CZECH REPUBLIC: FOREIGN POLICY DRIFT EXPECTED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRAGUE 000222 SIPDIS STATE FOR T, EUR/FO, EUR/CE E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2019 TAGS: EZ MARR NATO PGOV PREL SUBJECT: CZECH REPUBLIC: FOREIGN POLICY DRIFT EXPECTED AFTER PM TOPOLANEK'S DOWNFALL REF: A. PRAGUE 165 ¶B. PRAGUE 174 ¶C. PRAGUE 159 ¶D. PRAGUE 160 Classified By: CDA MARY THOMPSON-JONES FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The March 24 downfall of the Czech Government and the subsequent political upheaval, as well as the planned Czech parliamentary elections in the fall, will affect a range of Czech foreign and security policy priorities. In this cable we focus on three of the most visible and significant areas affected: the Czech EU Presidency, missile defense, and foreign deployments. Prior to the start of the Czech EU presidency, France and some of the older EU member states viewed the Czech Presidency with some apprehension, but the first half of the Czech Presidency appeared relatively successful. However, the Czechs will likely end on a sour note, given the domestic political turmoil and the upcoming May 9 change to a caretaker government. With two months remaining in its six-month Presidency term, very few experts expect much more from the Czechs in the way of new EU initiatives after May 9, although already scheduled summits, conferences, and workshops should not be affected. Topolanek's impeding departure will also effectively halt the extremely complicated ratification of the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement (BMDA) and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). It is highly unlikely that the post-Topolanek transition government will do anything with the two missile defense agreements before the next Czech parliamentary elections, tentatively planned for October 2009. Topolanek,s downfall may also further complicate the planning for 2010 Czech deployments to Afghanistan. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, are already discussing next year's deployments proposal and have begun consultations with the parliament, it is unlikely that this process will yield an early agreement on this issue, given the rancor and politicization that accompanied the 2009 deployments debate. More likely, deployments -- and many other key foreign policy priorities -- will be put on the back-burner, as the Czech political establishment focuses inward, in preparation for the next parliamentary elections, which are expected in October. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- �00A;EU PRESIDENCY: FINISH IN SHAME OR WITH A BIT OF HONOR? -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) In a recent interview, Czech Deputy Prime Minister Alexandr Vondra, who has led the Czech EU Presidency effort, summed up his country's Presidency prospects following the government's downfall: "Today, the question no longer is whether we will finish the Presidency with success -- the astonishment and ridicule has already begun. Now it is being decided, whether (we) finish in absolute shame or at least with a bit of honor..." Leading officials of the Topolanek cabinet voiced similar sentiments in the aftermath of the March 24 vote of no-confidence (ref A) and especially after it became clear that the Topolanek government would not serve until the end of June and complete the EU Presidency. As reported in ref B, the domestic political turmoil has undermined the Czechs' ability to advance the EU's agenda in areas requiring strong EU leadership -- building alliances or consensus around controversial issues or where there are widely diverging opinions. ¶3. (C) While the end of the Czech EU presidency may end in a whimper, it started with a bang, with Czech PM Topolanek,s widely praised handling of the Russia-Ukraine gas crisis. Due to the June European Parliament (EP) elections, much of the Czech EU presidency has been front-loaded. Anything that required EP support had to be completed by the end of April. In this regard, the Czechs have been fairly successful. They have forged compromises within the EU-27 and with the EP on the Third Energy Liberalization Package, 5 billion Euro for EU energy and rural broadband projects, regulation of credit rating agencies and many other bills. In the first three months of their presidency, the Czechs therefore managed to overcome some of the apprehension of certain older and larger EU members. This apprehension was driven by several concerns: 1) questions about the Czechs' ability to take over from the very ambitious French Presidency; 2) views of Czech President Klaus, a leading euro-skeptic, and the role he would play during the Czech Presidency; and 3) fate of the Lisbon Treaty in the Czech parliament. Indeed, the second and third concerns remain to date, with Klaus poised to participate in several EU summits and the conservative Czech PRAGUE 00000222 002 OF 004 Senate planning to debate and vote on the Lisbon Treaty in early May. It is unclear whether the pro-Lisbon forces have the necessary votes. DPM Vondra, who is a senator, recently stated that a failure to ratify the Lisbon Treaty "would bring (the Czech Republic) into isolation, from which (it) would be digging itself out for years." Indeed, if the Senate vote on the Lisbon Treaty fails, the end of the Czech EU Presidency would be worse than a whimper. ¶4. (C) The new government of Jan Fischer, which is expected to replace the Topolanek government on May 9, is likely to face several challenges, not least of which is that much of what happens within the EU is driven by the relationships among the EU's leaders. Even if the Fischer government retains some key experts, like DFM Jan Kohout or Czech Ambassador to NATO Stefan Fule, it will still lack clout and credibility (since they will represent a caretaker government and none of these men have been elected). The rumored decision to keep all current deputy ministers in place during the technocratic government will also ensure some continuity, and work will continue apace at the working level. Anything that may need a high level political push, however, may be effectively dead. Already Czech officials are reporting that other Member States and the European Commission have become more aggressive in pushing back against Czech Presidency positions. For example, according to Deputy PM Vondra,s Director of European Policy Coordination Karolina Kottova, although the Czechs had earlier resisted inviting Russia to the May Southern Corridor Summit, because of the government collapse, the Czechs came under renewed pressure and finally had to invite Russia. On the foreign policy front, DFM Jan Kohout, who is widely tipped to be Deputy PM and Foreign Minister, has served as Czech Ambassador to the Czech Mission to the EU for several years and knows how things work within the EU. He has also acted as the Czech development Minister and thus has forged relationships with some EU Foreign Ministers. Nevertheless, he doe not have the relationships or prestige current FM Schwarzenberg possesses. ¶5. (C) Perhaps even more important than the change at the MFA, though, is the transition in the Deputy Prime Minister,s office. Vondra not only engaged actively with his EU counterparts in Brussels, but he also played a key role coordinating the Czech EU Presidency within the Czech government to ensure (as much as possible) that all of the Czech ministries were on the same page. Vondra was able to do this successfully thanks to his skills, relationships with key political leaders, and his own political clout. Note: Vondra is a prominent member of PM Topolanek's Civic Democratic Party and a Senator. End Note. Any official (even Czech Ambassador to NATO Stephan Fule, who is widely rumored to be the next Minister for European Affairs) will have a very difficult time filling Vondra's shoes without the unique combination of assets that Vondra deployed so skillfully. Contacts note that Fule has little experience with the EU and that he is likely to be appointed as Minister for European Affairs and not Deputy PM, thereby effectively demoting the position. Contacts in Vondra,s office have privately suggested that Kohout, if appointed Deputy PM and FM as expected, could try to move the EU coordinating role to the MFA, leaving Vondra,s current bureaucracy with a much smaller role (and less clout),and further complicating Czech EU presidency decision-making. -------------- MISSILE DEFENSE IN THE FRIDGE -------------- ¶6. (C) Although Topolanek and his government are still firmly committed to missile defense, they are now in no position to move the SOFA or the BMDA ratification process forward. Even before the Prime Minister lost the vote of confidence on March 24, the parliamentary opposition led by the Social Democrats (CSSD) forced PM Topolanek to withdraw the two treaties from consideration in the Czech Parliament's Lower Chamber. Had Topolanek not retreated, the opposition would have forced a first reading vote on the two agreements, a vote that would have ended in failure for the Czech government (ref C). Until the next parliamentary elections, ratification of the MD agreements is unlikely to move forward in the sharply divided parliament, where the atmosphere will grow even more tense in what promises to be a fierce campaign before the next parliamentary elections. In the same interview, DPM Vondra stated: "The (MD) agreement is now in the refrigerator and we can pull it out whenever we need. We can at least calmly await the results of the fall (parliamentary) elections." However, even after the fall elections, the Czechs will be looking to Washington for "a PRAGUE 00000222 003 OF 004 clear signal of support for the radar from the White House," according to the MFA,s Director for Security Policy, Veronika Kuchynova-Smigolova. ¶7. (C) The Czechs have closely followed the policy review in Washington, as well as Congressional debates and decisions on the budget. Therefore, they approach every U.S. MD-focused visit, whether it be a congressional or a U.S. government agency delegation, with this "reading-the-tea-leaves" mindset. While the administration's MD policy review continues, the Czechs may interpret further technical visits, especially to the proposed Brdy site, as a signal of U.S. intentions. Furthermore, while the Ministry of Defense (MOD) experts will remain in place under the caretaker government, the MOD's ability to undertake significant actions on MD-related issues will be severely curtailed in the coming months. -------------- Outlook for 2010 Deployments to Afghanistan -------------- ¶8. (C) Despite the fall of the Topolanek government, the planning and preparations for the country's 2010 foreign deployments continues. The Czech government mismanaged the 2009 foreign deployment planning process, by not communicating with the opposition CSSD early in the process and by doing little to explain to the public the importance of these military missions. While the opposition also used the issue to score political points, ultimately, it was the Topolanek government that miscalculated and overestimated its ability to push through legislation without opposition votes and without public support. As a result, the 2009 deployments bill failed to pass on the first try, embarrassing the Czech government -- and the opposition -- in the process. ¶9. (C) Fortunately, Czech officials seem to have learned from their mistakes and are already actively engaging both the parliamentary opposition and the public. MFA and MOD officials, as well as the Czech Ambassador to NATO Stefan Fule, have been briefing the relevant parliamentary committees. The ministries have also organized a recent event to raise the level of public awareness with regard to the Czech PRT in Logar. Unfortunately, poor planning continues to plague even these efforts. A recent event targeting parliamentarians attracted only three MPs because it was scheduled during parliamentary recess. Despite this more pro-active approach, it is highly unlikely that in the next few years the Czechs will be able to contribute more troops to the Afghanistan mission above the current parliamentary-mandated ceiling of 550. Both MFA and MOD have told us that they will be emphasizing development and institution-building in preparing the 2010 deployment plans because they believe that these non-lethal activities will be viewed more favorably by the public and the parliament. ¶10. (C) Boosting public support for Czech missions abroad will be critical going forward. CSSD leader Jiri Paroubek is infamous for his reliance on public opinion polls to guide his policy decisions. Recently, Paroubek engineered an internal CSSD poll on Afghanistan (ref D). Overall, 82 percent of CSSD respondents supported ending the Czech Republic's deployments. If withdrawal was not an option, 87 percent supported a dramatic reduction in personnel to the same level as Slovakia's 200 deployed personnel. While the poll results are not necessarily binding, Paroubek could use them to justify a more hard-line position. In light of last year's highly polarized debate in the parliament and the prospect of fall parliamentary elections, it is unlikely that the Fischer care-taker government will be able to reach early political consensus on the 2010 deployments. Most likely, the issue will be taken up by the new parliament in late fall. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) The almost inescapable drift in Czech foreign and security policy under the care-taker government will impact a number of key issues of interest to the United States. Even if, as is expected, current DFM Jan Kohout takes the helm at the MFA, the instinctive pro-Americanism and focus on trans-Atlantic relations of the Topolanek government may disappear. Furthermore, many of our staunchest allies at the Czech MFA, including DFM Tomas Pojar, will be moving onto new jobs beginning this summer. Continued U.S.-Czech engagement will be key for ensuring that the drift does not carry the PRAGUE 00000222 004 OF 004 Czechs too far off the course and that they remain firmly engaged in Afghanistan, NATO, and promoting human rights. Once the new government takes the helm, probably this fall, it would be useful to reinvigorate the Strategic Dialogue launched in September 2008. Another meeting at that point would be extremely useful to review and revitalize the agenda, both bilateral and multilateral. Thompson-Jones