AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH 11TH CORPS COMMANDER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PESHAWAR 000022 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/7/2019 TAGS: MOPS PTER EAID PGOV PK SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH 11TH CORPS COMMANDER CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, Peshawar, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) On January 26, Ambassador met with 11th Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Masood Aslam and Chief of Staff Brigadier Aamer to discuss internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the situation in Swat. General Masood advocated a mixed approach to IDP assistance -- encourage some to go home where help would be distributed via tribal leaders while offering some direct cash relief to IDPs who must remain in camps or with family. In Swat, which General Masood described as a military priority "even before Bajaur or the Waziristans," the military is adopting tactics to respond to small mobile bands of militants and will concentrate first on bringing down violence in Mingora, one of Swat's principal cities. The pressure of coping with the IDP situation is falling on government infrastructure in the NWFP and the tribal areas, and the military is no exception -- and it comes at a time when it is clear that Swat requires a robust force to counter local militants. End Comment. IDP Assistance -------------- ¶2. (C) On January 26, Ambassador met with 11th Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Masood Aslam and Chief of Staff Brigadier Aamer to discuss internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the situation in Swat. Peshawar Principal Officer, Deputy Chief of the Office of the Defense Representative Pakistan, BG Joe DiBartolomeo, and CJTF-101 Liaison Officer (notetaker) also attended the meeting. ¶3. (C) Ambassador opened by noting that the conditions at the Kacha Gari IDP camp (approximately five miles west of Peshawar), which she visited earlier in the day, were better than she had expected. General Masood agreed with her assessment. He emphasized that the IDP issue could not be viewed as a purely humanitarian issue in isolation from the need to restore peace, rebuild, and provide compensation in Bajaur, Mohmand, and Swat, areas that have been most affected by military operations over the past year. ¶4. (C) General Masood added that durable rehabilitation for an affected area should focus on utilities, schools, and health services. He relayed his frustration with current relief efforts by stating that money was being spent, but with no lasting impact. The relief, he said, felt as if it was "trickling in." Ambassador asked how assistance should be provided -- through tribal leaders, cash, or vouchers. General Masood responded that a combination of all three methods would be needed. ¶5. (C) Some areas, Brigadier Aamer noted, were ready for IDPs to return, and IDPs from those areas should be encouraged to leave the camps immediately. Aid to these individuals could be distributed in their home areas by the Political Agent (PA) with the help of tribal leaders who could help ascertain appropriate levels of assistance and compensation. IDPs who remain in the camps and who are staying with relatives must also receive relief, preferably cash, commensurate to their losses. Direct assistance for these groups would require a thorough vetting process, but this approach would avoid the earlier error made when all IDPs were compensated at a flat rate of payment regardless of their estimated losses. ¶6. (C) General Masood expressed optimism that if the 11th Corps received the appropriate manning levels promised, which he expected, then the 11th Corps could build "teams" to address issues relating to relief and services. ODRP Deputy relayed that in his meetings with the General Headquarters (GHQ) in Islamabad, GHQ intended to establish planning cells at the 11th Corps to address these types of issues. Principal Officer suggested that the recently established Civil Military Coordination group in Peshawar (an interagency forum for Pakistani and U.S. agencies) could also take up this issue. A New Strategy in Swat -------------- ¶7. (C) General Masood outlined 11th Corps' "new" strategy in the Swat District. The military, he said, will not try to be "everywhere all the time." Instead, military forces would focus along lines of communication and supply first, and then expand outward. General Masood observed that militants in Swat PESHAWAR 00000022 002 OF 002 moved in small bands of no more than five to ten fighters each, making it particularly easy to slip in and out of large cities like Mingora. He intended to focus his forces first on Mingora, which has witnessed a steady increase in violence in recent months. Success with the dense population there, he said, would have benefits throughout Swat. More uniformed soldiers would be on the streets and guarding schools and other soldiers would move among the population in plain clothes. ¶8. (C) Responding to Ambassador's question about the source of militants in Swat, General Masood stated that some were local, some had come from the Wazaristans, some from Bajaur, and possibly some had come from Afghanistan. PO noted that Mullah Fazlullah has recently become bolder, organizing parallel "courts" that are handing down judgments and meting out punishments. General Masood said that his forces would counter such criminal actions with checkpoints dispersed throughout Swat in order to quickly react to these activities. Military forces would also engage in multiple areas simultaneously to serve as a "quick reaction force" to prevent the small groups of militants responsible for the courts from concentrating in any one area. ¶9. (C) Ambassador asked how Swat, which was renowned as a popular tourist spot, had deteriorated to such a degree. General Masood acknowledged that initial military operations in Swat had focused on the traditional objectives of key terrain (the high ground) and not on an enemy force-oriented objective (groups of militants). The initial shock of the operations flushed militants out, but a vacuum was created during the interim government; during this period, the militants were able to regroup. ¶10. (C) General Masood recalled that trouble in Swat is not new. The main basis of discontent is dissatisfaction with the judicial system and education. The 11th Corps Commander maintained that if Shari'a law was actually implemented, then it would ultimately backfire on the militants. Brigadier Aamer was unwilling to assign blame largely to the Awami National Party (ANP) for Swat's security deterioration. ANP, he said, had done the best it could but lacked assets for dealing with the militants. General Masood concluded by emphasizing Swat's importance to the military -- even before Bajaur -- because of the threat that an eastward spread of militants would represent to Pakistan's key artery in the north, the Karokoram Highway. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) The pressure of coping with the IDP situation is falling on government infrastructure in the NWFP and the tribal areas, and the military is no exception. How much the military will be able to help with relief is unclear, particularly if it takes on a renewed commitment in Swat. It is clear, however, that an unchecked militant presence in Swat represents a threat to the Karokoram Highway to the east of the district. Given the difficulties that security forces have already encountered in Swat and the importance of the Karokarom link, Pakistan's military leadership appears to have decided that it cannot afford the risk of waiting until the militants have become even more entrenched in the north. TRACY