SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR RICE'S MARCH 11-14

UNCLAS PORT AU PRINCE 000245 SENSITIVE SIPDIS USUN FOR AMBASSADOR RICE DEPT FOR WHA/FO AND WHA/CAR E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL UNSC HA SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR RICE'S MARCH 11-14 VISIT TO HAITI ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Your visit comes as democratic consolidation and economic progress have stalled, as the Haitian President and his new Prime Minister face difficult challenges in the aftermath of the April 2008 food riots and a devastating 2008 hurricane season. Although President Preval allocated nearly USD 200 million to disaster relief late last year and international donors have stepped up their assistance, relief efforts have only partially alleviated the dramatic damage to Haiti's infrastructure and its agricultural sector. The security situation has improved significantly since the presidential and legislative elections in 2006, thanks in large part to MINUSTAH's clampdown on gangs and improved capability and initiative by the Haitian National Police. Haiti's electoral authority is preparing long-overdue partial Senate elections, from which it has disqualified on flimsy grounds all candidates of the party of former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Neither President Preval nor the electoral council have been swayed by U.S., Canadian, MINUSTAH and OAS arguments that the April elections should be more inclusive. Preval is trying to generate consensus to reform the constitution, but this initiative remains controversial. Your visit will allow the Security Council to show strong support for MINUSTAH and its vital stabilization role. You should encourage President Preval to utilize the security gains provided by MINUSTAH to consolidate the rule of law and democratic institutions, build Haiti's capacity to provide for its own security, implement an economic recovery and development plan, and take advantage of trade preferences with the U.S. provided by HOPE 2 legislation. End summary. MODEST PROGRESS INTERRUPTED BY RIOTS, FLOODS -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Haiti is the hemisphere's poorest and most politically troubled country. After the collapse of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986, Haiti has experienced a succession of military governments, a popularly elected president overthrown by a military coup and then returned to power by U.S. military intervention, and successive elected regimes that have used violence against opponents and failed to hold constitutionally mandated elections. All these factors have exacerbated political instability and economic stagnation. Although the two years following the departure of then-President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 2004 were marked by political violence, the government that resulted from the presidential and legislative elections of 2006 gave Haiti a new chance to consolidate political stability and stimulate investment and economic growth. However, food and energy inflation leading to the rioting in April 2008 brought political progress to a halt. While there was genuine social grievance behind the April protests, much of the associated violence was organized by political forces seeking to oust then-PM Jacques-Edouard Alexis and capitalize on the resulting instability. ¶3. (SBU) The Senate voted to dismiss PM Alexis on April 12. In the five months following his dismissal, the Haitian government was paralyzed by political gridlock. Parliament rejected two Prime Ministerial candidates on specious grounds, in no small part because President Preval refused to bargain with parties and parliamentarians seeking lucrative positions in government. Preval finally lobbied hard for his third nominee, Michele Pierre-Louis, and made promises of party representation in the cabinet and in ministries. ¶4. (SBU) In the midst of political turmoil, a series of hurricanes and floods in August and September dealt the economy a heavy blow. The flooding killed almost 800 people, left hundreds of thousands without their homes or livelihoods, crippled the country's transportation infrastructure, and devastated livestock and crops. According to estimates, the storms caused at least USD 800 million in damage. In the face of strong public pressure to confirm a government able to respond to the hurricane damage, Parliament confirmed Pierre-Louis on September 5. You and your Security Council colleagues should urge the Government of Haiti to continue to consolidate political stability by seeking a better working relationship between the Executive and Legislature, and by continuing to work with donors to strengthen key institutions, especially the judiciary. ECONOMY STAGNATING -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The two decades of political instability following the collapse of the Duvalier dictatorship caused economic regression and stagnation to the point that Haitian GDP per capita, today around USD 700 per year, is barely higher than it was in the late 1950s. More than 80 percent of the population lives below the poverty level, and at least 60 percent of the population is unemployed or underemployed. The Preval government has focused primarily on security but largely failed to implement policies to facilitate foreign and domestic investment and create jobs. Current perceptions of security levels, inadequate infrastructure, and an inhospitable business climate deter investment in Haiti today. The August storms caused almost USD 1 billion in damage and reduced the 2008 growth rate to 1.3 percent, below the 2.5 percent population growth rate. Projected growth for 2009 is barely 2 percent. You should urge the President and the Government to implement business- and investment-friendly policies that will create jobs. The GOH should also help Haitian and foreign investors take maximum advantage of trade opportunities with the U.S. created by the second installment of the Haiti Opportunity Through Partnership Encouragement Act (HOPE 2). MINUSTAH: CRUCIAL GUARANTOR OF HAITI'S SECURITY -------------- -- ¶6. (SBU) MINUSTAH is the product of unprecedented hemispheric security cooperation among regional partners of the U.S. Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, and Peru contribute over half of MINUSTAH's 7,000 troops. MINUSTAH is thus a strong security plus for the U.S. Some Latin countries have been sympathetic to Haitian President Preval's repeated request to replace a portion of MINUSTAH troops with military engineers who would improve infrastructure and aid Haiti's development. During last year's mandate renewal debate, Preval requested a transfer of MINUSTAH's mandate from Chapter VII to Chapter VI of the UN Charter, claiming that a Chapter VII peacekeeping forces scare off foreign investors. For now, the Latins have held firm that their troops need Chapter VII rules of engagement to remain an effective security deterrent. But the Latins are more reluctant to exert political pressure on the Government of Haiti, as in the current issue of allowing broad participation in Senate elections (para. 11),out of fear of being perceived domestically as interfering in Haiti's internal affairs. ¶7. (SBU) While President Preval sometimes says that he hopes MINUSTAH will be able to leave by the end of his term in early 2011, the presence of MINUSTAH's peacekeeping troops and formed police units remains critical to maintaining the minimal security Haiti needs to move forward. Under the leadership of SRSG Hedi Annabi and Force Commander Major General Carlos Alberto Dos Santos Cruz, over 7,000 MINUSTAH troops and 2,000 police have worked closely with the Haitian National Police (HNP) to maintain order. MINUSTAH fills the gap left by inadequate force levels and capabilities of the HNP. MINUSTAH troops continue to provide security in areas such as the Cite Soleil slum, liberated from overt gang rule in early 2007. They are also the country's ultimate riot control force, which in times of unrest protects strategic government installations, including the National Palace and the airport. In MINUSTAH's UN police operations pillar, Formed Police Units (FPU - gendarmerie-type police units from individual contributor countries) aid the HNP with security operations and performing riot control, such as during the April 2008 disturbances. UN Police (UNPOL) advisors from various countries, including the United States, provide support to HNP operations. The UNPOL development pillar works with the HNP to develop its capabilities. ¶8. (SBU) A premature drawdown or withdrawal of MINUSTAH security forces could undermine the stability we have worked so hard to maintain, and promote the resurgence of gang violence, kidnappings, political violence (including the renewed use of gangs for political warfare),and drug trafficking. Such an environment could be more than Haiti's weak political and security institutions can cope with. It could encourage large numbers of Haitians again to take to boats or otherwise migrate abroad. ¶9. (SBU) MINUSTAH is already thinking of a drawdown strategy linked to the buildup of Haitian National Police force levels. MINUSTAH has defined the year 2011 target of 14,000 HNP officers as sufficient to allow drawdown or withdrawal of MINUSTAH's security forces. You should express strong support for MINUSTAH's continuing security role in Haiti until Haitian police are prepared to assume full responsibility, at least until 2011-2012. You should emphasize that MINUSTAH's core role remains stability and security, and that it needs the strong mandate provided by coverage under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. LONG-DELAYED ELECTIONS SCHEDULED FOR APRIL -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Amidst the country's rebuilding efforts, Haitian authorities are preparing to hold elections for the 12 vacant seats in the 30-member Senate, a void that has made it difficult for that body to muster a quorum. The elections were to have taken place in November 2007, but President Preval insisted the previous electoral authority (Provisional Electoral Council - CEP) was dysfunctional and had to be replaced. The April 2008 riots, the ensuing five-month search for a new government, and the August hurricanes provided further reasons for holding off the elections. The new Provisional Electoral Council is organizing the April 19 balloting, although some observers question President Preval's commitment (or the CEP's organizational capacity) to hold them on time. The USG has already made USD 4 million available to help fund the elections, and international donors will contribute approximately USD 11 million of the budgeted USD 16 million in election-related expenses. The terms of another third of the Senate, along with the entire Chamber of Deputies, will expire in January 2010, necessitating yet another round of elections in November of this year. ¶11. (SBU) The April elections have generated considerable controversy, especially surrounding the exclusion all candidates representing Fanmi Lavalas, the fractured political party of former President Aristide. CEP officials announced February 5 that Lavalas candidates had all failed to provide an explicit authorization by Aristide to represent the party in the coming elections. Aristide, currently in self-imposed exile in South Africa, declined to provide any of the local Lavalas partisans jockeying for power with a delegation of authority. That two competing factions of Fanmi Lavalas presented competing lists of candidates further undermined the case of the party. The CEP has not relented to calls from the major international donors to make the elections more inclusive. Protests organized by Lavalas activists have so far failed to inspire significant grassroots support. ¶12. (SBU) One element of uncertainty surrounding the elections concerns President Preval's longstanding call for constitutional reform. Preval argues that Haiti's current constitution, with its staggered presidential and legislative elections and a complicated series of indirect elections to determine the composition of key bodies, is a source of instability. Others cite the constitution's prohibition on dual nationality as a deterrent to foreign investment and greater involvement of Haiti's large diaspora. Preval recently established a working group to study the question and present reform proposals to Parliament. There has been some speculation that President Preval will revive the idea of a "constitutional pause" to temporarily halt the elections cycle, perhaps after the April elections, to push for a nationwide consensus on the outlines of a new constitution. You and your Security Council colleagues should strongly urge the government to hold the April 19 partial Senate elections on time, and to allow all parties that want to participate to do so. Excluding major parties will call the credibility of the elections into question, with negative consequences for Haiti's political stability. DONOR CONFERENCE SET FOR APRIL -------------- ¶13. (SBU) A donor conference is scheduled for April 13-14 in Washington to help Haiti address the significant damage wrought by the 2008 riots and hurricane season, and to shore up a difficult budget year for the Haitian government. Senior Haitian officials were initially reluctant to agree to a conference, fearing that returning home without a solid funding commitment would exacerbate their already difficult situation. Haiti is likely to use the conference to press for direct budget support, although international donors generally prefer to work through international NGOs, public international organizations, or UN agencies in view of the limited technical capacity of GOH institutions. President Preval asked Secretary Clinton for USD 75 million in direct budget support February 5; the Secretary promised she woul study the proposal. PREVAL MAY ASK FOR DEBT ELIEF, HALT TO DEPORTATIONS -------------- -------------- ¶14. (SBU) Due toHaiti's budgetary problems, Preval frequently pushes for debt relief in his meetings with international interlocutors. Haiti owes about USD 1 billion in external debt, largely owed to multilateral institutions, and President Preval argues that money currently spent on debt service would be better spent on repairing Haiti's damaged agricultural sector and transportation infrastructure. Observers expect the IMF to determine that Haiti has reached Highly Indebted Poor Country "completion point" status by July, freeing up as many as USD 5 million per month for other purposes. ¶15. (SBU) In addition, the issue of deportations from the United States has been on President Preval's agenda in recent weeks. Stung by the late 2008 denial of his request for Temporary Protected Status for Haitian nationals illegally in the United States, President Preval has renewed his request to the new Administration. Recent press reports that some 30,000 Haitians in the United States are under deportation orders have again brought U.S. immigration policy into focus here. However, the GOH agreed to resume special deportation flights as soon as March 11, after a six-month U.S. suspension due to the 2008 hurricanes. THE ASSISTANCE PICTURE: RULE OF LAW/GOVERNANCE -------------- - ¶16. (U) Our assistance efforts in Haiti -- financed by USAID, CDC, the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL/NAS),and the U.S. Coast Guard -- seek to implement reforms, build public institutions, improve law enforcement and corrections capability, and help deliver basic services. Rule of Law programs target Haiti's justice system by helping increase judicial authorities' administrative, management and technical capacity. Good Governance programs provide technical assistance and training to Haiti's Parliament in the areas of legislative drafting, legal and judicial reform, and rules of procedure. Programs aimed at conflict mitigation address poverty and gang-related violence through creation of short- and long-term employment and transfer of job skills trough labor-intensive reconstruction of social and productive infrastructure. Another program targets the Provisional Electoral Council to help it solidify its organization and modernize the voter registration process. Civil society programs assist a variety of local media, regional journalist associations, and public service associations, including those that monitor corruption. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE -------------- ¶17. (U) The steep rise in food prices in 2008 followed by the four hurricanes sharply exacerbated Haiti's chronic food insecurity, to which approximately 3 million Haitians are now exposed. USAID contributed USD 45 million in emergency food aid and another USD 14 million for post-hurricane recovery. USAID is continuing its programs to build disaster early warning, response and mitigation capacity. The Ambassador officiated in November at the ground-breaking ceremony for an Emergency Operations Center for Haiti's disaster response agencies. Following the hurricanes, Congress appropriated an additional USD 96 million over three years for the restoration of public services, repairs to public use infrastructure, provision of income-generating activities, asset restoration, and support to affected families. HEALTH AND EDUCATION/ECONOMIC GROWTH -------------- ¶18. (U) Basic health programs help increase access to essential health services in 72 public sector clinics and 80 NGO clinics. Nearly 50 percent of Haiti's population receives at least some health services financed by the USG. USAID-financed education programs include a new basic education project to strengthen the Ministry of Education's management and supervisory system, help it extend supervision over the vast private-sector education system, and provide scholarships. Social assistance programs support Haiti's most vulnerable citizens. Economic growth programs target trade and investment, financial sector programs for small and medium enterprises, and programs for agricultural productivity and marketing. Reducing environmental degradation is the goal of USD 25 million in programs that focus on restoring watersheds to thwart periodic flooding. HIV/AIDS RELIEF -------------- ¶19. (U) Haiti has the highest rate of HIV/AIDS infection in the Western Hemisphere. The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) will provide just short of USD 100 million in FY 2009 to prevent infections and place HIV-positive persons into treatment. Implemented by USAID and CDC, PEPFAR programs target HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, but also benefit large parts of Haiti's health care system. The PEPFAR program in Haiti is the largest in the hemisphere. POLICE REFORM/CORRECTIONS -------------- ¶20. (SBU) The U.S. is the lead donor in implementing the MINUSTAH/Haitian National Police (HNP) reform plan, which foresees building up the HNP from its current strength of 9,600 to 14,000 officers by the end of 2011. In concert with MINUSTAH's mandate to enhance Haiti's border security, the U.S. Coast Guard provides training for the Haitian Coast Guard, financed by INL/NAS. Facility renovations, additional boats, and a new operating base on the north coast will be funded by INL/NAS in 2009. The U.S. made a commitment in 2007 to assist in improving the conditions and respect for human rights in Haiti's prison system, and remains the lead donor to Haiti in this sector. TIGHE