CZECHS HOST NATIONAL SEMINAR ON NATO STRATEGIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 000696 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2014 TAGS: NATO PREL MARR MOPS MCAP EZ RU SUBJECT: CZECHS HOST NATIONAL SEMINAR ON NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT -- ALL ABOUT RUSSIA Classified By: CDA Mary Thompson-Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On November 24, the Czech MFA hosted a seminar, "Seeking a New NATO Strategic Concept: The Czech Perspective", attended by Group of Experts member Ambassador Hans-Friedrich von Ploetz, NATO Assistant Secretary General Jiri Sedivy, parliamentarians, MFA and MOD representatives, think tank researchers, and journalists. Much of the Czech focus was on the primacy of Article 5 and the negative role -- or even the threat -- of Russia. Ambassador von Ploetz's key themes were the importance of arms control and non-proliferation as the best means of avoiding conflict, and the need for what he viewed as a more constructive and realistic assessment of Russia -- or, as he put it privately, the need for some on the Czech side to focus more on being part of the solution rather than the problem. End Summary. The Big Picture -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Ambassador Sedivy began the seminar with his view of the new Strategic Concept's three primary objectives. The first of these is to explain "who we (NATO) are" in terms of collective defense and security, and to elaborate NATO's value added to the security of the international community. Secondly, to determine the "level of NATO's ambition" by establishing the scope of the Alliance's geographic focus and the eventual extent of NATO's membership, bearing in mind that greater size could ultimately translate to less collective action. As his third point, he noted that the Strategic Concept will have to incorporate new threats such as cyber warfare and piracy within the context of Article 5. Above all, however, Sedivy emphasized that the new Strategic Concept must demonstrate NATO's enduring relevance. He stressed a need for balance between continuity and change in the final product. No hope should be held out for solving the problems of NATO, he warned, simply by drafting a new Strategic Concept. These will only be addressed by political will and the investment of resources. ¶4. (SBU) Ambassador von Ploetz assessed the Strategic Concept process and desirable outcomes. He identified strategic objective number one as ensuring the security and defense of Alliance members' countries and societies through Article 5. This includes a reaffirmation of the transatlantic link and the underlying promise of help from U.S. forces in time of need, as well as an open door policy for potential new members. Safety and protection of the environment (e.g., against global warming) was his second strategic objective, with defense against more geographically distant threats being a third objective, if they pose a direct danger to member states. In considering the balance between territorial defense and expeditionary operations, von Ploetz indicated that, in his personal opinion, "NATO will have to act globally, but will not be a global actor." The Czech Big Picture -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Czech MOD's Assistant Deputy Minister for International Affairs and Defense Policy and Strategy Director Ivan Dvorak painted a more modest Czech view of the impact of the new Strategic Concept, observing that the final shape and character of the document will affect the Czechs' strategic vision for their armed forces. He said that military deployment capabilities for territorial defense and expeditionary operations are overlapping and complementary, and he emphasized the Czech Republic's commitment to NATO operations abroad, such as in Afghanistan. ¶6. (SBU) Saying he did not expect the Strategic Concept to encompass climate change, but to focus on military capabilities, Dvorak identified three primary audiences for the document. The first of these is the public audience in NATO countries who must be convinced that NATO is strong and can respond to threats. The second audience is "outside actors", some of whom share NATO's values, others who do not. Finally, there is the "professional public" consisting of members of the many organizations who will have to understand and implement the Concept. Regarding Article 5, both Dvorak and MFA's Security Policy Director Ivan Pocuch repeated the messages delivered at recent high-level U.S.-Czech bilateral meetings, during which they identified the Article as the "key" element in the Czech outlook on formulating the new Strategic Concept and urged maintaining the status quo, with Pocuch arguing in favor of preserving the Article's "constructive ambivalence and ambiguity". Russia Polemics -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Ambassador von Ploetz explained how the Strategic Concept process helps answer a pressing need for renewed transatlantic dialogue and consultation among Alliance partners and with other countries. He said the circle of important interlocutors includes Russia, though he noted that it will be necessary to find out to what extent "there will be two to tango" in the NATO-Russia relationship. MOD's Dvorak and MFA's Pocuch, echoing sentiments from other recent bilateral encounters, were markedly skeptical about the prospects for useful dialogue with Russia. Dvorak observed that dialogue would be successful only so long as the Russians act in mutual partnership with NATO. Pocuch took things up a notch when he insisted that cooperation with Russia is desirable only if Russia "does not behave like a spoiled child who always has to have his way," but as a "constructive player". ¶8. (SBU) After pausing to note that this view should not be taken as "the definition of the Czech position" on NATO-Russia dialogue, Pocuch moved on to assess what he identified as Russia's greater relative military strength in 2009 compared with the situation in 1999 when the last Strategic Concept was approved. He encouraged the retention of nuclear deterrence as a NATO principle, because, "no one really knows how many tactical and strategic nuclear weapons the Russians have, not even the Russians themselves." One-time Defense Minister Lubos Dobrovsky (also chief of staff to former President Havel and Czech Ambassador in Moscow from 1996-2000) scolded that those crafting the new Strategic Concept were only fooling themselves if they did not take what he considers the necessary step of actually naming those who pose a threat and preparing to fight against them, explaining that these potential enemies most especially include countries such as Russia who possess deliverable nuclear weapons. ¶9. (SBU) Lubos Palata, editor of the Czech daily "Lidove noviny" and correspondent for the Polish daily "Gazeta Wyborcza", claimed that citizens of NATO's new member countries are losing faith in Article 5 as a safeguard of defense, and that many see a situation similar to that of Poland in 1939, with worthless assurances from the West. He asserted that Central and Eastern Europeans view the deployment of their soldiers abroad as an exchange for a security guarantee and that the "lay public" thought of the formerly planned radar as a type of "insurance policy." He concluded that Central and Eastern Europeans will have to be convinced by the new Strategic Concept that their taxes should be spent on defense. He asserted that this will be an even more difficult case to make after what happened in Georgia, saying that NATO did nothing and the EU had to step in. Palata told his audience that Czechs don't understand why NATO is sending thousand of troops to Afghanistan or fighting Somali pirates, yet not doing anything about Georgia or the situation in Moldova, for example. ¶10. (SBU) Ambassador von Ploetz argued that any threat assessment must include an evaluation of capabilities and intentions. He painted what he called a more "sober" picture than what he estimated his Czech interlocutors were imagining about Russia, pointing out that the gap between U.S. and Russian conventional military capabilities will be even more disadvantageous for the Russians by 2017, and that currently only 10 percent of Russian military hardware is of non-Soviet-era provenance. He also claimed that what in fact had been poor Russian military performance in Georgia is being "kept secret" in Moscow. Thus, strictly from an analysis of military capabilities he is reluctant to label Russia a threat. ¶11. (SBU) More importantly, von Ploetz added, NATO should not be defined in terms of its enemies, but united by the values and the way of life for which the Alliance stands. Later, Ambassador von Ploetz also called participants' attention to the fact that Russia's proximity to the "arc of instability" in Eurasia coupled with the decline of its European population in the face of rising Muslim numbers poses a demographic challenge that Yevgeny Primakov has labeled the greatest threat to Russian security and stability. ¶12. (SBU) After supporting Ambassador von Ploetz's assessment of Russia's true military capabilities, Ambassador Sedivy stated that it is "irrational" to consider Russia a direct threat in the sense of Article 5. He did allow that Russian intelligence collection efforts against the West are still very vigorous, and he agreed that NATO needs to do more to "be visible" in places like the Baltics. Possibly turning his attention to Dobrovsky (who was a signer of the Open Letter to President Obama on July 16),Sedivy said that those who say America is turning its back on Europe are displaying "persistent immaturity". ¶13. (C) Privately, after the seminar, Ambassador von Ploetz remarked on the anti-Russia tenor of some of the statements, saying that when he encounters such attitudes in Central and Eastern Europe he finds it useful to encourage those holding them to focus on becoming "part of the solution" to establishing a constructive NATO-Russia dialogue rather than insisting on continuing to be "part of the problem" standing in the way of doing so. Afghanistan, NATO-EU, Non-Proliferation and Arms Control -------------- -------------- ¶14. (SBU) Ambassador von Ploetz warned that, in considering the nature of NATO's future role, "we must resist the temptation to view Afghanistan as the raison d'etre of the Alliance," and he insisted that NATO is not a "democracy exporter", but a provider of security and stability. He also highlighted the role of NATO-EU cooperation to prevent crises, identifying the EU as "the largest soft power player in the world" and forecasting increased EU military capabilities resulting from the Lisbon Treaty. MFA Political Director Ivo Sramek noted that the Lisbon Treaty will also be a force to be reckoned with in the shaping of future EU foreign policy. In addition to possibilities for comprehensive applications of civilian and military solutions resulting from a NATO-EU partnership, von Ploetz held up active non-proliferation and verifiable arms control policies as among NATO's best keys to crisis prevention -- and, in tough economic times, as solutions costing less than military hardware. ¶15. (SBU) MOD's Dvorak and Parlimanetarian Michael Hrbata (ODS party; Deputy Chairman of the Defense Committee) doubted the effectiveness and the likelihood of EU military action. Ambassador von Ploetz, calling himself the "father of the Eurocorps", insisted that, just as individuals are first and foremost responsible for their own welfare, so EU countries can and should spend more on defense rather than simply relying on the U.S. to "bail them out". Hrbata lamented what he described as the biggest cut in the Czech defense budget since 1989 (12 percent),and he noted that such a reduction does not help improve the country's military capabilities, notwithstanding Defense Minister Bartak's commitment in a recent ten-year planning analysis to make participation in NATO operations the military's number one priority. What Wasn't Discussed -------------- ¶16. (C) Comment: In addition to Russia's military capabilities, Czechs could point to the negative effects of Russian economic influence in such vital areas as energy security. Much of the Czechs' fate is in their own hands in these matters, including decisions about how to respond to foreign moves to acquire assets, and whether or not to pass anti-lobbying legislation and other transparency measures that would reduce the risk of having the country's security interests sold away to the highest bidder. ¶17. (C) In terms of the Czech Republic, jourmalist Palata's claims about the "lay" public feeling insecure after the cancellation of the radar do not account for the widespread Czech public opposition to the project. The public he is referring to is the "professional public" of politicians and journalists who supported the radar site. Meanwhile, the Czech public's concerns about its tax dollars being spent for defense are more likely to stem from media allegations of the military's mismanagement of acquisition funds, and from a guns-versus-butter analysis amid an economic downturn in the Czech Republic. ¶18. (C) Along with members of the old guard such as Dobrovsky, there was no shortage of young people in the room, many of whom were junior and mid-level MFA officials. Their eye-rolling at Dobrovsky's opinions and their expressions of consternation after the session are less an indication of political ideology than of a diminishment of the Czech view of Russia through the prism of former Soviet domination. Some would say this is a sign of a rising and dangerous naivite about the wider world. Younger Czechs whose education about, experience in, and exposure to that wider world twenty years after the Velvet Revolution might reply that, as Ambassador Sedivy characterized it, it is a sign of growing rationality. End Comment. Thompson-Jones