Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09PESHAWAR47
2009-03-10 11:20:00
SECRET
Consulate Peshawar
Cable title:  

NWFP: SWAT UPDATE; ANP HEDGING ON SUPPORT FOR ZARDARI?

Tags:  PGOV PTER MOPS EAID PK 
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O 101120Z MAR 09
FM AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7870
INFO AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL LAHORE IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 
CIA WASHDC
NSC WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
S E C R E T PESHAWAR 000047 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV PTER MOPS EAID PK
SUBJECT: NWFP: SWAT UPDATE; ANP HEDGING ON SUPPORT FOR ZARDARI?

REF: A) ISLAMABAD 501 B) PESHAWAR 42

CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate
Peshawar, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

SUMMARY
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S E C R E T PESHAWAR 000047 E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/10/2019 TAGS: PGOV PTER MOPS EAID PK SUBJECT: NWFP: SWAT UPDATE; ANP HEDGING ON SUPPORT FOR ZARDARI? REF: A) ISLAMABAD 501 B) PESHAWAR 42 CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate Peshawar, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) While the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) government has rejected militant calls for withdrawal of the army from Swat, plans to send the Nizam-i-Adl (Shari'a) Regulation to President Zardari again and a prisoner release underscore the provincial government's determination to hang onto this deal despite militant violence and intimidation (reftels). The Awami National Party (ANP) is criticizing Zardari in some of the harshest terms we have yet heard in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision against the Sharif brothers. How that translates into the level of support that Zardari can count on from his ANP partners is difficult to discern but bears watching particularly as ANP as well as the military are now pressing Zardari to sign the Shari'a regulation by March 15. Zardari refused to sign the Shari'a regulation last time around and told Ambassador March 8 that he will not sign. However, as his confrontation with Nawaz deepens, it is not only a distraction from the western border but could provide ANP and the military with leverage to pressure Zardari to sign the Shari'a regulation in return for support against Nawaz. End Summary. Three Key Militant Demands -------------- ¶2. (C) On March 9, ANP deputy leader Afrasiab Khattak briefed Principal Officer on his March 7 visit to Swat. Tehrik-I Taliban (TTP) representative "commander Mahmood" reiterated three key demands to government and Tehrik-i Nifaz-i Shariat-i Muhammadi (TNSM) participants at a joint meeting: implementation of the Nizam-i-Adl (Shari'a) Regulation; army withdrawal from Swat; and release of prisoners. Shari'a Draft for Signature -- Again -------------- ¶3. (C) Chief Minister Hoti, Khattak said, was sending a slightly updated draft of the Nizam-i-Adl Regulation to Governor Ghani shortly. The Shari'a draft, he continued, should reach President Zardari for signature later in the week. PO noted Zardari's previous refusal to sign and asked if Khattak expected that to change. "Yes," Khattak replied succinctly. No Army Withdrawal -------------- ¶4. (C) Army withdrawal from Swat, Khattak said, was a non-starter -- a point that was conveye
d to TTP. However, the army would pull back and consolidate its forces at four or five bases, Khattak clarified, once other security forces -- Frontier Corps, Frontier Constabulary, and police -- were in Swat in sufficient numbers. The provincial government was aiming to roughly double the number of police assigned to Swat and bring police strength up to approximately 3,000. The government was planning, he said, to rotate out police officers who had served in Swat during the recent months of violence because of the impact on morale. Dismantling militant check posts, Khattak observed, remains a problem, but the government was hoping to have police patrolling in areas south of Mingora soon. Twelve Prisoners Released -------------- ¶5. (C) Khattak confirmed weekend press reports that twelve prisoners in Swat had been released -- ten adults and two "boys" (age NFI). Khattak insisted that those released had been thoroughly vetted by the military and were not "hard-core" militants. The military had developed three categories of prisoners: "black," "gray", and "white." Each prisoner's case would be reviewed individually before there would be any decision for release. ¶6. (C) There were "hundreds" of people in custody, Khattak explained, including a number of "young boys" who are vulnerable. The government, he added, wanted to focus on bringing to justice militants who were guilty of "serious" offenses. (Note: The total number of prisoners in government/military custody is unclear. Inspector General NWFP Police Malik Naveed recently told post that the government had 1700 prisoners in Swat but did not have adequate facilities or resources to cope with such a large number over the long run. Naveed expressed concern about those involved in only minor offenses who were likely to be released but who had no economic prospects.) Zardari-Sharif Confrontation -------------- ¶7. (C) Turning to the Zardari-Sharif confrontation, Khattak observed that Zardari is "shrewd but not wise," an "accidental" leader who could and should have ruled by consensus. Zardari, he said, "will be removed." The president is "isolated" because he has chosen to surround himself with "non-political people" like Interior Advisor Rehman Malik and is making unpopular decisions such as his nomination of Farooq Naek as Chairman of the Senate. Allies like MQM are not supporting him. ¶8. (C) Khattak relayed a press conference scheme that Zardari had proposed where he, flanked by ANP's Asfandyar Wali Khan and JUI's Fazlur Rehman, would announce his intention to block the Supreme Court's decision. Nawaz won't go for those sort of proposals, Khattak said flatly. "He [Nawaz] has no trust in Zardari's words" and does not want to be beholden through any solution similar to the National Reconciliation Ordnance. Khattak did not anticipate large turnouts or any serious violence in the NWFP for the Long March. FATA -- The Root of the Problem -------------- ¶9. (C) The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA),Khattak said, particularly the Waziristans remain the root of security troubles in the NWFP. Zardari is focused on his "political survival," and the national civilian government, he remarked, does not have enough energy to remove militant sanctuaries in the FATA and introduce reform. Khattak advocated UN Security Council action (NFI) to bring pressure "from the outside." Comment -------------- ¶10. (S/NF) The provincial government seems determined to hang onto its deal in Swat. Khattak's UNSC proposal strikes us as further evidence of the lack of coherence between the national and provincial levels as well as reinforcing discontent with PPP ally Zardari. ANP is criticizing Zardari in some of the harshest terms we have yet heard in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision against the Sharif brothers. How that translates into the level of support that Zardari can count on from his ANP partners is difficult to discern but bears watching particularly as ANP as well as the military are now pressing Zardari to sign the Shari'a regulation by March 15. Zardari refused to sign the Shari'a regulation last time around and told Ambassador March 8 that he will not sign. However, as his confrontation with Nawaz deepens, it is not only a distraction from the western border but could provide ANP and the military with leverage to pressure Zardari to sign the Shari'a regulation in return for support against Nawaz. TRACY

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