NWFP: PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY COMMENT ON SWAT

S E C R E T PESHAWAR 000034


E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/23/2019
TAGS: PGOV PTER MOPS EAID PK
SUBJECT: NWFP: PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY COMMENT ON SWAT
DEVELOPMENTS

REF: PESHAWAR 33

CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate
Peshawar, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)


Summary
--------------


1. (C) Principal Officer met with Awami National Party (ANP)
deputy leader Afrasiab Khattak and 11th Corps Commander General
Aslam Masood separately on February 21. While both confirmed
that negotiations are taking place with Tehrik-i Taliban (TTP)
to extend the ceasefire in Swat (due to expire February 25),
press reports of a "permanent" ceasefire are premature. The
government is planning for schools, including those for girls,
to re-open March 1. However, the kidnapping and subsequent
release of the district's senior administration official by
militants on February 22 underscores the tenuousness and limits
of the ceasefire. Reinforcing local perceptions (reftel),some
senior officials do not expect the truce to hold more than two
to three weeks.


2. (C) Masood termed TTP's demand for the withdrawal of the army
as a "non-starter." However, beyond plans to implement Shari'a
law to "take away the militants' moral high ground," it is
difficult to discern any serious planning for the day when this
deal fails. We are pressing ahead with host government
counterparts on assistance needs -- humanitarian relief, shoring
up law enforcement, help for schools -- to give the government
as much advantage as possible in this period of relative quiet.
However, as important as these components are to rebuilding
public confidence, the single key ingredient for stabilizing
Swat is a sufficient heavy force level to cut off outside
support and to overwhelm the militants who are controlling
strategic areas of the valley -- a commitment the military has
yet to make. End Summary.

Swatis "Relieved"
--------------


3. (C) Khattak told PO that the mood in Swat was one of relief
after months of non-stop violence. The ANP deputy leader who
visited the district February 19-20 reported that shops in
Mingora were open in the evening and night-time rocketing had
ceased.

North of Mingora Unsafe
--------------


4. (C) The main road north of Mingora, however, remained unsafe
despite the ceasefire, Khattak said. The point was reinforced
in conversations with 11th Corps about access for humanitarian
assistance. Even Tehrik Nifaz-i-Shariat Mohammadi (TNSM) leader
Sufi Mohammad, Khattak said, traveled via secondary roads on the
left bank of the Swat River to reach Mullah Fazlullah's
stronghold at Matta (20 km north of Mingora).


5. (C) According to local press reports, Swat's District
Coordination Officer (DCO) was kidnapped outside Mingora (NFI)
by TTP on February 22 to "discuss important matters." The DCO
and his bodyguard team of six were reportedly released later in
the day after two TTP supporters in custody were allowed to go
free. NWFP Minister for Social Welfare Sitara Ayaz who has the
lead on relief for internally displaced persons (IDPs) told PO
February 24 that ANP intends to put the onus on Sufi Mohammad
for dealing with this "violation" of the ceasefire.


6. (C) Upper Swat beyond Khwazakhela (30 km north of Mingora)
remains in the hands of community leaders who have successfully
resisted TTP since late 2007. Swat's northern most areas are
populated by non-Pashtun Kohistanis, Khattak said, and the
tribal structure there is still intact.

Ceasefire Holding, But For How Long?
--------------


7. (C) 11th Corps Commander Masood told PO the ceasefire was
holding but offered no comment on how long that is likely to
last. Khattak reported that the military was negotiating an
extension but was pessimistic that any ceasefire would remain
intact. Interior Advisor Rehman Malik told Ambassador he
expected the ceasefire would last for only two to three weeks.
TTP spokesman Muslim Khan publicly contradicted weekend reports
that a permanent extension of the 10-day "unilateral" ceasefire
had been reached and was quoted saying that the status of the
ceasefire would be reviewed after it had expired.

TNSM-TTP Negotiations
--------------


8. (S/NF) TNSM and TTP representatives met February 20 to
arrange for a meeting between Sufi Mohammad and his son-in-law
Mullah Fazlullah in the coming days. Khattak said that ANP is
not participating in these discussions, but that ISI has a
representative present who is providing some back briefing to
ANP. (Note: There are reports that some present at the
discussions are quietly expressing doubts that TTP will lay down
arms permanently.)

TTP Demands
--------------


9. (C) ANP and 11th Corps accounts of TTP demands tally.
Fazlullah is asking for withdrawal of the army, release of TTP
prisoners, compensation for 2,000 TTP supporters killed or
wounded in the fighting, and amnesty. 11th Corps commander
commented that withdrawal of the army was a "non-starter." The
provincial government, Khattak said, is insisting that girls'
schools re-open on March 1 and that the military is supporting
this point. (Note: Fazlullah reportedly announced February 22
that girls would be allowed to sit for annual exams.)

Taking Away TTP's "Moral High Ground"
--------------


10. (C) PO expressed concern to Khattak and Masood that
negotiations with TTP are sending a signal of weakness. The
government, PO noted, has gone down this route before in past
failed peace deals. Masood maintained that the issue of Shari'a
law made the situation in Swat different and that the
government's announcement was taking away TTP's "moral high
ground." If the militants renew violence, the government,
Masood said, will have the support of the people who just want
peace and Shari'a. (Comment: We see no appreciable difference
between this plan and the provincial government's
reasons/actions in May 2008 that ultimately failed.)


11. (C) PO asked the 11th Corps Commander what measures would be
taken to cut off Baitullah Mehsud's support for TTP in Swat.
Masood acknowledged the problem, but said that army is
"physically" blocking Mehsud's help from getting in. The
military, he continued, was also working on a "larger strategy"
(NFI) to deal with Baitullah. (Note: According to local press
reports on February 23, Baitullah, South Waziristani commander
Mullah Nazir, and North Waziristan's Gul Bahadur announced an
alliance and the formation of a joint 13-member Shura
Ittihad-ul-Mujahideen. The group reportedly declared Afghan
Taliban's Mullah Omar as its "supreme leader" with Pakistani
leadership rotating among the three -- a sign that this new
"alliance" has not entirely suppressed local rivalries. Post is
gathering more details on this development.)

Assistance -- Next Steps
--------------


12. (C) PO emphasized to Khattak and 11th Corps Commander that
the United States was ready to help. Humanitarian assistance
was being channeled through the United Nations, the
International Committee of the Red Cross, and other NGOs. These
organizations had reported to the Embassy that there were plenty
of supplies on hand to expand the relief effort. Expanded
access into the Swat valley, however, was the issue. PO asked
that civilian and military officials allow "one-stop shopping"
for assistance implementers to gain permission for access to the
district. In addition to humanitarian relief, PO outlined
possible fast-track help to repair schools and strengthen police
stations.


13. (C) 11th Corps Commander requested Consulate's Special
Forces representative help with food packages, bedding/clothes,
and medicine for 20,000 families. The military intended, he
said, to distribute these directly in Swat. 11th Corps Chief of
Staff, Brigadier Aamer, projected that a U.S. team could visit
Swat for an assessment o/a February 25 when the 37th Division
commanding officer was back in Swat.


14. (C) PO asked Masood about strengthening the liaison with
11th Corps by establishing some permanent space at the
headquarters. PO observed that a more regular presence would
assist our coordination on IDP relief as well as border issues.
Masood agreed to review the request. (Comment: We read that
response as "no," but will continue to push on better access.
In 2006-2007, there was some office space available for a
liaison officer at 11th Corps. The change in command in the
summer of 2007 and periodic flare up in tensions along the
border eroded that small foothold at the headquarters.)


15. (C) Khattak said he was heading a Task Force for Swat that
will fold in the IDP relief coordination that has been taking
place thus far. U.S. mission representatives, he said, would be
welcome to participate. PO encouraged Khattak to include 11th
Corps which had not been participating in coordination efforts.
Khattak agreed to do so.

NWFP "Self-Defense" Force
--------------


16. (C) NWFP Chief Minister Hoti publicly announced February 22
that he has directed provincial officials to hand out 30,000
rifles to "patriotic people" and "peace loving groups" for
self-defense. Police station house officials reportedly have
been ordered to ensure that the weapons are not given to
"terrorists and troublemakers." Inter-Services Public Relations
Director MG Abbas confirmed the Army had been consulted about
this proposed self-defense plan. It is not clear whether the
offer includes ammunition, or if it covers Swat under a
ceasefire. Separately, Abbas confirmed that the Army has no
plans to withdraw from Swat and is "keeping other options open"
if peace negotiations in Swat fail.

Comment
--------------


17. (C) Beyond plans to implement Shari'a law "to take away the
militants' moral high ground," it is difficult to discern any
serious planning for the day when this deal fails. As important
as humanitarian relief and law enforcement assistance are to
rebuilding public confidence, the single key ingredient for
stabilizing Swat is a sufficient heavy force level to overwhelm
the militants who are controlling strategic areas of the valley
-- a commitment the military has yet to make.


TRACY