SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY CLINTON'S VISIT WITH THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRAGUE 000175 SIPDIS EUR/ERA FOR WLUCAS, EUR/CE FOR ATRATENSEK E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2019 TAGS: EG EUN EZ OVIP PGOV PREL SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY CLINTON'S VISIT WITH THE PRESIDENT TO PRAGUE APRIL 4-5 REF: PRAGUE 153 Classified By: DEPUTY POL/ECON COUNSELOR MARTINA STRONG FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Embassy Prague warmly welcomes the President's and your April 4-5 visit and participation in the U.S.-EU Summit. You will arrive at an extremely tense time in Czech domestic politics. The government of Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek was toppled on March 24, but he continues to rule until the next government can be formed. Despite the domestic political turbulence, the Czechs retain the EU Presidency. The Czech Presidency priorities, which include energy security, the Middle East, and Afghanistan, remain unchanged, but their ability to advance them and push for EU consensus has been weakened. During your visit, the Czechs will also seek to reaffirm their country's strong bilateral ties with the United States. The Czech Republic has been a committed ally, actively engaged in Afghanistan and Kosovo, as well as in advancing democracy and human rights around the world. Prime Minister Topolanek's government views missile defense (MD) as an important contribution to NATO's security and a key element of the country's partnership with the United States. The President's and your visit will help strengthen the foundation of this partnership and advance many of our shared goals in Europe and around the world. END SUMMARY. -------------- A Valued Ally With Domestic Challenges -------------- ¶2. (C) Nearly 20 years after the 1989 "Velvet Revolution," the Czech Republic today is a democratic market economy and a committed U.S. ally. The Czech Republic has been a member of NATO since 1999 and the European Union since 2004. After 26 months in power, PM Topolanek's government lost a vote of no confidence on March 24, but continues rule until the next government can be formed. With the fall of the government, President Vaclav Klaus has assumed significant political powers, in accordance with the Czech constitution. President Klaus and PM Topolanek are bitter rivals, and it is widely believed that Klaus has masterminded Topolanek's downfall, even though until recently they were members of the same party. The successful effort to unseat PM Topolanek during the country's EU Presidency and at a time when the impact of the global economic crisis is beginning to be felt illustrates the Czech Republic's poisoned domestic politics, in which matters of domestic and foreign policy are ignored or used to settle political scores, usually to the detriment of the Czech Republic's international standing and national interest. ¶3. (SBU) Despite these domestic political challenges, our bilateral relations are excellent, with the Czech Republic's November 2008 entry into the Visa Waiver Program having removed the one long-standing irritant. Czech Prime Minister Topolanek's commitment to strong transatlantic ties undergird his government's support for the U.S.-proposed missile defense radar site. The country also has been a steady supporter of U.S. and NATO military operations and maintains approximately 1000 troops on foreign missions. In Afghanistan, the Czechs have about 500 military and civilian officials. In 2008, they launched a provincial reconstruction team (PRT),deployed a Special Forces unit, and sent experts to an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) in Afghanistan. Over the past several years, they have also maintained an infantry battalion of 450 troops in Kosovo. Domestic political constraints, however, may make it difficult for the Czechs to maintain, let alone increase, their foreign troop deployment levels. ¶4. (C) Building on its own recent history, the Czech Republic is our strongest partner in Europe on Cuba, and an active supporter of Cuba's democratic opposition. Likewise in Georgia, Belarus, Burma, Iraq and other countries in transition, the Czech government and NGOs work to support peaceful transformations. Prague has been home to the U.S.-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty since 1995, and has actively supported broadcasts to countries in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East. ¶5. (SBU) Following several years of strong economic performance, the small, open, export-oriented Czech economy is now struggling with the effects of the global economic downturn. The economy is expected to contract by as much as two to three percent in 2009. Unemployment has climbed to 7.4 percent. Nevertheless, the Czech financial system has remained relatively healthy, and the Czech Republic is one of only four OECD countries not to have had to recapitalize its PRAGUE 00000175 002 OF 003 banks. The government has put forward an economic recovery program, costing almost 2 percent of GDP, designed to maintain employment and exports. Fearing the consequences to their economy should international investors put them in the same category as some of their more troubled neighbors, the Czechs have opposed any initiatives that treat Central and Eastern Europe as a unified region. Within the EU, the Czech government has supported increased coordination while opposing supranational regulation and excessive state intervention in the economy. This conservative approach is espoused by PM Topolanek personally, but especially by President Klaus. -------------- U.S.-EU Summit -------------- ¶6. (C) Securing President Obama's and your presence in Prague for the U.S.-EU Summit was a signal achievement for the Czech EU Presidency. The proposed U.S.-EU summit agenda (climate change, energy security, Afghanistan/Pakistan, Iran and the economy),as well as the foreign ministerial agenda (Middle East/Gaza, Russia, the Eastern Partnership and the Balkans), reflect President Obama's key priorities and dovetail well with the Czech EU Presidency's overarching theme of "Europe Without Borders" and its three areas of focus: 1) Economic Competitiveness (including addressing the challenges of the global financial crisis); 2) Energy Security and Sustainability; and 3) Europe in the World (external relations). During the first several weeks at the helm of the EU, the Czechs faced two immediate crises: gas and Gaza. The Czechs' active shuttle diplomacy facilitated a solution to the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute. The bigger challenge, however, lies ahead: uniting the EU behind an energy security strategy that rests on further diversification of suppliers and routes, including support for the Nabucco and TGI (Turkey-Greece-Italy) pipelines, improved outreach to Caspian producers, and increased interconnectivity of the internal EU gas and electricity grids. (Note: The unpredictability of Russian energy supplies had already hit the Czech Republic in 2008, when Russian crude oil deliveries to the Czech Republic declined sharply -- ostensibly for technical reasons -- following the July 2008 signing of the U.S.-Czech Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement. End Note.) ¶7. (C) In Afghanistan, in addition to being an active bilateral contributor (noted earlier),the Czech EU Presidency has pressed for greater EU coordination and contributions, particularly in the civilian sphere. At the EU-Afghanistan Troika Ministerial on January 23, the EU reaffirmed its long-standing commitment to Afghanistan reconstruction (from 2002-2006 the EU contributed over 1.3B euros to this effort and for 2007-2010 it has pledged 610M euros). The Czechs are currently facilitating internal EU discussions on how to strengthen the current EUPOL mission in Afghanistan and how best to support upcoming Afghan presidential elections. The EU also held a EU-Pakistan Ministerial on March 13, which focused on upgrading relations and took note of the fact that the European Commission had allocated some 200M euros from 2010-2013 for rural development and education projects in Pakistan. ¶8. (C) Moving the EU toward a more united transatlantic approach to Russia remains a key goal and challenge for the Czech Presidency. Given their negative historical experience, the Czechs have been a valuable U.S. ally with regard to Russia, within the EU as well as NATO. Events including the Georgia conflict, the gas crisis, and Russia's stance with regard to missile defense have reinforced Czech skepticism toward Russia. They generally agree with the U.S. approach of cooperating wherever possible, but resisting Russia's economic and military pressure against its neighbors. However, the Czechs are also keenly aware that during their EU presidency they may be required to temper their government's views on Russia to achieve an EU consensus. ¶9. (SBU) Related to the Czech focus on Russia is their goal of advancing EU relations with its "Eastern Partners," which the EU defines as Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova and Belarus. EU leaders announced on March 20 that they would provide assistance to these nations totaling 600M euros through 2013. The idea behind this initiative is to strengthen relations and encourage free-market and democratic reforms within these six nations. The EU also seeks to improve its energy diversification through cooperation with these countries. Of the 600M euros, more than half will be for strengthening state institutions, border control and assistance for small businesses. The EU will also host its first summit with these Eastern Partners on May 7. Whether PRAGUE 00000175 003 OF 003 and at what level Belarus may participate in the May summit remains undecided. ¶10. (SBU) We have a ready and attentive ally in the Czechs when it comes to advancing stability in the Balkans and EU enlargement. Indeed, our willingness to put the Balkans on the agenda makes it easier for the Czechs to advance one of their key priorities. Unfortunately, Czech efforts to date to advance EU enlargement with Balkan countries have met with strong resistance from some EU member states. Name issues and ICTY compliance, but also enlargement fatigue are behind this resistance. We can anticipate that the Czechs will strive to keep the Balkan nations oriented to the West, but progress may be slow. ¶11. (C) With respect to the Middle East, we can anticipate that the EU Foreign Ministers will want to speak about the entire region, not just Gaza, although they spent much of their time in January and February on precisely this issue. The Czechs, particularly PM Topolanek and FM Schwarzenberg, have traveled to the Middle East several times in the last few months, in addition to hosting multiple separate events for EU member states in Brussels with key Middle East interlocutors. -------------- Two Issues to Watch - Guantanamo and Missile Defense -------------- ¶12. (C) The Czech EU Presidency has welcomed the U.S. administration's executive orders related to the closure of the Guantanamo detention facility. The Czechs have facilitated internal EU discussions at the Foreign, Justice, and Interior Ministerial levels. European Commissioner Barrot and Czech Interior Minister Langer traveled to the U.S. March 16-17 to discuss with Attorney General Holder and other USG officials EU questions about the detainees. While the EU member states consider this to be a decision for each individual member state to make, they have discussed establishing an EU framework to address collective Schengen travel security concerns. However, the EU has not taken collective action yet. Czech officials have been clear that the Czech Republic, while willing to facilitate EU discussions on the resettlement of detainees, cannot accept any of them due to domestic political reasons. ¶13. (C) EU membership is one of two pillars of Czech foreign policy. NATO and strong transatlantic ties form the second pillar. Given the importance the Czechs assign to their relationship with the United States, PM Topolanek and his government have viewed missile defense as a natural next step in the security partnership between our two countries. Since the United States officially presented the MD proposal to the Czech Republic in January 2007, the Czech government has been unwavering in its support, despite significant public opposition driven largely by the Czech historical experience and concerns about foreign troop presence on the Czech territory. Russian threats and intransigence with regard to MD in many ways reinforced the Czech government's determination to proceed with the project. The Czech government moved quickly to negotiate and sign the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement and the Status of Forces Agreement. The Czech Senate ratified the agreements in November 2008. Ratification of the two agreements in the Lower Chamber has been suspended due to the domestic political turmoil, but also due to outstanding questions about the U.S. administration's plans. Going forward, the Czechs consider close consultations with the United States as critical. -------------- A Strong and Reliable Partnership -------------- ¶14. The Czechs view your visit and the U.S.-EU summit not only as a significant opportunity to advance our shared agenda, but also as a recognition of the truly remarkable progress the Czech Republic and its Central European neighbors have made since the fall of the Iron Curtain in ¶1989. Despite its small size and at times unsettled political scene, the Czech Republic has consistently proven to be a reliable and active ally of the United States. The Czechs are appreciative of the positive role the United States has played at key moments of their history. They are, in turn, proud of their own contributions to security, democracy, and freedom around the globe since 1989. Thompson-Jones