NWFP: DETERIORATING CONDITIONS IN SWAT AMID TALK OF

S E C R E T PESHAWAR 000093


E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/6/2019
TAGS: MOPS PREF PTER EAID PGOV PK
SUBJECT: NWFP: DETERIORATING CONDITIONS IN SWAT AMID TALK OF
"IMMINENT" OPERATIONS

CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate
Peshawar, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)


1. (S) Summary. According to Frontier Corps (FC) commander
General Tariq Khan, Swat operations are imminent, but no
decision has been made over whether regular army or FC will lead
the operation. General Tariq, however, told Peshawar PO that FC
does not have enough forces to take on Swat where militants are
dug in and according to a growing number of reports are largely
in control of the district's principal cities, Mingora and Saidu
Sharif. FC operations in Dir and Buner remain active; northern
Buner has not been secured. Overall internally displaced
persons (IDP) numbers from Buner remain unclear. The Northwest
Frontier Province (NWFP) Minister for Social Welfare told PO
that she expects operations in Swat to generate a large number
of IDPs at a time when the provincial government is already
struggling to cope with the Buner influx of IDPs who have
primarily moved into Mardan and Swabi districts in the Peshawar
valley. Pakistani military officials have repeatedly expressed
concerns about the lack of local capacity to handle additional
IDPs, and this factor may also hold back the launch of
operations in Swat. End Summary.


2. (S/NF) During a May 6 visit by 101st Airborne Division
commander MG Schloesser, Frontier Corps Inspector-General
(commander) General Tariq Khan provided an update of ongoing and
planned Frontier Corps (FC) operations in the Malakand division
and the FATA. Tariq said that Swat operations were imminent,
and might commence within the next few days. Reiterating what
we have been hearing, however, he noted that the questions of
which organization (FC or regular army) will take the lead and
which forces will participate are still unresolved. Later,
Tariq told PO that he does not have enough available forces
under his command to take the lead in Swat. (Note: However, ANP
provincial government leaders have been clear in conversations
with PO that that they favor a leading role for the FC in the
Swat operation.)


3. (S) Tariq confirmed press reporting that northern Buner has
not yet been cleared of Taliban, but said that he planned to
rely on the re-activated Buner lashkar forces to perform those
operations so that the Frontier Corps can move on to other
operations. He provided fewer details on Dir, but acknowledged
that operations there had not yet pacified the area. He noted
that the recent rainy weather in the NWFP has slowed operations
in the north; the cloud cover has reduced air support for FC
operations to a low level.


4. (S) Tariq portrayed both the Dir and Buner operations as
having diverted FC resources from his ongoing plans to secure
the northern areas of the FATA. Tariq imminently planned
another clearing operation in Bajaur Agency's Charmang valley
and northwestern Mohmand Agency to cut off remaining militant
elements from resupply routes through Afghanistan and to destroy
any organized resistance. He claimed that many militant
commanders in that area were now contacting security forces to
negotiate their surrender. FC also planned an operation using
its forces already deployed in Kurram Agency to trap and defeat
Taliban-affiliated Sunni militia elements in lower Kurram; he
noted the beneficial effect that a (currently nonexistent)
north-south road through Kurram would have on the ability of the
FC to operate in this area. Tariq characterized all of these
operations as a prelude for an attack on the Mehsud areas of
South Waziristan Agency (SWA),which he predicted would take
place in June if operations in Swat went well.


5. (C) MG Tariq was insistent that the fighting in Buner had
produced no more than 10,000 IDPs. PO met May 6 with NWFP
Minister for Social Welfare Sitara Ayaz who said that overall
numbers for Buner IDPs were difficult to ascertain. There was
not enough experienced staff to handle registration in Mardan
and Swabi districts where most of the IDPs have settled. Ayaz
expressed deep concern about the government's ability to cope
with additional IDPs which seemed almost a certainty once
operations were launched in Swat (further details septel).


6. (S/NF) Comment. While the question over the appropriate lead
force for Swat is likely creating some tension and delay in the
start of operations in Swat, worries over the impact of
additional IDPs flooding into the Peshawar valley districts is
almost certainly of equal if not greater concern to Pakistani
military and civilian officials. Fears of an overwhelmed
government and angry IDPs in districts closer to Peshawar could
lead to delays in the Swat operation. End comment.


7. (U) This cable has not been cleared by MG Stroesser.

TRACY