SCENESETTER FOR DPM VONDRA'S VISIT TO DC TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRAGUE 000155 SIPDIS EUR/CE FOR ATRATENSEK E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2014 TAGS: EUN EZ OVIP PGOV PREL SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DPM VONDRA'S VISIT TO DC TO DISCUSS POTUS VISIT AND MISSILE DEFENSE Classified By: Charge Mary Thompson-Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Deputy Prime Minister Alexandr Vondra will visit Washington on March 23-24, at the same time that his government faces a critical March 24 no-confidence vote, the result of which is unclear. Despite this uncertainty, Vondra's chief goal is to set the agenda and settle outstanding issues in preparation for the upcoming POTUS visit to Prague April 4-5. Of particular interest to the United States are the Czech presidency's EU priorities related to energy security, the Middle East, and Afghanistan. Vondra will also seek to reaffirm his country's strong bilateral ties with the United States. The Czech Republic has been a committed ally, actively engaged in Afghanistan and Kosovo, but also in advancing democracy and human rights around world. For the Czech government, missile defense (MD) is another key element of the country's partnership with the United States, and Vondra will press for a clear statement of the Obama administration's MD policy. Also of note, DPM Vondra travels directly to Washington from the March 19-20 European Council meeting of the 27 EU heads of government. END SUMMARY. -------------- A Valued Ally With Domestic Challenges -------------- ¶2. (C) Nearly 20 years after the 1989 "Velvet Revolution," the Czech Republic today is a democratic market economy and a committed U.S. ally. The Czech Republic has been a member of NATO since 1999 and the European Union since 2004. PM Topolanek's government has been in power since January 2007, but it is fractured and its shaky majority in the parliament depends on the assistance of a few deputies who have crossed party lines but whose support has been unreliable. Indeed, the government will likely face a vote of no-confidence on March 24, a fifth attempt by the opposition to unseat PM Topolanek. It is unclear whether PM Topolanek will be able to survive this challenge. If the parliamentary opposition succeeds with the no-confidence motion, the current government will probably continue to rule until June 2009, to minimize disruptions to the country's EU presidency. The opposition's effort to unseat the prime minister during the country's EU presidency is unprecedented in the EU, but it illustrates the Czech Republic's poisoned domestic politics, in which matters of foreign and security policy -- from foreign deployments to missile defense (MD) -- are used to settle political scores, usually to the detriment of the Czech Republic's international standing and national interest. ¶3. (SBU) Despite the domestic political challenges, our bilateral relations are excellent, with the Czech Republic's November 2008 entry into the Visa Waiver Program having removed the one long-standing irritant. Czech Prime Minister Topolanek's commitment to strong transatlantic ties undergird his government's support for the U.S.-proposed missile defense radar site. The country also has been a steady supporter of U.S. and NATO military operations and maintains approximately 1000 troops on foreign missions. In Afghanistan, the Czechs have about 500 military and civilian officials. In 2008, they launched a provincial reconstruction team (PRT) and deployed a Special Forces troops. They also deployed a handful of experts to an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) in Afghanistan. Over the past several years, they have also maintained an infantry battalion of 450 troops in Kosovo. Domestic political constraints, however, may make it difficult for the Czechs to maintain, let alone increase, their foreign troop deployment levels. ¶4. (C) Building on its own recent history, the Czech Republic is our strongest partner in Europe on Cuba, and an active supporter of Cuba's democratic opposition. Likewise in Georgia, Belarus, Burma, Iraq and other countries in transition, the Czech government and NGOs work to support peaceful transformations. Prague has been home to the U.S.-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty since 1995, and has actively supported broadcasts to countries in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East. ¶5. (SBU) Following several years of strong economic performance, the small, open, export-oriented Czech economy is now struggling with the effects of the global economic downturn. Nevertheless, the conservative, inward-looking Czech financial system has remained relatively healthy. The Czech Republic is one of only four OECD countries not to have had to recapitalize its banks. The Czech real economy, PRAGUE 00000155 002 OF 004 however, is suffering from a significant decline in external demand for Czech products. Over 80 percent of Czech manufacturing is exported, mainly to Western Europe. The Czech economy is expected to contract by as much as two to three percent in 2009. Unemployment, which fell to a record low of five percent in July, has now climbed to 7.4 percent. The government has put forward an economic recovery program, costing almost 2 percent of GDP, designed to maintain employment and exports. Because most Czech goods are exported, while most household goods are imported, however, the government has done little to stimulate domestic demand. In responding to the global economic crisis, the Czechs stress themes in the EU and other public fora: 1) the need to avoid protectionism and "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies; 2) the importance of sustainable public finance; and 3) a preference for "evolutionary, rather than revolutionary" changes to regulations and oversight. While the Czechs support increased coordination, they oppose supranational regulation. The Czechs are also very concerned about the consequences to their economy should international investors put them in the same category as some of the more troubled economies in the region. Thus, they have opposed any initiatives that treat Central and Eastern Europe as a unified region. -------------- U.S.-EU Summit -------------- ¶6. (C) The Czechs view the upcoming U.S.-EU summit in Prague as significant not only for the substance of the agenda, but also because Czechs see this as a recognition of the truly remarkable progress the Czech Republic and its Central European neighbors have made since the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989. The Czech Republic joined the European Union in May 2004, and assumed its first-ever rotating six-month presidency on January 1, 2009. Traditionally the Czech Republic has shared with the United States the same broad goals and approaches to key foreign policy issues. As EU president, the Czechs must seek EU consensus rather than advance their national viewpoint. However, from Cuba to Russia to the Balkans, we have worked with the Czech Republic closely in the past, and this close cooperation has continued during the Czech EU presidency. One key goal for the Czechs is to establish even closer U.S.-Czech collaboration during their EU Presidency on our transatlantic priorities. DPM Vondra deliberately chose these dates following the European Council for his U.S. visit in order to personally convey the wishes of the EU leaders as well as to finalize and resolve as many outstanding issues as possible before the summit. -------------- Summit Agenda Fits Well with EU Presidency Priorities -------------- ¶7. (C) The proposed U.S.-EU summit agenda (climate change, energy security, Afghanistan, the Balkans, Iran and the economy) dovetails well with the Czech presidency's overarching theme of "Europe Without Borders" and its three priority areas, the "3 Es." These are: 1) Economic Competitiveness (including addressing the challenges of the global financial crisis); 2) Energy Security and Sustainability; and 3) Europe in the World (external relations). During the first several weeks at the helm of the EU, however, the Czechs quickly became consumed by the "2 G's": gas and Gaza (with Guantanamo referred to as a third "G" in private conversations with Czech officials). The Czechs' active shuttle diplomacy facilitated a solution to the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute. The bigger challenge, however, lies ahead: uniting the EU behind an energy security strategy that rests on further diversification of suppliers and routes, including support for the Nabucco and TGI (Turkey-Greece-Italy) pipelines, improved outreach to Caspian producers, and increased interconnectivity of the internal EU gas and electricity grids. (Note: The unpredictability of Russian energy supplies had already hit the Czech Republic in 2008, when Russian crude oil deliveries to the Czech Republic declined sharply -- ostensibly for technical reasons -- following the July 2008 signing of the U.S.-Czech Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement. End Note.) ¶8. (C) Since the USG proposed summit agenda highlights Iran, rather than the Middle East (the EU suggestion),we can anticipate that DPM Vondra, on behalf of EU leaders, may highlight their interest in speaking more broadly about the region. While the Czechs recognize the need for a serious discussion about Iran and will welcome USG comments regarding the current status of the USG policy review on Iran, the EU has been heavily engaged over the last few months in Gaza and in discussions with the region as a whole. The Czechs, PRAGUE 00000155 003 OF 004 particularly PM Topolanek and FM Schwarzenberg, have traveled to the Middle East several times in the last few months, in addition to hosting multiple separate events for EU MSs in Brussels with key Middle East interlocutors. ¶9. (C) In Afghanistan, in addition to being an active bilateral contributor (noted earlier),the Czech EU Presidency has pressed for greater EU coordination and contributions, particularly in the civilian sphere. At the EU-Afghanistan Troika Ministerial on January 28, the EU reaffirmed its long-standing commitment to Afghanistan reconstruction (from 2002-2006 the EU contributed over 1.3B euro to this effort and for 2007-2010 it has pledged 610M euros). The Czechs are currently facilitating internal EU discussions on how to strengthen the current EUPOL mission in Afghanistan and how best to support upcoming Afghan presidential elections. ¶10. (SBU) We have a ready and attentive ally in the Czechs when it comes to advancing stability in the Balkans and EU enlargement. Indeed, our willingness to put the Balkans on the summit agenda makes it easier for the Czechs to advance one of their key priorities. Unfortunately, Czech efforts to date to advance EU enlargement with Balkan countries have met with strong resistance from some EU member states. Name issues and ICTY compliance, but also enlargement fatigue are behind this resistance. We can anticipate that the Czechs will strive to keep the Balkan nations oriented to the West, but progress may be slow. -------------- Not on the Summit Agenda, But Vondra is Likely to Raise... -------------- ¶11. (C) While not on the Summit agenda, we understand that DPM Vondra plans to discuss Russia with USG interlocutors during this March 23-24 visit. Moving the EU toward a more united transatlantic approach to Russia remains a key goal and challenge for the Czech Presidency. Given their negative historical experience, the Czechs have been a valuable U.S. ally with regard to Russia, within the EU as well as NATO. Events including the Georgia conflict, the gas crisis, and Russia's stance with regard to missile defense have reinforced Czech skepticism toward Russia. They generally agree with the U.S. approach of cooperating wherever possible, but resisting Russia's economic and military pressure against its neighbors. However, the Czechs are also keenly aware that during their EU presidency they may be required to temper their government's views on Russia to achieve an EU consensus. ¶12. (C) The Czech EU Presidency has welcomed the U.S. administration's executive orders related to the closure of the Guantanamo detention facility. The Czechs have facilitated internal EU discussion at the Foreign, Justice, and Interior Ministerial levels. European Commissioner Barrot and Czech Interior Minister Langer traveled to the U.S. March 16-17 to discuss with Attorney General Holder and other USG officials EU questions about the detainees. (Note: We understand DPM Vondra may follow up on Langer's discussions with USG officials. End Note.) While the EU member states consider this to be a decision for each individual member state to make, they have discussed establishing an EU framework to address collective Schengen travel security concerns. However, they have not taken collective action yet. Czech officials have been clear that the Czech Republic, while willing to facilitate EU discussions on the resettlement of detainees, does not plan to accept any of them due to domestic political reasons. -------------- Missile Defense: Another Key Priority -------------- ¶13. (C) EU membership is one of two pillars of Czech foreign policy. NATO and strong transatlantic ties form the second pillar. Given the importance the Czechs assign to their relationship with the United States, PM Topolanek and his government have viewed missile defense as a natural next step in the security partnership between our two countries. Since the United States officially presented the MD proposal to the Czech Republic in January 2007, the Czech government has been unwavering in its support, despite significant public opposition driven largely by the Czech historical experience and concerns about foreign troop presence on the Czech territory. Russian threats and intransigence with regard to MD in many ways reinforced the Czech government's determination to proceed with the project. The Czech government moved quickly to negotiate and sign the Ballistic PRAGUE 00000155 004 OF 004 Missile Defense Agreement and the Status of Forces Agreement. The Czech Senate ratified the agreements in November 2008. Ratification of the two agreements in the Lower Chamber has been suspended due to domestic political opposition, but also due to outstanding questions about the Obama administration's intentions. ¶14. (C) In his Washington meetings, Vondra will stress that missile defense will be at the top of the bilateral agenda for Czech officials but especially for the media during President Obama's visit to Prague. Vondra will press for advance coordination on the public message, but more importantly, for ongoing consultations as the United States proceeds with the discussions with Russia. Given the long Czech history of great powers deciding their country's fate, the Czechs do not want to be taken by surprise, especially with regard to Russia. Vondra may also reiterate that the Czech government would be interested in moving forward with the proposed radar site even if the United States decides to postpone its decision on the interceptors proposed for Poland. -------------- A Strong and Reliable Partnership -------------- ¶15. (C) DPM Vondra will have an extremely difficult task ahead of him in Washington: he will be speaking on behalf of a government that may lose a vote of no-confidence in the coming days. At the same time, however, he will be speaking on behalf of a country that has consistently proven to be a reliable and active ally of the United States. The Czech contributions to security, democracy, and freedom around the globe have been considerable since 1989. Vondra, in various positions of leadership over the years, has been responsible for many of these contributions. He has also been the United States' best friend on the Czech political scene and a stalwart defender of the trans-Atlantic orientation in Czech foreign and security policy. Supporting him and his like-minded allies in the Czech Republic will be important as the country moves through a period of political instability. Thompson-Jones