CAMBODIA, UNHCR, AND THE UIGHURS: THE MADNESS OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PHNOM PENH 000960 SIPDIS GENEVA FOR RMA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2019 TAGS: PREF PREL PHUM PGOV CB SUBJECT: CAMBODIA, UNHCR, AND THE UIGHURS: THE MADNESS OF THE METHOD (PART II) REF: A. PHNOM PENH 954 (DEPORTATION SCENARIO) ¶B. PHNOM PENH 953 (NOTAL) ¶C. PHNOM PENH 934 (UIGHURS MOVE AGAIN) ¶D. PHNOM PENH 926 (AMBASSADOR MEETING WITH DPM SAR KHENG) ¶E. PHNOM PENH 925 (UPDATE ON UIGHUR ASYLUM-SEEKERS) ¶F. PHNOM PENH 913 (AMBASSADOR MEETING WITH UNHCR) Classified By: Charge d'Affaires TheodoreAllegra; Reasons 1.4 (B,D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During a December 21 meeting with Charge and other diplomatic representatives to discuss the Royal Government of Cambodia's (RGC) refoulement of 20 Uighur asylum seekers December 19 (Ref A),UNHCR Regional Representative Raymond Hall stated that although Cambodia had tried hard over the years to assume refugee responsibilities, it was unable to withstand direct pressure from China in its first major test. Hall confirmed that UNHCR had made no special accommodations for protection or processing of this group, despite the high visibility and Chinese pressure attendant to their cases, but acknowledged that with the "wisdom of hindsight" the UNHCR might have handled the Uighur case differently. To that end, Hall confirmed that UNHCR would take "extraordinary measures" on behalf of the two remaining Uighur asylum seekers still presumed to be in Cambodia. He emphasized that a "single act of political interference" should not eclipse a past record of accomplishment in which "significant protection" had been provided to refugees in Cambodia over the years. Nonetheless, pending notification of RGC intentions, he said the UNHCR would reassess its role in Cambodia and likely disengage from the refugee status determination process. This is part II of a two-part message; a report on Charge's meeting the same day with RGC Deputy Foreign Minister Long Visalo is Septel. END SUMMARY. UNHCR and the RGC Trade Dip Notes -------------- ¶2. (C) UNHCR Regional Representative Raymond Hall began his briefing with a review of official exchanges between the UNHCR and RGC as deportation became imminent (copies sent to EAP/MLS). In response to verbal notification from the RGC December 18 that deportation was imminent, the UNHCR delivered a diplomatic note warning that deportation before full examination of refugee claims would be a "grave breach of international law." The following day, UNHCR sent another note expressing "grave concern" at the imminent deportation which was "contrary to the commitments" Cambodia had assumed as a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention. On that same day, an RGC note to UNHCR (copied to the Chinese Embassy) affirmed that there were only 20 Uighurs in the temporary resettlement and that "the UNHCR should take responsibility for the disappearance of two Uighur Chinese asylum seekers." In a response December 20, the UNHCR made clear that any future actions with the RGC on the case of the two would depend on the outcome of discussions on protection and claims assessments that conform to international standards. UNHCR Role and Responsibilities -------------- ¶3. (C) UNHCR Regional Director Raymond Hall reviewed his "cordial" earlier meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Long Visalo, who did "not express an aggressive view" of the situation, appeared to understand the issues at stake, and expressed a keen interest in continued cooperation with the UNHCR. In response to various queries by diplomatic representatives, Hall described the role of the UNHCR in this case. He noted that Cambodia had been "solely responsible" for refugee status determination since June 1, 2008. Furthermore, the two sides had established jointly agreed procedures for joint registration and, for those 59 individuals in Cambodia with refugee status, jointly administered food and lodging. Referring to DFM Long Visalo's assertion that UNHCR had not cooperated in providing the notifications required under the relevant joint procedures, Hall said he "profoundly disagreed" with that assessment and said that all appropriate notifications had been made to Ministry of Interior officials, although he conceded that UNHCR had not seen the necessity to work also with Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials for that purpose. ¶4. (C) Hall continued that, until the Uighur cases, asylum seekers were jointly registered fairly rapidly and their status honored. He affirmed that UNHCR took no responsibility for protection, policing, accommodation or general care and maintenance of asylum seekers. Groups such as Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS) took on those roles, he said. When several Ambassadors and Charge pressed him on that point with respect to the Uighurs given their high visibility and public and likely private pressure from China, Hall stated that the UNCHR had "scrupulously observed" agreed joint procedures with the RGC for registration and notification but had made "no special accommodation" for the Uighur asylum cases. He added that UNHCR practice was to make "mandate determinations" independently only in "non-signatory" countries and that it would have been a "breach of agreement" with PHNOM PENH 00000960 002 OF 002 the RGC to do so when things were proceeding well. ¶5. (C) Hall assessed that there was a very real effort by many components of the Cambodian government to honor the Uighurs' protected status as asylum seekers, but that the "political realities simply did not allow" space for that to continue. He believed that the decision to deport the Uighurs was made at the top level of the RGC, but not until December 18. The level of pressure exerted was obvious on December 20 -- after the deportation -- when plain clothes police visited locations inhabited by asylum seekers to check on documents, but presumably in search of the remaining two Uighurs. Nonetheless, this decision to deport Uighurs back to China should not eclipse a past record of accomplishment in which "significant protection" had been provided to refugees in Cambodia over the years, he stressed. ¶6. (C) When Charge inquired about what UNHCR would do if the two missing Uighur asylum seekers came to the UNHCR office seeking protection, Hall answered that UNHCR would "wish to enter into discussions about their cases" with the RGC, but confirmed that UNHCR would not tell the Cambodia government where they were located. Following that, he said there were two options: (1) to arrive at an "exceptional agreement" with the RGC despite the lack of a refugee status determination, and seek to have them leave the country in response to "an evacuation offer" from another government; or (2) to undertake an independent mandate determination and thereafter approach interested governments for emergency expedited resettlement. There was "little likelihood of success" for the first option, he mused, because of Chinese pressure to find the pair and deport them back to China. And he said that exercising the second option would likely prompt the RGC to "close the UNHCR office in Cambodia." UNHCR'S Future Role In Cambodia -------------- ¶7. (C) UNHCR now faces a dilemma, said Hall. It could try to renew its productive record with Cambodia of the past, or it could step back from much of its mission in Cambodia to the point where "no one will be protected." Hall said that he has requested a meeting with the RGC to discuss the UNHCR's role under a new subdecree issued December 17 to regularize the process under which the RGC has broader responsibilities of adjudication vis a vis UNHCR. In response to speculation that the subdecree had contributed to the Uighur deportation, and was indeed issued December 17 to support that result, Hall said the subdecree was a long awaited document and was not in conflict with international law. Nonetheless, Hall added that UNHCR's future collaboration will obviously be "colored by this event," and that, even if UNHCR stops assistance with the adjudication process, it might still continue with training and capacity-building efforts. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: During this sober and frank session with diplomatic representatives acutely aware of UNHCR usual roles and responsibilities, Hall put off most of the group by beginning with a recitation of the official diplomatic exchanges that had occurred when things started to go from bad to worse for the Uighur asylum seekers. Only when he began a similar recitation of roles and responsibilities pursuant to the joint agreement with the RGC to justify UNHCR's distance from obvious protection issues and processing delays did he seem to recognize how divorced from reality that presentation seemed under the current circumstances. He then stated multiple times that, with the benefit of hindsight, UNHCR would have done things differently. And though some in the group argued that it was foresight rather than hindsight that really mattered here, Hall appeared to be sincerely interested in doing whatever possible for the two remaining Uighur asylum seekers still unaccounted for. All recognized, however, how difficult success would be in that effort under either of the two options presented by Hall, even given the "keen interest" the RGC now says exists in favor of future joint determinations of refugee status in accordance with international standards. END COMMENT. ALLEGRA