POST CONVENES EAC MEETING ON MOTORWAY ATTACK

C O N F I D E N T I A L PESHAWAR 000087 DS/IP/SCA; DS/EX; DS/TIA/ITA; DS/CT E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/29/2019 TAGS: ASEC PTER CASC PGOV MOPS PK SUBJECT: POST CONVENES EAC MEETING ON MOTORWAY ATTACK REF: A) PESHAWAR 86 B) PESHAWAR 77 CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate Peshawar, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (d) ¶1. (C) PO convened an Emergency Action Committee (EAC) meeting on April 29 to review an attack on a Pakistani security forces convoy on the Peshawar-Islamabad motorway. RSO, RAO, MGT, CONS, PD, USAID, and ODRP attended the meeting. ¶2. (C) On April 29 at approximately 0400 (local) hours a Frontier Corps (FC) convoy was traveling eastbound on the M1 Motorway when unknown attackers launched a rocket propelled grenade. Confirmed reports indicate that at least one (1) RPG was fired, possibly from a vehicle in the westbound lane of the divided high-speed roadway, missing the FC convoy and striking a stationary Motorway Police vehicle; injuring one officer. FC reported that the convoy stopped and personnel conducted a searched the area but were unable to identify the attackers. The attack occurred in the vicinity of the Mardan interchange, approximately 21 miles east of Peshawar along the 120 mile link between Islamabad and Peshawar. (Note: Post understands that security forces for operations in Buner have been assembling in Mardan.) Post is gathering additional details of the attack. ¶3. (C) The Peshawar-Islamabad highway represents a critical support link for the Consulate. While there has been no claim of responsibility, militant activity in NWFP districts adjacent to the highway, particularly Mardan, has been steadily creeping up in recent months. Post understands that a curfew has been imposed in Mardan areas adjacent to Buner. While there has been no claim of responsibility, the attack may be retaliation for military operations in Buner and Dir. ¶4. (C) Travel to Peshawar is on a mission essential basis. Post policy has been to permit mission personnel travelling in fully armored vehicles to move on the motorway without additional security escort. The Consulate provides additional security between the exit of the motorway (approximately 5 miles east of the Consulate) and any destinations within Peshawar. The motorway which opened in fall 2007 has only a handful of on/off ramps and passes through primarily open field areas in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). ¶5. (C) The EAC determined that the attack had crossed a tripwire. The attack is the first known incident of this nature associated with the motorway in the NWFP. RSO said that attacks with weapons such as RPGs are extremely difficult to counter. RSO explained that this attack would require a re-evaluation of post's contingency plans for evacuation which to date rely substantially on ground movements via the motorway. PO and RSO noted that post's security and logistical resources are already under severe stress to support existing mission requirements. The rapidly growing complexities of post's movements (Ref A), including matching up vehicle and security assets for travel between Peshawar and Islamabad, requires a sophisticated and substantial coordination capability that post does not possess. ¶6. (C) No travel was scheduled for April 30 and May 1 between the Consulate and the Embassy. The EAC agreed to review the volume, timing, routes, and means of transportation between Peshawar and Islamabad. (Note: In addition to the Grand Trunk road as an alternative route to reduce our presence on the motorway, a commercial air link between Islamabad and Peshawar is still in effect.) PO asked that Consular review current public language regarding security and roads in the NWFP. The EAC agreed to meet again on May 1. TRACY