SCENESETTER FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRIED'S VISIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRAGUE 000005 SENSITIVE SIPDIS EUR/CE, EUR/FO, EUR/ERA E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2014 TAGS: NATO PREL PGOV EZ EUN SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRIED'S VISIT TO PRAGUE Classified By: DCM Mary Thompson-Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Assistant Secretary Fried, Embassy Prague looks forward to welcoming you to the Czech Republic. Your visit will underscore the importance of our strong transatlantic partnership, which received a boost from the Czech Republic's entry into the Visa Waiver Program, but which also has suffered with the protracted Czech domestic debate over Missile Defense. The Czechs' engagement internationally - from Kosovo to Afghanistan and from Gaza to the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute - also demonstrates the GOCR commitment to our two countries' shared security priorities. In addition, your visit will help set the stage for an even closer U.S.-Czech collaboration during the upcoming Czech EU Presidency on our transatlantic priorities. END SUMMARY. -------------- U.S.-Czech Relations -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Nineteen years after the 1989 "Velvet Revolution," the Czech Republic today is a prosperous market economy, a stable democracy, and a committed American ally. The Czech Republic has been a member of NATO since 1999 and the European Union since 2004. Our bilateral relations are excellent, with the Czech Republic's recent entry into the Visa Waiver Program having removed the one long-standing irritant in our relationship. PM Topolanek's firm commitment to strong trans-Atlantic ties undergird his government's support for missile defense and the U.S.-proposed radar site in Brdy near Prague. The country also has been a steady supporter of the war on terror, and has over 1000 troops on foreign deployments; the Czechs launched a provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in Afghanistan in March 2008 and deployed a Special Forces unit to Afghanistan in mid-2008. Building on its own recent history, the Czech Republic is our strongest partner in Europe on Cuba, and an active supporter of Cuba's democratic opposition. Likewise in Georgia, Belarus, Burma, Iraq and other countries in transition, the Czech government and NGOs work to support peaceful transformations. Prague has been home to the U.S.-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty since 1995, and has actively supported broadcasts to countries in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East. ¶3. (C) Domestic Politics: PM Mirek Topolanek, the head of the center-right Civic Democratic Party (ODS),leads a coalition government with the Christian Democrats and the Greens. The coalition won in the 2006 elections exactly half of the seats in the lower chamber of the Parliament, and it has managed to rule thanks to various "renegade deputies" from the opposition Social Democrats (CSSD). However, the October 2008 regional and senate elections were a significant setback for the Topolanek coalition, which has always been shaky at best. Despite Topolanek's reelection as ODS chairman in early December, it is unclear whether his government continues to hold a majority in the lower chamber. Two recent legislative defeats -- on foreign deployments and health care -- demonstrated the government's precarious position and the opposition's determination to press its advantage after the October elections. ¶4. (C) In this environment, Topolanek is trying to retool his cabinet and find some room to calm the charged political atmosphere during the country's EU Presidency. So far, the opposition has not been amenable to a political cease-fire proposal, which DPM Alexandr Vondra had negotiated late last year with the main opposition party, the Social Democrats (CSSD). Indeed, the opposition CSSD, which is outstripping ODS by 15-20 percent in recent public opinion polls, has sensed an opportunity and is pressing for early elections this year. Consequently, decisions on everything from foreign deployments to missile defense have been tainted by the country's poisonous domestic politics to the detriment of the Czech Republic's international standing and national interest. ¶5. (SBU) Topolanek has strained relations with President Vaclav Klaus, who founded ODS and was re-elected to a second five-year term in February 2008. During the recent ODS Congress Klaus openly supported Topolanek's challenger for the part's chairmanship. He also resigned from his position as ODS Honorary Chairman and left the party he founded 18 years ago. Klaus's euroskepticism and opposition to the Lisbon Treaty has put him at odds with many EU political leaders. Nevertheless, the Czechs are planning to give Klaus a role during their EU Presidency, possibly during the EU-Russia Summit. Many political analysts speculate that Klaus may help form a new right-wing, Euroskeptic party, PRAGUE 00000005 002 OF 004 which would compete in the June 2009 European Parliament elections. ¶6. (SBU) Economics: The Czech Republic has transformed itself, with the help of significant inflows of Foreign Direct investment, into a vibrant market economy, with a strong manufacturing base, low unemployment, and stable financial system. Per capita GDP in 2007 was 16,838 USD (80 percent of the EU-27 average). The U.S. is the fifth largest foreign investor. Significant U.S. investments include Honeywell, Ingersoll Rand and IBM. Despite growing pressure from the business community, the Czech Republic is unlikely to adopt the Euro before 2013. Long-term challenges include dealing with an aging population diversifying the economy away from manufacturing toward a more high-tech, services-based economy. The country also suffers from persistent corruption and struggles to improve transparency in government and business. ¶7. (SBU) While the Czech financial system remains relatively healthy, the Czech real economy is feeling the effects of the global financial crisis, largely due to a drop in demand for Czech exports. The Czech economy is heavily dependent on manufacturing exports, especially from the automotive sector (the Czech Republic is the second largest per capita producer of cars in the world). Over 80 percent of Czech exports are to fellow EU members. After three years of over six percent real GDP growth (2005-2007),the Czech economy slowed to four percent in 2008 and is expected to fall to between zero and two percent in 2009, although some economists are warning that a recession is possible. The Ministry of Finance is preparing a possible fiscal stimulus, but plans to adopt it only when growth falls below 2 percent. The Czechs are closely consulting with the UK on the EU response to the crisis. While they support increased coordination among national regulators, they are likely to oppose any attempts to implement new pan-European financial regulations or efforts to erode their free and open trading and investment climate. -------------- Czech EU Presidency and the Russia/Energy issues -------------- ¶8. (C) The Czechs, who joined the EU in May 2004, assumed the rotating six-month presidency from the French January 1. This is the first time the Czech Republic has held the EU presidency and only the second time for one of the 12 newest EU member states. (Note: Slovenia was the first in the first half of 2008. End Note.) The Czech EU Presidency has an overarching theme "Europe Without Borders" and focuses on three priority areas, which they refer to as the "Three Es": EU Economic Competitiveness (including addressing the challenges of the global financial crisis),Energy Security and Sustainability, and Europe in the World (External Relations). Within External Relations, the Czechs plan to focus on the Western Balkans, transatlantic relations, and the Eastern Partnership. We share the same broad goals with the Czechs; the challenge will be finding a way to help the Czechs forge an EU consensus close to our shared goals. The beginning of the Czech Presidency, however, has so far been dominated by Gaza, the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute and the global financial crisis. To reaffirm the United States and the EU's strong relations, the Czechs have begun to press for an early visit to Prague by the next U.S. President during their six months at the EU's helm. ¶9. (C) A key challenge for the Czech Presidency will undoubtedly be the EU's policy toward Russia. Overall, the Czechs are, and will continue to be, a valuable ally on Russia within the EU. However, they are keenly aware that as the incoming EU President, they must temper their government's views on Russia to achieve an EU consensus. ¶10. (C) Energy security is a related issues, since the Czechs are especially concerned about the reliability of Russian supplies and Russian efforts to buy up Central European energy infrastructure and assets. For the Czechs, the current Russia-Ukraine gas dispute underscores the importance of this topic. The Czech Republic is dependent on Russia for 70 percent of its gas, 65 percent of its oil, and 100 percent of its nuclear fuel. The level of Russian crude oil deliveries to the Czech Republic has declined -- ostensibly for technical reasons -- since the United States and Czech Republic signed the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement in early July. Czech energy security goals include further diversification of suppliers and routes, including support for the Nabucco and TGI pipelines, improved outreach to Caspian producers and increased interconnectivity of the PRAGUE 00000005 003 OF 004 internal EU gas and electricity grids. To this end, the Czechs are planning an EU electricity interconnectivity conference in January and both a Southern Corridor Gas Summit and a Ukraine transit infrastructure conference in March. The Czechs have suggested that we can play a useful role by timely support of Czech energy security-related initiatives during their presidency. -------------- Allies in Missions Abroad -------------- ¶11. As inhabitants of a small country that has a long history of suffering at the hands of larger neighbors, the Czechs are strong believers in the importance of collective security. Membership in NATO is the cornerstone of Czech foreign and security policy and is broadly supported by all parties, except the Communists. Most political parties see the U.S. as a key strategic partner, both as a guarantor of NATO's future and as a strong partner working collaboratively with the EU. ¶12. (SBU) Military Deployments: The Czech military has made excellent strides toward reform and NATO compatibility in the past decade. A team of fourteen Czech soldiers just completed their training mission while assigned to FOB Taji in Iraq. In Afghanistan, where the number of troops is around 500, the Czechs are manning a provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in Logar province (SE of Kabul), and an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) in Kabul, both of which they established in March 2008. The PRT significantly expanded their military and civilian presence in the country. (Note: The Czech PRT has an annual budget of around 6.2M USD for civilian reconstruction projects. End Note.) In mid-2008, the Czechs also deployed 100 Special Forces troops in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in the South. Along with the Czech's sizable commitment to Afghanistan, they also have an infantry battalion of around 450 troops deployed on a permanently rotating basis to Kosovo in support of KFOR. ¶12. (SBU) The Ministry of Defense's (MOD) draft 2009 deployment plan sought to increase the total number of soldiers deployed abroad from a maximum ceiling of approximately 1150 to just over 1380, with an increase of over 250 additional troops for Afghanistan. However, the deployment legislation has been revised after it failed to pass in the lower chamber of the parliament December 19 due to domestic political disputes between the government and the opposition. At that time PM Topolanek used his authority to extend current deployments for a maximum of sixty days (through March 1). In the meantime, the government hopes to reach a compromise with the opposition to secure enough votes from the coalition parliamentarians. The Czech MOD developed a revised foreign deployments bill, but this has not yet been discussed with the opposition. Therefore, it is not clear whether this latest proposal will pass, especially since at the heart of the dispute are domestic politics, not troop levels. Without a parliamentary resolution, the Czech constitution would require a withdrawal of Czech troops from their foreign missions. Therefore, at your luncheon with Czech parliamentarians we would encourage you to thank the Czechs for their contributions and underline how the exemplary service of their soldiers and reconstruction experts is helping the Afghan people build a stable and more prosperous country, a goal of the international community. -------------- Visa Waiver -------------- ¶13. (C) For many years, Czech frustration at being excluded from the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP) was our only significant bilateral irritant. The Czech government worked hard with DHS and the State Department to fulfill the requirements for visa waiver reform included in the August 2007 law implementing the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. These labors bore fruit on November 17, the anniversary of the Velvet Revolution, when the first Czechs, traveled to the U.S. without a visa. -------------- Missile Defense -------------- ¶14. (SBU) PM Topolanek's strong commitment to the trans-Atlantic relationship has been key to his government's support for missile defense. The Czechs moved quickly to conclude and sign both the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement (BMDA) and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). PRAGUE 00000005 004 OF 004 The Czech Senate ratified both agreements on November 27, 2008, but it is unclear when the Lower Chamber will take up the agreements. There is an effort among the parliamentary opposition to send the two agreements to the Constitutional Court for a review. Without the government's support, however, the opposition would not have the required number of votes in the Lower Chamber to pass a resolution requesting the constitutional review. The Topolanek government remains committed to ratifying the agreements, but it is increasingly unlikely that the government will be able to achieve this goal without support from the opposition. In a recent interview, PM Topolanek stated that in order to generate a "positive momentum" with opposition parliamentarians, a clear statement of support for MD from the new U.S. administration will be needed. Any doubts regarding the next administration's support for the European MD site would undermine Czech ratification prospects. ¶15. (C) The opposition in the parliament has used a number of arguments to support its anti-MD stance, chief among them being public disapproval of the proposal. Public opinion polls have consistently shown that about two-thirds of the Czechs oppose the facility. Many Czechs have an instinctive aversion to the idea of stationing foreign troops on Czech soil, given strong memories of the Soviet invasion in 1968 and the subsequent stationing of Soviet troops through the early 1990's. It is important to note, however, that when ranked against other issues, MD is ranked well below other concerns, most notably pocket-book issues. Polls have also shown that a majority of the population does want to be protected against the ballistic missile threat. ¶16. (C) The parliamentary opposition has also continued to charge that this is a bilateral initiative, rather than a full-fledged NATO effort, despite the strong statement of support for MD issued at the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest and the December Foreign Ministerial. With the transition in Washington, opponents argue that the Czech Republic cannot be certain that the new administration will continue to support MD. Opponents have also raised questions about the reality of the threat from Iran and the greater Middle East, and whether the radar will be a net plus or minus in terms of security for the Czech Republic. Finally, there is an active "no" campaign that has been quick to spread misinformation and rumors in an effective attempt to maintain public opinion against the facility. ¶17. (C) To answer the critics within the Czech parliament, Embassy Prague has been conducting a very active outreach to members of parliament, and especially the opposition. With regard to the public opinion, the Embassy's approach has been to re-frame the discussion to one focused on the broader issues of the strategic security relationship. To the extent that the Embassy and visiting USG officials can emphasize the broader theme of a cooperative security relationship based on joint responses to common threats and shared interests, we are in a much stronger public position on missile defense, Afghanistan and other security issues. -------------- A Strong and Valued Partnership -------------- ¶18. (C) Despite its small size and at times unsettled political scene, the Czech Republic has consistently proven to be a reliable and active ally of the United States. The Czechs are appreciative of the positive role the United States has played at key moments of their history. The key themes for your meetings and public statements should be: setting the stage for close U.S.-EU cooperation under the Czech EU Presidency, recognizing Czech contributions and partnership in promoting global democracy, freedom and security; highlighting the country's Visa Waiver Program entry; expressing appreciation for Czech willingness to enhance common defense through participation in foreign missions and support for the MD shield. Graber