Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09PRAGUE681
2009-11-20 13:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Prague
Cable title:  

CZECH INTERIM GOVERNMENT EXCEEDING EXPECTATIONS

Tags:  PGOV PREL EZ 
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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRAGUE 000681 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL EZ
SUBJECT: CZECH INTERIM GOVERNMENT EXCEEDING EXPECTATIONS

Classified By: CDA Mary Thompson-Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRAGUE 000681

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL EZ
SUBJECT: CZECH INTERIM GOVERNMENT EXCEEDING EXPECTATIONS

Classified By: CDA Mary Thompson-Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The interim, technocratic government of
Jan Fischer was appointed on May 8, 2009 by President Klaus,
after Mirek Topolanek's ODS-led coalition government lost a
vote of confidence on March 24. Topolanek and CSSD leader
Jiri Paroubek agreed on Fischer, a previous unknown who
headed the Czech Statistical Office, because he was
politically obscure and perceived as malleable. Yet Fischer
has proven his mettle as an effective, confident Prime
Minister and has gained the trust and support of the public.
ODS and CSSD contacts have verified that Topolanek, Paroubek
and a small cadre of party leaders have met to discuss the
possibility of holding early elections in February, instead
of the regularly scheduled May 2010. While early elections
in February are still unlikely, the fact of the meeting hints
at the growing unease over Fischer's burgeoning popularity
within the major parties. Despite his success as Prime
Minister, Fischer's government is still very reliant on the
support of both Topolanek and Paroubek. Regardless of the
date of parliamentary elections, Fischer has proven a
reliable ally and willing interlocutor who is willing to
engage with the U.S. on a wide range of issues. End Summary.

--------------
Fischer's Interim Government
--------------


2. (SBU) No one had heard of Jan Fischer before CSSD and
ODS presented him to President Klaus as their choice for
interim Prime Minister. Klaus appointed the former Head of
the Czech Statistical Office as PM on May 8, the day Mirek
Topolanek resigned as PM. Fischer's government was comprised
mostly of Ministers affiliated with the two major parties -
CSSD and ODS. Fischer's initial goals and mandate were
modest: finishing the Czech's EU Presidency, preparing the
country's 2010 state budget and austerity package, moving
forward with privatization of Czech Airlines, starting debate
on the 2010 foreign deployments bill, taking on the extremist
Workers Party and, of course, preparing the country for early
elections.


3. (SBU) Fischer assumed the responsibilities of the EU
Presidency with little difficulty. His performance was
statesmanlike, although the Embassy noticed a definite shift
in power and coordination from the Deputy Prime Minister's
office (formerly led by Alexander Vondra) to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. From the announcement of the new
government, Foreign Minister Kohout moved to transfer much of
the responsibility for Summit preparations and substantive
issues from Vondra's office to the MFA.



4. (C) The interim government has its critics as well,
mostly from ODS. Previous Interior Minister and current ODS
Vice Chairman Ivan Langer publicly sparred with interim
Interior Minister Martin Pecina (loyal to CSSD),after Pecina
changed the portfolio of the ODS number two at the Interior
Ministry, Zdenek Zajicek, and limited Zajicek's ministerial
authority. This prompted Zajicek to resign and Langer and
Topolanek to call for Pecina's removal. Topolanek, known for
his emotional reactions, said Fischer's government "could not
enjoy" ODS confidence while Pecina was still in office.
Topolanek later retreated from this ultimatum. Fischer took
a stately approach and completely defused the issue, saying
he would meet with Pecina later to discuss changes at the
Interior Ministry. Pecina remains as Interior Minister.

--------------
Now, Until the Next Elections
--------------


5. (SBU) Fischer's legislative accomplishments show that he
was a confident leader and an astute politician. In May,
respected security policy analyst Jiri Schneider told poloffs
that the Fischer government would be lucky to get the 2011
foreign deployments bill through first reading, given the
controversy surrounding the 2010 bill. However, Fischer
gained consensus on and swiftly pushed through the 2011
deployments bill to completion. He did the same with
controversial economic austerity measures necessary to meet
the 2010 state budget cost saving goals. Fischer's Interior
Minister, Martin Pecina, has ramped up the government's
efforts to fight extremism, working collaboratively with the
Human Rights Minister, Michael Kocab. Fischer publicly
confronted President Klaus over Klaus's reluctance to sign
the Lisbon Treaty. Currently, although only 1.8 percent of
Czechs believe politicians, Fischer enjoys an approval rating
of 79 percent, with more than two-thirds of the electorate
wanting his interim government to stay in power until regular
parliamentary elections occur.


6. (C) Despite his successes to date, Fischer has kept his
government's priorities from now until the May 2010 elections

PRAGUE 00000681 002 OF 003


modest. He selected a EU Commissioner who was acceptable to
both the Civic and Social Democrats. He wants to move
forward on the large (and controversial) environmental
remediation tender, as well as Trade Minister Tosovky's
long-term energy policy. Fischer also seeks to present
anticorruption legislation to the parliament, but may find
this more difficult to push through parliament given the
embedded special interests.


7. (C) Although the Fischer government appears stable for
now, there will probably be a some changes in the near
future. Minister for European Affairs Stefan Fule was
selected as the Czech nominee for the European Union
Commission and must be replaced. A couple of names have been
mentioned as his replacement; the most recent is the current
Czech Ambassador to Australia, Juraj Chmiel. In addition,
the Minister of Environment, Ladislav Miko, is slated to
leave the government at the end of November. The Director of
Policy at the Ministry of Environment, Pavel Sremer, told
poloff that one of the Deputy Ministers will likely succeed
him.

--------------
...Whenever That May Be
--------------


8. (C) After the deal for early elections in November fell
apart, everyone geared up for May 2010. A recent leak in the
press about meetings between CSSD and ODS leaders to discuss
the possibility of early elections in February 2010 was
confirmed by the Embassy in a telcon with Jan Hamacek, CSSD
MP and party leader, as well as Chair of Foreign Relations
Committee, although publicly denied by Paroubek of CSSD.
(Comment: Hamacek is the more trustworthy of the two. End
Comment.). Yet in the wake of the meeting, Hamacek said
February elections were "unlikely" and President Klaus said
they were not "realistic."


9. (C) Both Paroubek and Topolanek are becoming wary of
Fischer's burgeoning popularity and are growing weary from
the stress of a prolonged campaign. Paroubek in particular
pays close attention to polls: reportedly, the Topolanek
government's rise in popularity during the first part of the
EU presidency was one factor that motivated Paroubek to seek
the confidence vote that brought the government down.
Topolanek's ODS party will hold a party congress on the
weekend of November 21 and 22, to vote on a platform.
However, there have been numerous calls from other ODS party
leaders to have a secret ballot on party leadership - that
is, a vote of confidence on Topolanek. Topolanek refuses to
allow it, but this grumbling could be the impetus Topolanek
needs to push for early elections in February.

--------------
Reliable, Popular, But Mindful of His Place
--------------


10. (C) PM Fischer has been a strong ally to the U.S. and a
willing interlocutor. His government's swift and smooth
handling of the foreign deployments bill was impressive. His
Minister of Defense, Martin Bartak, laid the groundwork with
legislators from both ODS and CSSD so that all issues were
ironed out prior to the vote. CSSD MPs noted that Fischer's
handling of the foreign deployments bill was a bi-partisan
success and in pleasant contrast to 2009, because Fischer
addressed CSSD's concerns up front and gave them no reason to
entrench.


11. (C) Fischer's government has been a reliable,
cooperative partner for the U.S. Despite being told that
Czech interlocutors would be consulted days before an
announcement of our decision on the security review policy
and missile defense, Fischer's handling of the late-night
call from President Obama hours before the decision was
announced was gracious and statesmanlike. He understood the
decision and agreed that we needed to focus on the future of
our defense cooperation and not dwell on missile defense.
When the U.S. delegation arrived to explain the decision just
a few hours later, the Czech side circulated a paper entitled
"Beyond the Missile Defense Review."


12. (C) Comment: During the visit of Vice President Biden,
Fischer was very engaging and effusive in his support for
mutual cooperation. At the press conference that followed
the meeting, Fischer even went beyond his scripted remarks
calling the U.S. an important ally and expressing his desire
to move forward on security and other issues. Even though
Fischer greeted VP Biden at the airport upon arrival (usually
enough),he came to the airport to see Biden off and joined
the conversation Biden was having with former President
Vaclav Havel and spent nearly another hour with both of them.
After departure, Fischer sincerely thanked the Charge
d'Affaires for organizing the trip, commenting about its

PRAGUE 00000681 003 OF 003


success. It was clear from the meetings and his remarks to
the Charge that Fischer likes the U.S. and wants to foster an
even stronger bilateral relationship.


12. (C) It is no surprise that Fischer is so popular with
Czechs, as he is perceived as responsible and trustworthy.
He is, however, still dependent on the support of the two
major parties and must be mindful of the two leaders -
Topolanek and Paroubek - who put him in power. If his
policies or governing fails to reconcile with ODS and CSSD
leaders and their goals, he could easily find that he no
longer enjoys their confidence. But Topolanek and Paroubek
must also be careful, for they are far less popular than
Fischer and would suffer from ousting him for no good reason.
End Comment.
Thompson-Jones

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