trans-Atlantic element of
European security must remain a vital source of security in
Europe and North America.

b) There are currently more questions than answers about the
Medvedev proposal. The EU will seek clarifications on Russian
ideas. The burden of specification lies on the proposing
side, i.e. the Russian Federation.

c) Possible discussions should take place within existing
structures and involve all transatlantic partners. The OSCE
is the most suitable venue.

d). Common and indivisible European security must remain
based on shared values.

e) In the short run, the debate on European security should
focus on restoring trust and providing impulses for the
resolution of protracted conflicts and the resumption of key
arms control and confidence building measures.

f) A comprehensive and multi-dimensional approach to security
stemming from the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 Paris
Charter must be the main points of departure for any debate
aimed to improve and strengthen European Security in Europe.

g) Comprehensive security architecture as developed over the
years based on existing institutions and shared commitments
and principles must remain intact. The EU remains open to
considering ways to improve the effectiveness of such
institutions without limiting their effectiveness and scope
of activities.


3.(C) Chalupecky is concerned that the French and the
Italians will push for immediate discussions with Russia on
the Medvedev proposal. Chalupecky said his government feels
strongly that any EU discussions must not get ahead of
NATO's deliberations. They do not want any EU discussions to
be seen as weakening or marginalizing NATO's primary role in
European security.

4.(C) Comment: We are fortunate that the Czechs now hold the
presidency of the European Union. With a strong advocate for
our shared positions within the EU and NATO, we have an
opportunity in the remaining months of the Czech presidency
to push for a joint NATO-EU strategy for dealing with
Medvedev's initiative. However, within the EU, the Czechs
cannot do this without the help of another large EU member
state. They are a relatively small country, and, as EU
president, are bound to work to achieve consensus rather than
push their own viewpoint.
Thompson-Jones