NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY REVIEW CONFERENCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 000553 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/MNSA, GENEVA FOR CD E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2019 TAGS: AORC KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL UNGA IAEA NPT EZ SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY REVIEW CONFERENCE REPORTING REQUEST: CZECH REPUBLIC REF: A. STATE 83600 ¶B. 11 SEPTEMBER 2009 BLAHA-DAVIS/SCHEIBE E-MAIL Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Charles O. Blaha, reasons 1 .4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The Czech government and Czech political parties have historically backed strong non-proliferation measures and their universal application. As an EU member, the Czech government's public position is consistent with the EU position. The Czech government and public support U.S.-Russian arms control efforts, although some Czechs are skeptical of Russian compliance. Czechs across the political spectrum would oppose bilateral arms control negotiations that included other matters related to Czech or Central European security if the Czech Republic was not included or consulted. The Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) UN Department is the Czech Republic's lead decision making body on NPT and related matters. End Summary. Czech Policymakers and Views -------------- ¶2. (C) In the Czech Republic, policy on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and similar and related control regimes have historically been the province of experts. Within the Czech government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) UN Department has the lead. In the normal course of events, decisions on these and related matters do not go higher within the MFA. The Prime Minister's Office, Defense Ministry, military and parliament generally play only ancillary roles. However, to the extent that an NPT or similar issue were to become controversial or high-profile, decisions would go higher in the MFA and thereafter to the minister and cabinet level. ¶3. (C) The Czech National Nuclear Security Authority (its Czech acronym is SUJB) is the lead agency for domestic implementation of international nuclear control and safeguards. SUJB also provides experts to advise the MFA and other Czech government officials, and to the IAEA and other international nuclear bodies and agencies. ¶4. (C) The Czech government and Czech political parties have historically backed strong non-proliferation measures and their universal application. Both leading Czech political parties, the center-right Civic Democrats (ODS) and center-left Social Democrats (CSSD),have historically supported multilateral nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear control efforts. However, ODS, and a significant portion of the Czech public, tend to be skeptical of the efficacy of multilateral agreements and treaties, and favors the use of additional mechanisms, such as sanctions. The Czech government and much of the public support the peaceful use of nuclear power. ¶5. (C) According to MFA UN Department Director Katerina Sequensova, much of the Czech Republic's position on these issues is reflected in ref B, which post has e-mailed to the Department. Although this letter from Czech FM Kohout to Secretary Clinton was drafted by the Czechs during their EU presidency on behalf of the EU as a whole, according to Sequensova, the Czech MFA "drafted 95 percent of the text." These views are unlikely to change significantly after upcoming Czech elections. Working Through the EU -------------- ¶6. (C) As an EU member, the Czech government's public position is consistent with the EU position. The Czechs work chiefly through CONUP, the EU working group on non-proliferation. One or two officers from the MFA UN Department, the Czech IAEA mission, and/or the Czech mission in Geneva travel to key CONUP meetings. Within the EU, the Czechs do not align with any particular country or group. Views on U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control Efforts -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Though they are far from seized with the issue, the Czech government and the broader public support U.S.-Russian arms control efforts, with two caveats. As noted above, some Czechs and Czech officials (but not all) are skeptical about Russian intentions, doubt Russia will comply with agreements, and would advocate establishing additional measures to ensure Russian adherence to any agreements. Second, Czechs across the political spectrum would want the U.S. to consult with, and include, the Czech government if NPT or similar arms-control related negotiations included areas affecting Czech or Central European security issues. In particular, if arms-control negotiations were to include some connection with the proposed missile defense radar site in the Czech Republic, the Czechs would oppose any understanding made without their consultation or inclusion. Thompson-Jones