MISSILE DEFENSE: CZECHS LOOKING FOR A POSITIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRAGUE 000041 SIPDIS STATE FOR T, EUR/FO, EUR/CE E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV EZ SUBJECT: MISSILE DEFENSE: CZECHS LOOKING FOR A POSITIVE SIGNAL FROM WASHINGTON REF: A. 08 PRAGUE 738 ¶B. 08 PRAGUE 788 ¶C. PRAGUE 24 ¶D. 08 PRAGUE 407 Classified By: CDA MARY THOMPSON-JONES FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Since the November 27 Czech Senate approval of the two missile defense (MD) agreements, the Czechs have been unable to advance the MD agreements in the Lower Chamber, where ratification has been temporarily put on hold due to domestic political problems and questions about the future direction of U.S. MD policy. The strongly pro-U.S. Czech government remains committed to MD, but PM Topolanek's domestic political standing is weak and his attention has recently shifted to the Czech EU presidency, including the crises in Gaza and over Russian gas deliveries. In a series of recent meetings, PM Topolanek and his ministers stressed the need for a positive signal on MD from the next U.S. administration, but they acknowledged that the new administration's MD policy may not be known for some time. The Czechs consider an expression of U.S. support for the MD radar in Brdy and continued progress within NATO as crucial to the ratification prospects of the MD agreements. END SUMMARY. -------------- CZECH GOVERNMENT: COMMITTED BUT ANXIOUS -------------- ¶2. (C) Since the United States officially presented the MD proposal to the Czech Republic in January 2007, PM Topolanek's government has been unwavering in its support for MD. Topolanek, who is a confirmed transatlanticist, views MD as a natural next step in the security partnership between our two countries. He is also proud of the Czech initiative in advancing the MD effort within NATO. In addition, Topolanek considers MD as an opportunity to expand science and technology cooperation with the United States. The Czechs moved quickly to negotiate and sign the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement and the Status of Forces Agreement. The Czech Senate ratified the agreements on November 27, ¶2008. Ratification of the two agreements in the Lower Chamber has been postponed due to domestic political opposition and divisions within the Topolanek coalition, as well as due to questions regarding the intentions of the Obama administration. PM Topolanek and his government have stressed in their recent meetings with Ambassador Graber that �0A;MD remains a top foreign policy priority for the Czech Republic. During his departure calls on various ministers, Ambassador Graber heard repeatedly that the Czech side is determined to see the MD proposal become reality. ¶3. (C) Almost in the same breath, Czech officials ask whether the United States will remain equally committed to MD under the Obama administration. The Czechs have been paying close attention to any signals from Washington, be they from the Hill or the incoming officials. Several ministers in Topolanek's cabinet told Ambassador Graber in recent weeks that they viewed a positive signal from the next administration as key to completing ratification of the MD agreements. Topolanek and his government are savvy enough to know that the answer to their question about the future of MD policy is not likely to be immediately forthcoming from the Obama administration. Topolanek has therefore been playing for time, delaying the first reading of the MD agreements in the Lower Chamber. Of course, the decision in early December to postpone the first reading was also driven by Topolanek's domestic political difficulties. -------------- NECESSARY DELAY IN RATIFICATION -------------- ¶4. (C) Despite the November 27 ratification of the two MD agreements in the Czech Senate and the positive momentum that this vote generated (ref A),Topolanek had to postpone the Lower Chamber consideration of the agreements because it was unclear whether the agreements would survive the first reading vote. At the time, Topolanek was facing not only the strident opposition from the Social Democrats (CSSD) and the Communists (KSCM),but also a rebellion within his own Civic Democratic Party (ODS). As the failed vote on foreign deployments, which are much less controversial than MD, subsequently showed, Topolanek had probably made the right decision in delaying the first reading of the MD agreements. A failure during the first reading would bury MD forever. Even CSSD's Jan Hamacek, the chairman of the Lower Chamber's PRAGUE 00000041 002 OF 004 Foreign Affairs Committee, told us that the government could not move the agreements forward without being 100-percent certain of success. The change in U.S. administrations provided Topolanek with a useful excuse for postponing the Lower Chamber debate on MD. ¶5. (C) Waiting for the Obama administration's position on MD has also been a long-held position of some Green Party members, especially Minister of Education Ondrej Liska, who is the Greens' leading foreign policy voice. Consequently, the delay had the added benefit of satisfying one of the Greens' main demands with regard to MD. In addition, along with postponing the fight over MD ratification, Topolanek has also delayed another political fight of equal magnitude -- the Lisbon Treaty ratification. Both MD and the Lisbon Treaty have been moving roughly in parallel through the Czech parliament, and their ratification has been formally linked by PM Topolanek's ODS at the party's December congress. ODS resolved that the MD agreements must be ratified prior to any progress on the Lisbon Treaty. In a move engineered by Topolanek, the Czech Senate agreed to postpone consideration of the Lisbon Treaty by two months. On January 8, PM Topolanek told Ambassador Graber: "(the delay) gives me two months to find a solution" to the ratification of both MD and Lisbon. Note: Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty is also being slowed in the Lower Chamber, although related work continues in some committees. End Note. -------------- -- CZECH GOVERNMENT OPEN TO CHANGES IN U.S. POLICY -------------- -- ¶6. (C) Czech officials have indicated both publicly and privately their understanding that the new U.S. administration will need time to decide on the future course of its MD policy. DPM Alexandr Vondra and MFA officials have been quoted in the press as stating that they do not expect a decision for several months. At the same time, the Czech government has to keep an eye on the domestic political calendar. With the 2010 parliamentary elections only 18 months away, PM Topolanek would rather put the controversy over MD behind him. This is why recent comments made by Under Secretary for Defense Policy nominee Michele Flournoy regarding reviewing MD plans as part of the new administration's QDR raised concerns among Czech officials that the MD policy review will take much longer than they had anticipated. The Czechs had hoped that upcoming events, including the NATO Defense and Foreign ministerials, as well as the NATO Summit in early April would inject more urgency into Washington's deliberations on MD policy. ¶7. (C) The Czech government is also trying to anticipate other possible changes to the U.S. policy on MD. In recent meetings with Congresswoman Ellen Tauscher and Assistant Secretary Fried (refs B and C),DPM Vondra indicated that the Czech government would be interested in moving forward with the proposed radar site, even if the Obama administration decided to postpone its decision on the interceptors proposed for Poland. Since the Tauscher and Fried meetings, DPM Vondra and MFA Director for Security Policy Veronika Kuchynova have also spoken about this possibility in press interviews. This position has not been formally endorsed by the Czech cabinet, but it is essentially a return to the Czech stance in early 2007, when it appeared that the U.S.-Polish BMDA negotiations were deadlocked. At that time, Czech government officials indicated -- both publicly and privately -- that they were planning to move forward on the Brdy radar even without a U.S. agreement with Poland. Note: Should such a decision be reached, it could play into the hands of some MD opponents in the Czech Republic, who have argued that the proposed radar will undermine Czech security if it is insufficienty protected. The decision to move forward without Poland could also be problematic because it could reinforce the criticism that the radar is a bilateral project. This has been a key contention of the opposition, but also of some coalition parliamentarians. End Note. -------------- RATIFICATION OPTIONS AND TIMING -------------- ¶8. (C) The options for passing the MD agreements through the Lower Chamber have not changed. One option is to pass the agreements with coalition and renegade MPs only. The other is to forge a compromise with the opposition on both MD and the Lisbon Treaty. With regard to the first option, Ambassador Graber's departure calls on various ministers made clear that some in Topolanek's cabinet continue to believe PRAGUE 00000041 003 OF 004 that they will be able to pass the MD agreements without help from the opposition. However, given the uncertain position of Education Minister Liska, Christian Democratic MP Ludvik Hovorka, and former-CSSD MP Evzen Snitily, it is not clear whether the government would have the necessary votes. Both Liska and Snitily, for example, have stated that they would vote for the MD agreements in the first reading, but would not necessarily support them in the second reading. ¶9. (C) Similarly, the second option is fraught with uncertainty. CSSD leader Jiri Paroubek has to date given no indication that he would be prepared to allow his MPs to vote their conscience on MD. In a long discussion with Ambassador Graber in December, Paroubek repeated all the same arguments of why he cannot move on this issue. All of his arguments hinge on his domestic political standing vis-a-vis the government and the Communist party. Paroubek has already begun his campaign for the 2010 parliamentary elections -- and some speculate for the 2013 presidential election -- and he views all issues, including foreign policy and security priorities, through that prism. Nevertheless, many in the Topolanek government believe that an endorsement of the MD radar from the Obama administration will be crucial in convincing Paroubek and generating some opposition votes in favor of the MD agreements. ¶10. (C) The ratification schedule in the Lower Chamber remains unclear. The government is focused at this time on the EU presidency and on passing the foreign deployments bill. Defense Committee chairman Jan Vidim indicated to the Czech press service (CTK) that even though the Lower Chamber is scheduled to resume the first reading in early February, the timing would likely slip in anticipation of a signal from Washington regarding the next steps on MD. Even after the two MD agreements are successfully approved by both chambers of the parliament, much work will remain for the Czech government. The government has deliberately held back the constitutionally mandated resolution approving the stationing of U.S. troops on Czech territory. Czech MFA officials have told us that only after the agreements have been ratified will it make sense to pass this resolution, which will require 101 out of 200 votes in the Lower Chamber and 41 out of 81 votes in the Senate. Here again the Senate will have no problems passing the resolution, since the coalition holds a comfortable majority in the upper chamber. In the Lower Chamber, the resolution will face the same challenges as the two MD agreements. ¶11. (C) Another factor that could potentially impact the timing of MD ratification is the Constitutional Court. It is likely that a group of opposition MPs will seek a constitutional review of the MD agreements once they are passed by the Lower Chamber. A Constitutional Court review would extend the ratification timeline by several months. Note: Under the Czech constitution, MPs and Senators can request a Constitutional Court review even before the two agreements are passed by both chambers, but such a motion would require a majority in either chamber, something the opposition does not have at this time. For a discussion of the various options pertaining to Constitutional Court reviews, please see ref D. End Note. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) The Czechs are carefully watching developments in Washington and remain eager to consult with the new administration on MD and other issues. We understand that there may be an opportunity for DefMin Parkanova to meet with Defense Secretary Gates on the margins of the February 19-20 NATO ministerial in Poland. It is likely that Parkanova will press for an update on the status of Washington deliberations regarding MD. Should FM Schwarzenberg travel to Washington in February as the Czechs have proposed, he would also have MD high on his agenda. ¶13. (C) Two years ago, when the United States proposed to station an MD radar in the Czech Republic, the Czech government embraced the MD project without reservation. They considered it as an important next step in the U.S.-Czech bilateral relationship, but also saw it as a keystone for further MD work within NATO. Although preliminary U.S.-Czech discussions on the MD proposal had already begun under the former CSSD-led government, it has been the Topolanek government which has borne the political costs of moving forward formally with the negotiations and signing. Despite these costs, the Topolanek government remains committed to PRAGUE 00000041 004 OF 004 its strong security partnership with the United States, and to the MD radar specifically. While ratification of the MD agreements and the troop resolution is by no means a done deal, the Czech government is convinced that with a positive decision from Washington and continued progress within NATO, the MD radar will be approved and will eventually stand in the Czech Republic. Thompson-Jones