NWFP: PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY COMMENT ON SWAT

S E C R E T PESHAWAR 000034 E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/23/2019 TAGS: PGOV PTER MOPS EAID PK SUBJECT: NWFP: PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY COMMENT ON SWAT DEVELOPMENTS REF: PESHAWAR 33 CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate Peshawar, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Principal Officer met with Awami National Party (ANP) deputy leader Afrasiab Khattak and 11th Corps Commander General Aslam Masood separately on February 21. While both confirmed that negotiations are taking place with Tehrik-i Taliban (TTP) to extend the ceasefire in Swat (due to expire February 25), press reports of a "permanent" ceasefire are premature. The government is planning for schools, including those for girls, to re-open March 1. However, the kidnapping and subsequent release of the district's senior administration official by militants on February 22 underscores the tenuousness and limits of the ceasefire. Reinforcing local perceptions (reftel),some senior officials do not expect the truce to hold more than two to three weeks. ¶2. (C) Masood termed TTP's demand for the withdrawal of the army as a "non-starter." However, beyond plans to implement Shari'a law to "take away the militants' moral high ground," it is difficult to discern any serious planning for the day when this deal fails. We are pressing ahead with host government counterparts on assistance needs -- humanitarian relief, shoring up law enforcement, help for schools -- to give the government as much advantage as possible in this period of relative quiet. However, as important as these components are to rebuilding public confidence, the single key ingredient for stabilizing Swat is a sufficient heavy force level to cut off outside support and to overwhelm the militants who are controlling strategic areas of the valley -- a commitment the military has yet to make. End Summary. Swatis "Relieved" -------------- ¶3. (C) Khattak told PO that the mood in Swat was one of relief after months of non-stop violence. The ANP deputy leader who visited the district February 19-20 reported that shops in Mingora were open in the evening and night-time rocketing had ceased. North of Mingora Unsafe -------------- ¶4. (C) The main road north of Mingora, however, remained unsafe despite the ceasefire, Khattak said. The point was reinforced in conversations with 11th Corps about access for humanitarian assistance. Even Tehrik Nifaz-i-Shariat Mohammadi (TNSM) leader Sufi Mohammad, Khattak said, traveled via secondary roads on the left bank of the Swat River to reach Mullah Fazlullah's stronghold at Matta (20 km north of Mingora). ¶5. (C) According to local press reports, Swat's District Coordination Officer (DCO) was kidnapped outside Mingora (NFI) by TTP on February 22 to "discuss important matters." The DCO and his bodyguard team of six were reportedly released later in the day after two TTP supporters in custody were allowed to go free. NWFP Minister for Social Welfare Sitara Ayaz who has the lead on relief for internally displaced persons (IDPs) told PO February 24 that ANP intends to put the onus on Sufi Mohammad for dealing with this "violation" of the ceasefire. ¶6. (C) Upper Swat beyond Khwazakhela (30 km north of Mingora) remains in the hands of community leaders who have successfully resisted TTP since late 2007. Swat's northern most areas are populated by non-Pashtun Kohistanis, Khattak said, and the tribal structure there is still intact. Ceasefire Holding, But For How Long? -------------- ¶7. (C) 11th Corps Commander Masood told PO the ceasefire was holding but offered no comment on how long that is likely to last. Khattak reported that the military was negotiating an extension but was pessimistic that any ceasefire would remain intact. Interior Advisor Rehman Malik told Ambassador he expected the ceasefire would last for only two to three weeks. TTP spokesman Muslim Khan publicly contradicted weekend reports that a permanent extension of the 10-day "unilateral" ceasefire had been reached and was quoted saying that the status of the ceasefire would be reviewed after it had expired. TNSM-TTP Negotiations -------------- ¶8. (S/NF) TNSM and TTP representatives met February 20 to arrange for a meeting between Sufi Mohammad and his son-in-law Mullah Fazlullah in the coming days. Khattak said that ANP is not participating in these discussions, but that ISI has a representative present who is providing some back briefing to ANP. (Note: There are reports that some present at the discussions are quietly expressing doubts that TTP will lay down arms permanently.) TTP Demands -------------- ¶9. (C) ANP and 11th Corps accounts of TTP demands tally. Fazlullah is asking for withdrawal of the army, release of TTP prisoners, compensation for 2,000 TTP supporters killed or wounded in the fighting, and amnesty. 11th Corps commander commented that withdrawal of the army was a "non-starter." The provincial government, Khattak said, is insisting that girls' schools re-open on March 1 and that the military is supporting this point. (Note: Fazlullah reportedly announced February 22 that girls would be allowed to sit for annual exams.) Taking Away TTP's "Moral High Ground" -------------- ¶10. (C) PO expressed concern to Khattak and Masood that negotiations with TTP are sending a signal of weakness. The government, PO noted, has gone down this route before in past failed peace deals. Masood maintained that the issue of Shari'a law made the situation in Swat different and that the government's announcement was taking away TTP's "moral high ground." If the militants renew violence, the government, Masood said, will have the support of the people who just want peace and Shari'a. (Comment: We see no appreciable difference between this plan and the provincial government's reasons/actions in May 2008 that ultimately failed.) ¶11. (C) PO asked the 11th Corps Commander what measures would be taken to cut off Baitullah Mehsud's support for TTP in Swat. Masood acknowledged the problem, but said that army is "physically" blocking Mehsud's help from getting in. The military, he continued, was also working on a "larger strategy" (NFI) to deal with Baitullah. (Note: According to local press reports on February 23, Baitullah, South Waziristani commander Mullah Nazir, and North Waziristan's Gul Bahadur announced an alliance and the formation of a joint 13-member Shura Ittihad-ul-Mujahideen. The group reportedly declared Afghan Taliban's Mullah Omar as its "supreme leader" with Pakistani leadership rotating among the three -- a sign that this new "alliance" has not entirely suppressed local rivalries. Post is gathering more details on this development.) Assistance -- Next Steps -------------- ¶12. (C) PO emphasized to Khattak and 11th Corps Commander that the United States was ready to help. Humanitarian assistance was being channeled through the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and other NGOs. These organizations had reported to the Embassy that there were plenty of supplies on hand to expand the relief effort. Expanded access into the Swat valley, however, was the issue. PO asked that civilian and military officials allow "one-stop shopping" for assistance implementers to gain permission for access to the district. In addition to humanitarian relief, PO outlined possible fast-track help to repair schools and strengthen police stations. ¶13. (C) 11th Corps Commander requested Consulate's Special Forces representative help with food packages, bedding/clothes, and medicine for 20,000 families. The military intended, he said, to distribute these directly in Swat. 11th Corps Chief of Staff, Brigadier Aamer, projected that a U.S. team could visit Swat for an assessment o/a February 25 when the 37th Division commanding officer was back in Swat. ¶14. (C) PO asked Masood about strengthening the liaison with 11th Corps by establishing some permanent space at the headquarters. PO observed that a more regular presence would assist our coordination on IDP relief as well as border issues. Masood agreed to review the request. (Comment: We read that response as "no," but will continue to push on better access. In 2006-2007, there was some office space available for a liaison officer at 11th Corps. The change in command in the summer of 2007 and periodic flare up in tensions along the border eroded that small foothold at the headquarters.) ¶15. (C) Khattak said he was heading a Task Force for Swat that will fold in the IDP relief coordination that has been taking place thus far. U.S. mission representatives, he said, would be welcome to participate. PO encouraged Khattak to include 11th Corps which had not been participating in coordination efforts. Khattak agreed to do so. NWFP "Self-Defense" Force -------------- ¶16. (C) NWFP Chief Minister Hoti publicly announced February 22 that he has directed provincial officials to hand out 30,000 rifles to "patriotic people" and "peace loving groups" for self-defense. Police station house officials reportedly have been ordered to ensure that the weapons are not given to "terrorists and troublemakers." Inter-Services Public Relations Director MG Abbas confirmed the Army had been consulted about this proposed self-defense plan. It is not clear whether the offer includes ammunition, or if it covers Swat under a ceasefire. Separately, Abbas confirmed that the Army has no plans to withdraw from Swat and is "keeping other options open" if peace negotiations in Swat fail. Comment -------------- ¶17. (C) Beyond plans to implement Shari'a law "to take away the militants' moral high ground," it is difficult to discern any serious planning for the day when this deal fails. As important as humanitarian relief and law enforcement assistance are to rebuilding public confidence, the single key ingredient for stabilizing Swat is a sufficient heavy force level to overwhelm the militants who are controlling strategic areas of the valley -- a commitment the military has yet to make. TRACY