CZECH VIEWS ON THE VISEGRAD FOUR (C-RE9-02125)

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 000722 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2034 TAGS: PINR PGOV PREL EZ PL HU LO SUBJECT: CZECH VIEWS ON THE VISEGRAD FOUR (C-RE9-02125) REF: STATE 125736 Classified By: Acting Political and Economic Counselor Michael Dixon fo r reason 1.4(C). ¶1. (SBU) In response to reftel, Poloff met on December 14 with Jiri Cistecky, Director of the Czech MFA's Central European Department, and Petr Maryska, a member of the Central European Department's Visegrad 4 (V-4) working group, to discuss Czech perceptions of the current state of V-4 cooperation, and particularly Poland's approach to V-4 involvement. ¶2. (C) Cistecky indicated that, while V-4 cooperation is probably generally viewed positively by those looking at the V-4 "brand" from the outside, the internal view in Prague is that much of the V-4's activity lacks practical results, and is instead limited to declarations of support or statements of intent by the V-4. Cistecky said that the Visegrad Fund continues to be used successfully to finance activities in pursuit of common V-4 positions on an ad hoc basis, usually through NGOs. However, formal V-4 cooperation with the governments of non-V-4 countries more often ends up taking a bilateral form, because the mechanisms for implementing and sustaining a relationship with the V-4 as a group are undefined. ¶3. (C) In part for this reason, Cistecky stated that the V-4 had embarked in the spring on an in-depth analysis of its goals, organization and capacities to determine if there is a desire for more purposeful cooperation, both within the V-4 and with potential external partners, and how best to develop the necessary structures and procedures to support such objectives. This process of self-examination is also aimed at determining the most effective ways in which the V-4 can leverage its positions in other international bodies, especially the EU. While the response thus far to this analysis has been muted, Cistecky expects that the back-to-back Hungarian and Polish EU presidencies in 2011 may prompt more effort to define and focus V-4 activity. ¶4. (C) Cistecky described Poland's level of cooperation with other V-4 members as "broad, but not deep." He said the process of finding the best ways for the V-4 to work together in a more coordinated way will continue to be hampered by Poland's desire to "be in charge instead of being an equal partner." Cistecky feels Poland's wider agenda to be "the biggest of the little ones" and to lead a Central/Eastern European coalition in the EU further complicates its role in the V-4. Nevertheless, he noted that the Czech Republic and Poland share very similar foreign policy views, especially about Eastern Europe and the Balkans, while it is sometimes more difficult for the Czechs to find common positions with Hungary and Slovakia. ¶5. (C) Without addressing any particular potential arrangement, Cistecky speculated that the V-4 might, in the future, become "the platform" onto which other relationships could be attached to expand the V-4's international influence. However, he believes that the V-4 has enough to do for now to solidify itself internally. Thompson-Jones