RC-EAST MG SCAPPAROTTI DISCUSSES BORDER COORDINATION WITH PAKISTANI ARMY/FRONTIER CORPS

C O N F I D E N T I A L PESHAWAR 000208 E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2019 TAGS: MOPS PREL PTER PK SUBJECT: RC-EAST MG SCAPPAROTTI DISCUSSES BORDER COORDINATION WITH PAKISTANI ARMY/FRONTIER CORPS Ref: A) ISLAMABAD 2462; B) ISLAMBAD 2427 CLASSIFIED BY: Candace Putnam, Principal Officer, Peshawar, State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary. In an October 13 meeting with RC-East Commander MG Scapparotti, Pakistan' 11th Corps Commander Masood and Frontier Corps commander Tariq Khan discussed ongoing operations and venues for cross-border cooperation. The Pakistanis requested U.S./ISAF assistance in blocking militant border crossings ahead of what they characterized as their "final push" to drive militants out of Bajaur; they also noted increased movement across the Paktika-Waziristan border. Masood agreed with the necessity for increased U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan but suggested that this would strain Pakistan's infrastructure for supplying U.S./ISAF troops. Both Masood and Khan pressed for improvements to the Pakistani side of the Torkham border crossing. End summary. ¶2. (C) On October 13, MG Curtis Scapparotti, accompanied by PO and SOC-FWD Colonel Kurt Sonntag, met jointly with Pakistan's 11th Corps commander LTG Masood Aslam and Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) Frontier Corps commander MG Tariq Khan. Cooperation with FC Operation in Bajaur -------------- ¶3. (C) Tariq said the Frontier Corps (FC) was engaged in a "final push" to eliminate the militant threat in Bajaur. (Note: According to FATA ACS Habibullah Khan, the FC in Bajaur has been augmented by three additional "wings" - battalion equivalents for the operation. Its goal to entirely mop up remaining militants in the Charmang valley while cutting off and gradually tightening the noose on militants in the restive Mahmond tehsil; both areas are on the border with Afghanistan.) SOC-FWD commander noted that SOC-FWD liaisons would be in Bajaur October 13 to support this operation (ref A). ¶4. (C) Tariq passed information regarding militant crossing points on the Bajaur-Kunar border, where he wanted RC-East support. Tariq alleged that the GOA was actively ensuring that the "Khan of Kunar" in Afghanistan had the financing and supplies necessary to attack Pakistani military forces. Tariq mentioned SIGINT indicating that safe havens have been offered to Pakistani insurgents in Afghanistan in an effort to safeguard force structure as the Pakistani military begins offensive operations. ¶5. (C) MG Scapparotti reviewed the redeployment of U.S. forces in Nuristan and Kunar to protect population areas and briefed plans to coordinate blocking action with Pakistani military. He said that RC-East was also focusing on building Afghan National Army and Afghan Police/Border capabilities. Scapparotti offered that his intelligence indicated that the insurgents are increasingly having logistical problems, to include the ability to resupply ammunition and food. Tariq asked that RC-East consider beginning dual patrolling with the FC and other measures to improve daily cross-border communication. In particular, he mentioned an issue with radio frequency compatibility. Both sides agreed to raise the issue at the next border flag meeting. Movement across the Waziristan-Paktika Border -------------- ¶6. (C) As usual, Masood was evasive about the precise timing of the allegedly imminent 11th Corps operation against Mehsud areas of South Waziristan. However, both sides agreed there had been an increase in cross-border movement along the South Waziristan-Paktika border. Their consensus was that the most appropriate way to deal with this flow was to increase the number of sensors; it did not make sense to position permanent forces. Tariq said they were seeing increased action along the Iranian border as well. Improving Torkham -------------- ¶7. (C) Masood stated that the U.S. needed more troops in Afghanistan, though the actual numbers could be debated. However, he said, the U.S. should also factor in the need for infrastructure along the GLOC supply lines to support such an increase. It would take time to develop the roads, bridges, and other infrastructure necessary on the Pakistan side of the border to handle the increased traffic that the new troop levels would require. ¶8. (C) Masood particularly raised the need to improve border controls through Torkham. Tariq said there were two dimensions to the problems-security and political, which increasingly intersected. Afghan complaints about Pakistani inspections of fruit and other trucks created a political furor that did not take into account the reality of militants using these trucks to smuggle guns into Pakistan. The FC was ready to build a new gate and possibly provide security for border officials, but he needed to convince the civilian customs and bank personnel to man the site beyond the current 1000-1400 daily schedules. Tariq said that the Pakistani government had "tried and failed" to control the Pashtun truckers transporting supplies for coalition forces in Afghanistan. He alleged that the civilian contractors were cutting corners and at the expense of the U.S., and claimed that the ten NATO trucks burnt over the past weekend were because the contractor was trying to save money by parking where he was told not to park. Often, Tariq said, the allegedly destroyed truck merchandise ends up in Peshawar bazaars. ¶9. (C) Comment: Atmospherics at the meeting, the first between the field commanders in this sector of the border since August, were good; notably, the Pakistani generals abandoned the usual set power point brief for a useful exchange, and they did not even raise the issue of the Kerry-Lugar Bill (ref B). Ongoing cooperation and coordination of U.S./ISAF and Pakistani forces, especially with the support of SOC-FWD, for the pending Bajaur operation will we believe, further enhance the bilateral relationship. ¶10. (U) MG Scapparotti did not have an opportunity to clear this message. PUTNAM