FIRST U.S.-CZECH HIGH LEVEL DEFENSE GROUP: CZECHS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRAGUE 000668 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED TEXT TO PARA 22) SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/CE E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MASS MOPS EZ SUBJECT: FIRST U.S.-CZECH HIGH LEVEL DEFENSE GROUP: CZECHS CAUTIOUS ON SHARED EARLY WARNING OFFER PRAGUE 00000668 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Mary Thompson-Jones for reasons 1.4 (b ) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The first-ever U.S.-Czech High Level Defense Group (HLDG) meeting on November 6 in Prague, led by Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for International Security Affairs Alexander Vershbow, was productive and cordial, covering: NATO issues, U.S.-Russia relations, the new Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) for missile defense (MD), Afghanistan, and bilateral funding and acquisition issues. The Czechs have moved past the results of the MD policy review, are fully engaged on new modalities of cooperation, and stressed their need to show their public concrete results. They emphasized the constraints on their defense budget due to the current economic downturn. The U.S. delegation offered the Czechs participation in an MD Shared Early Warning (SEW) system; Defense Minister Bartak reacted positively in a separate meeting with U.S. delegation head Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) Alexander Vershbow. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) detailed plans for the next phase of joint MDA-funded R&D cooperation, and the Czechs asked for a permanent liaison officer at MDA. The Czech government's commitment to Afghanistan remains strong. On the sale of excess defense article KC-130s, the Czechs doubted the two sides could find a medium ground between their expectations and the realistic cost figures, and suggested it might be time to "shake hands" and look for other areas of cooperation. While stressing their appreciation for FMF and IMET programs, they asked that the U.S. consider proportional parity between Czech and Polish programs. End Summary. "MATURE, LONG-TERM" SECURITY RELATIONS -------------- ¶2. (U) In addition to ASD Vershbow, the U.S. delegation included representatives from OSD, MDA, AT&L, DSCA, EUCOM, the State Department, and Embassy Prague. Deputy Defense Minister Jan Fulik headed the Czech delegation, which included other MoD representatives, the Deputy Chief of the Czech General Staff, a member of the Czech NATO Mission, and a Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) representative. ASD Vershbow also met privately with Minister Bartak on the margins of the HLDG. ¶3. (C) Deputy Defense Minister Jan Fulik expressed appreciation for the HLDG dialogue and offered condolences for the shooting at Fort Hood. Fulik emphasized that despite temporary resource problems, the Czechs do not lack the will to strengthen bilateral and multilateral security cooperation. Fulik said that the Czechs understood the reasons for the new MD architecture, but still faced political challenges that they hoped to move beyond. Veshbow noted that the U.S. aims for "mature, long-term" security relations with the Czech Republic (CR) and was committed to consultations with the CR on key security issues. STRATEGIC SECURITY OVERVIEW -------------- ¶4. (C) Fulik said Czech security policy is still influenced by Russian behavior. The CR seeks "pragmatic" relations with Russia but is concerned by Russian assertion of privileged spheres of influence and its "creeping influence" in NATO business. Fulik said that the CR might be able to bring some fresh ideas to help restart the NATO-Russia effort. He expressed satisfaction with the work to date of the Group of Experts (GoE) on the new NATO Strategic Concept. Both Fulik and MoD Director of Defense Policy and Strategy Ivan Dvorak stressed the need to balance Article 5 collective defense and out-of-area operations, with Dvorak adding that Article 5 must remain the "cornerstone." Both added the need to keep Allies involved by having early discussions in the North Atlantic Council (NAC). ¶5. (C) ASD Vershbow said that the Strategic Concept review needs to be open and inclusive, so that it incorporates all allies' views, with the final product accessible to publics and parliaments. He agreed on the need for balance between Article 5 and out-of-area operations, noting that both required deployable forces. Even defining the meaning of Article 5 in an era of asymmetric threats would not be a simple task. He stressed the need for the Strategic Concept to ensure that NATO generates the resources to match its level of ambition; meeting the resource challenge should include collective and pooling efforts, increased use of PRAGUE 00000668 002.2 OF 004 common funding, and development of "niche" capabilities by some allies. OSD Europe/NATO Principal Director Julianne Smith emphasized the importance of allies' willingness to provide resources and of realistic resource planning. ¶6. (C) Fulik predicted that due to economic conditions, the CR's defense budget would be constrained in 2010. He hoped it would improve in 2011; if not, the CR will find it hard to keep deployments at their current level. Dvorak added that the average NATO member contributed 0.5 percent of its budget to NATO common funding, but the Czechs contribute 2.5 percent. ¶7. (C) ASD Vershbow briefed on the status of U.S.-Russian relations, emphasizing that the "reset" will not come at the expense of our European allies. The Czechs noted they were pleased to hear the reset was not just one way, noting they felt at the beginning that the Russians believed that only the U.S. needed to reset. MISSILE DEFENSE -------------- ¶8. (C) Fulik called the MD policy review "a little painful for us" but focused on the future. He declared that the CR was "deeply interested in participating immediately" in the new PAA architecture. He said that the Czech side had created a 10-person MD experts group for which it was seeking "appropriate places." ¶9. (C) Missile Defense Agency (MDA) International Affairs Director Nancy Morgan briefed on the new MD Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) and on MDA plans for the next phases of three MDA-funded U.S.-Czech research projects -- all of which had provided valuable inputs to U.S. MD programs. The Czechs had no questions following the presentation. ¶10. (C) OSD Nuclear and MD Policy Principal Director John Plumb offered the Czechs participation in a MD Shared Early Warning (SEW) system and explained SEW's operation, noting that SEW could possibly evolve into a larger role for the CR, for example, in the area of consequence management. ASD Vershbow noted this offer was in line with the 2008 U.S.-Czech Declaration of Strategic Cooperation's commitment to share MD situational awareness. Once NATO made decisions on adopting the PAA as part of a NATO-wide MD effort, it would be easier to identify other opportunities for Czech participation, building on the SEW capability. Fulik was initially non-committal (probably because the Czechs were not expecting this offer and did not have instructions),but reacted more favorably in discussing the idea over lunch. Defense Minister Bartak reacted enthusiastically in a separate meeting with ASD Vershbow. Bartak said this is what the Czechs were seeking and that it offered a logical continuation of the MD process. He rejected the idea that it would interfere with Czech elections, saying the sooner the better, but that he would have to raise it with the government. ¶11. (C) MDA's Morgan offered to host a Czech expert for a 4-6 week orientation visit to MDA headquarters. Fulik and Dvorak pushed hard for a permanent Czech liaison officer (LNO) position at MDA to publicly demonstrate Czech participation in the "evolution of ideas" on MD and "political, not just technical, cooperation." MDA International Affairs Director Morgan explained that MDA was in the process of relocating per BRAC and could only accommodate a temporary placement. She also mentioned that there were disclosure issues that made it difficult to agree to an embossed LNO. Fulik replied that the CR wanted to be a "partner, not a visitor" on MD. ASD Vershbow said the two sides could continue to look for ways to accommodate the Czech request, but in the interim, urged the Czechs to consider an exchange visitor at MDA. AFGHANISTAN -------------- ¶12. (C) Fulik said that despite limited resources, the Czech government's commitment to Afghanistan remains strong and they have no plans to withdraw forces. He expressed concern about the Karzai government and the need to address governmental corruption and inefficiency. The Czech government faced difficulty in explaining the Afghanistan commitment to its public and to parliament, which must annually approve foreign deployments of Czech troops. Fulik said the MoD was finalizing a medium-term plan that would for PRAGUE 00000668 003.2 OF 004 the first time shift the panning process to a three-year cycle rather than the current annual plan, which, if approved by parliament, would make planning easier. ¶13. (C) ASD Vershbow expressed gratitude for Czech contributions in Afghanistan, noted U.S. material support for the Czech effort there, and briefed on the situation on the ground. Vershbow said that when President Obama makes his decision on additional resources, the U.S. will be looking to European allies to respond as well. MEETING WITH DEFMIN BARTAK -------------- ¶14. (C) During the lunch break, ASD Vershbow met separately with Defense Minister Bartak. Bartak focused on Czech public perceptions about MD and about expectations in the Czech media on the next steps. He said there is still some public sensitivity on MD, and a sense that the government invested a lot politically. Bartak expressed a desire to tighten the transatlantic relationship and a need to put some form of concrete cooperation on the table soon. ¶15. (C) Bartak noted that he had won an important victory in parliament on November 5, when MPs agreed to protect the Czech embassy in Kabul with military rather than police officers, which would allow him to add another 20 Special Forces to the Czech contingent in Afghanistan. He also noted his effort to change the parliamentary review and mandate process from an annual event to a three-year process, which would greatly improve continuity and planning. ¶16. (C) Bartak spoke at length about Russia, which he said is a very sensitive issue for the Czechs. He said the Czech perception of Russia is "not so positive," and predicted that the upcoming celebrations on November 17 marking the 20th anniversary of the Velvet Revolution would be used politically against the former USSR and against communists. He said Russian activities on Czech soil have sharply increased; that their actions are in opposition to their public statements; and that "they are using the old methods again." ¶17. (C) Bartak noted Vice President Biden's trip included advocacy for Westinghouse in the current USD 27 billion nuclear tender, something he supports. He said there was an extended discussion in the government over the weekend on whether the state should play a decision-making role, something Bartak advocates. He predicted this would generate a controversial discussion in the Czech public about the wisdom of accepting the Russian offer if it should prove to be the best offer. Noting Czech dependence on Russian oil and gas, Bartak argued that this should be a political as well as economic decision by the government. ASD Vershbow noted that energy security was not merely a commercial question, but a strategic decision. ¶18. (C) Bartak also raised the issue of the C-130 purchase prices, and said that since the Czechs planned to use them for Afghanistan deployments, they should be offered at a better price. Vershbow noted expert groups were also meeting on that issue and discussion would continue, but that the requirements for flying into Afghanistan drove up the cost. DEFENSE COOPERATION -------------- ¶19. (C) STRATEGIC AIRLIFT: Fulik noted that in the wake of the recently completed DSCA program review, he fully understood the cost estimates for the EDA KC-130 sale, but that the government had a media problem thanks to expectations that the program would be significantly cheaper. While they urgently wish to acquire transport aircraft to achieve independence in airlift, Fulik doubted it was possible to bridge the gap between cost and expectation, so it might be time to "shake hands" and look for other solutions. To end the program on a positive note, he suggested that both countries agree that the KC-130 was not the best option for meeting the Czech requirement but that we would continue to look for solutions to the capability shortfall. The Czech side emphasized that they would like to pursue a future effort in a government-to-government program (Comment: Czech procurement laws require any commercial sales to go through Czech middlemen, which tends to add significant markups to any acquisition program. End Comment). PRAGUE 00000668 004.2 OF 004 ¶20. (C) FOREIGN MILITARY FUNDING (FMF): Fulik expressed his deep appreciation for the significant amount of U.S. FMF that the Czechs have received, noting that it has played a key role in preparing their forces for operational deployments. While he understood that the funding was intended to help "developing" countries and they were happy the Czech economy had developed to move them out of that category, he asked that we consider the relative FMF program levels for the Czech Republic and Poland: Poland, with four times the population of the CR, receives ten times the FMF funding. Dvorak noted that this creates a domestic political and media problem for the Czech government. ASD Vershbow pointed out that DoD is requesting significant FMF and IMET increases for the CR that, if approved, would narrow the gap. ASD Vershbow noted that the U.S. was seeking a significant increase in Czech FMF for FY2011. He observed that the Czechs had over USD 10 million in uncommitted FMF funds and that Congress would be reluctant to allocate additional funds when the Czechs have not yet spent what they have already received. He added that they might consider applying the unspent USD 10 million to a C-130 purchase. Dvorak replied he had not been aware of the unspent funds. ¶21. (U) EDUCATION AND TRAINING: The Czechs expressed deep appreciation for the significant role that IMET has played in improving the leadership and enhancing the professional capabilities of their forces, and Fulik noted that the IMET funding was probably more important than any equipment they had received. To take the program further, they specifically requested assistance in developing their training capability so that they can better pass on the instruction that they have received through IMET. They specifically requested U.S. cooperation with the British Military Training Team effort at Vyskov. ¶22. (C) CBRN: Noting the continuing availability of a senior staff position for a U.S. expert at the Czech CBRN facility, Fulik urged that the slot be filled noted and that the facility be better integrated into NATO. ASD Vershbow agreed this was a good example of a valuable "niche" capability in NATO. He said that the US would look at options to fill the staff position and welcomed Czech proposals for how to integrate the center. ¶23. (C) RECIPROCAL DEFENSE PROCUREMENT (RDP): The Czech side inquired about the status of the RDP MOU. OSD/AT&L International Cooperation Director Al Volkman said that a U.S. procurement specialist would visit Prague in one week to review Czech procurement procedures, and that a draft MOU would not be ready until early 2010. Dvorak noted the MoD is under pressure from Czech industry for an answer on RDP. State Department EUR/CE Director Alex Karagiannis pointed out that the CR's legal requirement for a Czech intermediary for defense procurements, and general lack of transparency, were significant hurdles that still had to be overcome. ¶24. (C) CZECH AIR DEFENSES: Fulik pointed out that in a few years the CR would begin to replace aging missiles and radar used for Czech air defenses. He said the CR would share its proposal with U.S. companies once it was concrete. EUCOM J-5 MG Paul Schafer urged the Czechs to draw on Embassy Prague DAO and ODC to define requirements, since air defense systems are very expensive and should be purchased strictly on requirements. ¶25. (C) NATO HIP TASK FORCE: Fulik urged the U.S to sign the NATO HIP Task Force Declaration; ASD Vershbow replied that the U.S. is still staffing the proposal in legal and comptroller channels. ¶26. (U) This message was cleared by Assistant Secretary of Defense Vershbow. Thompson-Jones