WHAT IS HAPPENING TO THE HARD-EARNED POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PHNOM PENH 000489 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS, P, D, IO, DRL NSC FOR L. PHU PACOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM KJUS PREL EAID CB SUBJECT: WHAT IS HAPPENING TO THE HARD-EARNED POLITICAL SPACE IN CAMBODIA, WHY, AND WHAT SHOULD WE DO ABOUT IT? REF: A. PHNOM PENH 469 ¶B. PHNOM PENH 413 ¶C. PHNOM PENH 410 ¶D. PHNOM PENH 394 ¶E. PHNOM PENH 387 ¶F. PHNOM PENH 273 ¶G. 05 PHNOM PENH 1892 ¶H. 05 PHNOM PENH 210 ¶I. 05 PHNOM PENH 204 Classified By: AMBASSADOR CAROL A. RODLEY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The wider political space seen in Cambodia during the run-up to the 2008 National Assembly elections last July is undergoing an autocratic nip-and-tuck as the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP) exerts one of its periodic reining-in exercises in the name of greater social order and security. The last three months have seen at least ten defamation and disinformation suits against opposition party members, journalists and private citizens. The jailing of an opposition editor and the shuttering of an opposition newspaper have many human rights activists commenting on threats to fundamental freedoms of expression. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs took a broad interpretation of international legal norms on interference in internal affairs when, in response to the Ambassador's comments on endemic corruption (Ref D),it issued a diplomatic note to all diplomatic missions in early June. While threats of violence or physical intimidation remain significantly lower than just five years ago, the CPP is mounting a sophisticated rules-based campaign to chip away at free speech. Civil society and human rights monitors worry that more of these "rule of law" tactics will be used in pending legislation to curb the activities of NGOs (NGO Law) and restrict freedom of assembly (Peaceful Demonstrations Law). ¶2. (C) The CPP's roots as a hegemonic power structure and the approved use of UNTAC-era laws that had always emphasized peace and security at the expense of political and civil rights are among the causes for this new wave of defamation cases. When CPP leaders perceive a choice between pluralistic liberal democracy and order, stability and economic development, they will exploit that conflict to maximize their own power and preempt opposition challenges to their political authority. A familiar pattern of post-election crackdowns seen in 1995, 1998, and 2005 (often using defamation as the muzzle of choice),is playing out once again and CPP is following the same playbook that FUNCINPEC First Prime Minister Ranariddh used in the past. The biggest difference now is the much reduced violence, the more sophisticated curtailment of wide-open freedoms, and the appearance that CPP is making a bid to be the last party standing with no viable alternative in sight. Embassy will continue to speak out on these threats to democracy and human rights and is already engaged in a long-term campaign to engage the government, reach out to NGOs and civil society, and stand up for basic freedoms while being cognizant of underlying fears by leaders of threats to order (that may be fueled by legitimate fears over the poor economy, joblessness among a huge youth population, and high crime rates). Continuing to build trust and understanding with the government, even when we disagree, is an important part of our ability to influence the outcome here; in order to do this, some messages need to be delivered privately. While many in the mainstream human rights and democracy NGO's support this approach, and indeed follow it themselves, others and some members of the political opposition will criticize it. Finally it is important to note the current constriction of political space is a phenomenon almost entirely confined to Phnom Penh; recent visits to a number of provinces reveal no significant impact or increased tension. END SUMMARY. Freedoms Won -------------- PHNOM PENH 00000489 002.2 OF 005 ¶3. (C) While Freedom House still lists Cambodia as "not free", some of the sub-scores under political and civil liberties have improved modestly over recent years. In the year-long run up to national elections in 2007-2008, Cambodia's political space opened up perceptibly. Opposition members of parliament generally were more candid in their assessments of government failings, relatively crude rhetoric was a daily occurrence in an expanded set of newspapers (some of which were established solely to play obvious partisan roles),and leading opposition newspaper Moneasekar Khmer increased its circulation five-fold to 5000 copies a day. More radio stations aired more opposition broadcasts daily in the first half of 2008 than in all of 2007. While the CPP still dominated the media, the official 30-day campaign period saw the most balanced coverage of the 10 other contesting opposition parties than ever before. The opposition Sam Rainsy Party was a big winner in this effort at greater equity during the campaign, and emerged from the elections as the strongest party after the CPP, despite generally a mediocre campaigning strategy and a failure to overcome the nationalist sentiment generated by the government's success in obtaining World Heritage inscription for Preah Vihear. It is true that Sam Rainsy faced a defamation suit lodged by Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Hor Namhong, but that appeared never to be more than an issue of personal honor, and was allowed to be continued until after the election. One ham-fisted effort to detain opposition editor Dam Sith ended in his release and the dismissal of the case after Dam Sith offered a simple apology. A "Perfect Storm" of Litigation -------------- ¶4. (C) All of that changed when, in an April 23 press conference Sam Rainsy Parliamentarian Mu Sochua expressed great offense at an off-the-cuff statement by Prime Minister Hun Sen on April 4 and announced her intent to sue the Prime Minister for defamation. This openly hostile (and obviously personal) attack set off a war of words between the main protagonists and in the early stages the leading civil society advocates urged the parties to take the matter out of the courts. But reported overtures to Mu Sochua to apologize and be done with it (many thought she could not build a case when, in fact, PM Hun Sen never mentioned her name) were met with principled statements about obtaining justice in Cambodia. In the end, the government did what it has done so many times before and unleashed an unprecedented wave of defamation and disinformation suits (Refs A-F). SRP leader Tioulong Saumura likened these suits, some of which carried jail time, to being dropped into the middle of a typhoon (Ref A) and told us recently that the Sam Rainsy Party would seek not to confront the CPP where it is strongest: in the courts controlled by the executive. (COMMENT: Saumura's analysis was essentially that an SRP member taunted Hun Sen into playing his game on his field and now the rest of SRP, upon consideration, realizes that they are no match, and that there is nothing to be gained from this folly. END COMMENT.) Why Did it Happen? -------------- ¶5. (C) CPP confrontation with those who challenge its authority is not new, although the continued decline in violence and physical threats and intimidation are welcome improvements. Usually these conflicts occur in the period after elections, when parties are consolidating their positions. Soon after the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement, before Cambodia's first election in 1993, the CPP response -- whether sanctioned by the leadership or not -- to the creation of a new party was to attack violently the political players. UNTAC reinforced the peace and security message and the UNTAC law criminalized defamation in order to keep the Khmer Rouge propaganda machine at bay. In 1995 internal purges in the FUNCINPEC party was part of a CPP-FUNCINPEC leadership agreement to get rid of critics and PHNOM PENH 00000489 003 OF 005 reflected the hard-ball politics that Cambodia has just emerged from: Sam Rainsy, Son Sann, and Prince Norodom Sirivudh were all purged that year. First Prime Minister Ranariddh, who was not unfamiliar with the uses of defamation, said that only "constructive" criticism was allowed. After the 1998 elections, violence against opponents remained a dominant theme until a new government was formed. The 2003 elections resulted in a political standoff for almost a year. After the new coalition government was formed in 2004, the CPP again turned its attention to its opponents. Throughout 2005 at least six defamation suits were brought against Sam Rainsy, Mam Sonando, Rong Chhun, Kem Sokha, Yeng Virak, and Pa Nguon Teang. The parliamentary immunity of Rainsy was lifted in February 2005 along with that of SRP MP Cheam Channy (Refs H, I). Late in 2005, Hun Sen said that freedom of speech must be balanced against the interests of social order and stability -- he was reacting especially to those critics of his policy regarding Cambodian-Vietnam border negotiations (Ref G). ¶6. (C) It was also Hun Sen who led the effort to de-criminalize defamation in early 2006. By that time, Rainsy had been pardoned, Cheam Channy's sentence was reduced and the other critics were released. However, the pattern of CPP tactics to exert control is clear: silence critics through the threat of the law. With the defamation charge no longer carrying jail time, the government now turns to disinformation or incitement charges when it wants to make a point. ¶7. (C) In the new multi-party pluralistic democracy of Cambodia, the government has still not developed a thick skin, the sensitivity to criticism is high, and the desire to bring opponents down a notch still remains with the CPP as part of its nature, history and ideology. With the 2008 elections well behind it, the government can now turn its attention to its critics. Hun Sen, perceiving the need to deal with his own "blue" conservative faction in the CPP (old warriors Chea Sim and Hang Samrin),must show that he has the power to enforce strict measures to uphold social order. (COMMENT: At least Hun Sen appears pragmatic enough to make deals with those about to be jailed (Ref A); however, Sok An lately appears to be more dogmatic as evidenced by his June 19 speech to the National Assembly on the responsibilities of the free press and his reported obstinate refusal to accept an apology from journalist Hang Chakra, who was jailed on disinformation charges for articles on the corrupt circles surrounding Sok An. END COMMENT.) Other Potential Threats: It's All About Implementation -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Further threats to a more open political atmosphere are seen in two new proposed draft laws on demonstrations and on NGO's. The NGO Law first surfaced in draft in 2006 but was then shelved when a number of donors joined NGO groups in opposing its strict reporting requirements. The draft illustrated clearly that the government's concern was primarily with NGOs engaged in partisan politics. Since then, the Ministry of Interior has revisited the law and reportedly is considering consulting with civil society on a new proposed draft NGO Law that, among other things, requires annual reports made to the Ministry of Interior. In the meantime, CPP party leaders have noticeably increased their rhetoric against NGOs that the CPP claims criticize the government but which are themselves corrupt, non-transparent, and not accountable to anyone. This past week, allegations of corruption against the former Cambodian Human Rights Center surfaced just as its former head, Kem Sokha, was preparing for his Human Rights Party annual conference. ¶9. (C) Similarly, a draft Law on Peaceful Demonstrations -- which went through earlier public consultations -- is wending its way through the draft law review process. Although critics say that the law's provisions are vague on limiting PHNOM PENH 00000489 004.3 OF 005 demonstrations that might affect "public order" (because the term is not defined),SRP parliamentarian Son Chhay makes a point that applies to many of Cambodia's laws in the current context: the law itself is probably better than the UNTAC-era law, he said, but it is the implementing decrees and the implementation itself that counts. Only when the details of implementation are considered will we know how onerous, or how good, a law will be. The implementation of the disinformation article of the UNTAC Law is an example of restrictive interpretation. And while there are reports that the new penal code will repeal the UNTAC articles and will not apply disinformation measures to journalists, the one exception is if national security is involved. ¶10. (C) According to Sok An, national security is virtually always affected in defamation cases, because the critical articles rely on "lying sources" and the "lies are prepared in advance with bad intentions and are against the government." As Sok An told the Ambassador (Ref C),whole subject areas such as Angkor Wat or the borders are off limits as any criticism can lead to instability and "anarchy." Just as the U.S. imposed new legislative restrictions in response to the 9/11 attacks, so too the RGC would have to impose restrictions on criticisms of the government, Sok An said. A Concerted Response -------------- ¶11. (SBU) In response to the degradation of human rights over the past months, the Embassy is engaging the government directly to encourage senior leaders to demonstrate commitment to democracy and human rights. In part, we are assuming that the message of political dominance has been sent, the game of defamation has grown tiresome and that the government will want to be seen in a better light by the international community. In our message, the Embassy is focusing on a number of themes to re-direct the government's thinking. First, that potential investors will be disturbed by the underlying political instability that the defamation cases bring. Cambodia is desperate for more foreign direct investment (FDI) and will listen intently to this argument to focus on the positive to attract more FDI. In fact, we will argue, the government appears more confident if it allows critics to speak, presents its own best case, and adapts accordingly. These defamation cases are seen by the outside world as a sign of weakness and not -- as the government clearly believes -- as a sign of strength. The Cambodian leadership is deeply concerned for its international legitimacy and we will appeal to the government to pay attention to the negative publicity it has drawn to itself. Finally, embracing democratic values will secure greater stability for the country in which the people have a say, there is a means to vent concerns and release political pressures that otherwise may build up over time. ¶12. (SBU) Either alone or with other missions, the Ambassador will publicly pay a visit to imprisoned newspaper editor Hang Chakra. The Ambassador has held a series of meetings with ministers and Hun Sen's close advisors, including DPM Sok An (Refs C, D) and DPM Sar Kheng, Om Yentieng, and Minister of Justice Ang Vong Vathana, to review the RGC's recent back-sliding, to question the perceived threats to freedom, and to propose a different way forward to win legitimacy among the international community. A number of Embassy officers are conducting similar meetings at the working level in key ministries. As we listen to government concerns and build confidence in our relationship and in our intentions, we hope to counter some RGC officials' perceptions that U.S. support for pluralistic democracy is a vote against the current government. We need to de-personalize this confrontation in order to make progress. Although the Sam Rainsy Party thinks it has found a way out (Ref A),we will engage with the political parties to see where a more meaningful role can be found for them to work with the government, which in turn may require a more responsible and PHNOM PENH 00000489 005 OF 005 less confrontational posture by the opposition. Embassy officers will also spend the next months engaging regularly with the NGO community and civil society to review with them our public position and to build confidence that a firm resolve can help see us through this difficult period, while aiming for more progress on democracy and human rights. ¶13. (SBU) The Embassy will reinforce some of the same pro-democracy messages to preserve political freedoms that we have made since the parliamentary immunity of Mu Sochua and Ho Vann was lifted June 22 at which time A/DCM joined the U.K., German, and French mission deputy heads in front of the National Assembly to express concern about the surprise inclusion of Ho Vann's case, the closed parliamentary session to remove MPs' immunity and the threat posed by this action to freedom of expression. We expect to work more closely with like-minded diplomatic missions in next few weeks, and to include missions based in Bangkok such as the Netherlands and Sweden, which take an interest. The ASEAN Human Rights Body now being established may prove to be another venue to carry our message, although this is a new entity in Cambodia and may take time to develop. ¶14. (SBU) The Embassy has a public diplomacy component woven into our strategy. Up to the present, we have responded to local press inquiries with expressions of concern for press freedoms and free speech and to reiterate our strong support for democratic freedoms, In our public remarks, we will adapt some of the same themes raised by President Obama in Russia and again in Africa: that America's interest is in democratic governments that protect the rights of their people, adding in our context that the rule of law must be consistent with Cambodia's own constitution which enshrines freedoms of expression and assembly. ¶15. (SBU) As embassy engages with the government, NGOs and civil society and projects our public diplomacy message to the public, we will report regularly on developments. ¶16. (SBU) COMMENT: Although Cambodia's ruling party has conducted its cyclical reining-in exercises before, we view with real concern the recent closing of opposition newspaper Moneaksekar Khmer, the legal threats to its publisher Dam Sith, and the jailing of opposition journalist Hang Chakra. Legal attacks against MP's for their outspoken criticism sends a signal to Cambodian society that the lines are being re-drawn on what is permissible to say and these new lines are far from where they should be in an environment of genuine free speech. ¶17. (SBU) COMMENT CONT.: Aside from the threat to stability that a few might feel by public remarks on corruption, there is genuine fear among Cambodia's ruling party about the increasing joblessness among a large, youthful population and increased criminal activity because of the lack of other opportunities. We need to understand and be responsive to Cambodia's new reality, to listen intently to what the leadership is worrying about and to show that we have a relationship of trust. This will help to reopen the political space lost over the last few months, a loss that is by no means irreparable. Should the proposed campaign result in no movement by the government within the next few months, we shall have to re-evaluate and consider a more outspoken posture and joint action with the larger donor community. For the time being, measured diplomacy combined with reassurance of support to civil society and a public diplomacy campaign may gain a beachhead for broader democratic trends and a renewed commitment to human rights. RODLEY