PESHAWAR CONVENES EAC ON JULY 17, 2009 REGARDING RECENT

S E C R E T PESHAWAR 000148


NOFORN

DEPT FOR: SCA/EX; DS/EX; DS/IP/SCA; DS/TIA/ITA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/17/2019
TAGS: ASEC PTER PK CASC
SUBJECT: PESHAWAR CONVENES EAC ON JULY 17, 2009 REGARDING RECENT
THREAT REPORTING AND ATTACKS

REF: A. PESHAWAR 145

B. TDX-315/046510-09


CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate
Peshawar, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (c),(d)



1. (S//NF) Post convened an Emergency Action Committee (EAC)
meeting on July 17, 2009 to assess recent militant attacks and
other security incidents, Peshawar-specific threat reporting and
the al-Zawahri (al-Qaeda) video statement. The EAC concluded
that the security situation in Peshawar remained tenuous with
clear indications of active, well coordinated hostile
surveillance against US-interests and known al-Qaeda and Taliban
groups operating in close proximity to Peshawar with significant
capabilities and an intent to target Consulate facilities,
personnel and movements. Although security resources are being
established to mitigate many of the threats present in Peshawar,
continued deficiencies in securing Consulate staff and
facilities remain. Pending RSO Peshawar initiatives were
discussed by the EAC and will be re-prioritized accordingly.
Principal Officer (PO),Regional Security Office (RSO),Regional
Affairs Office (RAO),Office of Defense Representative Pakistan
(ODRP) and Management Office (MGT) were represented.


2. (S//NF) RSO initiated the EAC by providing an overview of the
following recent events:

(a) International Carriers Suspend Operations on July 15, 2009:
For the third time in two months, operations at the Peshawar
International Airport (PEW) were suspended. Reports indicate
this suspension, limited to non-Pakistani carriers, was in
response to increased open source reporting on Peshawar's
security situation. RSO sources believe most carriers will
resume services within one week. Post is coordinating with
Embassy Islamabad to issue a revised Warden message.

(b) Rocket Attack on July 15, 2009: Seven (7) rockets were fired
from an unknown direction into the Old City of Peshawar
impacting at least three different locations between 3 and 6
miles from the Consulate.

(c) Assault on Police Station on July 15, 2009: Militants
conducted an infantry-style, smalls arms attack against a
Frontier Police Station in Chamkani, Peshawar (5 miles east of
Consulate). Police repealed the attack and reported no injuries.

(d) UNHCR Official Killed on July 16, 2009: A United Nations
High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) was killed in an apparent
kidnapping attempt from the UNHCR Office in Hayatabad, Peshawar
(5 miles west of Consulate) near the Kacha Gari internally
displaced persons (IDP) camp. One guard may also have been
injured in this attack.

(e) Armed Robbery Outside Consulate on July 15, 2009: During
daylight hours an armed robbery occurred adjacent to one of the
Consulate's entrances and was witnessed by RSO security elements.


3. (S//NF) RSO provided an assessment of these incidents as they
relate to Consulate operations in the extent that although
reports indicate adversaries believe that most Consulate
personnel have relocated to Islamabad, the security environment
remains critical and that any changes that increase the
Consulates activities would correspondingly raise risk.
Initiatives that will mitigate some of the threats against
Peshawar's operations were outlined; but RSO reiterated that
those without any immediate actionable countermeasures, such as
home/work travel between University Town and the Consulate would
remain critical vulnerabilities. Measures that are underway
include: establishment of a Worldwide Personal Protective
Services (WPPS) contract for protection and emergency response
teams (pending legal review); rotational painting and acquiring
lower profile vehicles; physical security upgrade projects at
the Consulate and Khyber Club Residential Complex; hardening of
residential safe havens; additional security checkpoints in
University Town; and establishing a sub-station for police
providing direct support. These measure are assessed as critical
in securing Consulate facilities/residences and lowering the
profile of Consulate operations, though in the interim, all
potential measures available to RSO Peshawar have been
implemented.


4. (S//NF) PO noted threat reporting that had accurately
identified the Consulate's use of two (2) vehicle movements
to/from the housing cluster. Single vehicle movements for all
Consulate personnel will only be possible once the WPPS contract
is fully operational in Peshawar. The advantage of single
vehicle movements with appropriate drivers/security staff is an
enhanced ability to blend into local traffic.


5. (S//NF) Lastly, Peshawar RSO reported that an increase in
surveillance detection reporting had been witnessed over the
past several weeks. Although this rise could be related to
increased intelligence reporting indicating surveillance, that
greater SD deployments may be a factor in the uptake in
reporting. RSO will continue to monitor the security situation
and report any anomalies to the EAC.


6. (S//NF) Discussion regarding the status of PEW international
flights reiterated the findings from REFTEL A. Post remains
prepared to support Islamabad re-routed flights and will
coordinate with all arriving/departing personnel as necessary.
The EAC considered a Post policy to restrict Consulate personnel
using flights between PEW and Islamabad International Airport
(ISB) but determined that no changes were required due to a lack
of routine flights, advantages of ground travel and weighed risk
to all forms of travel.


7. (S//NF) RAO provided the EAC a review of several recent
reports and the overall situation in Peshawar. Key reports
discussed by the EAC include REFTEL B that reaffirmed the
presence of al Qaeda groups in Peshawar conducting active--and
often very accurate--reporting on the Consulate operations,
namely movements to/from University Town. RAO assessed that
al-Qaeda and Taliban groups have demonstrated increasingly
brazen and new modus operandi that includes remaining in
populated areas for protection despite raids, increasing numbers
and movements of foreign fighters in/around Peshawar and
conducting surveillance for attacks in spite of increased
Government of Pakistan (GoP) offensive efforts. The EAC agreed
with the assessment that the most likely form of attack would
target the Khyber Club Complex or movements in/out of University
Town, but that key adversaries are seeking high value/impact
attacks. RSO concurred and highlighted these two targets remain
the most vulnerable.


8. (S//NF) The EAC then discussed potential impact from the al
Qaeda video statement released on July 15th by senior al Qaeda
commander Ayman al-Zawahri. The EAC noted the Pakistan centric
content of the video, namely calling upon all Pakistani's to
join the Jihad and statements linking key GoP institutions with
corruption and US collaboration. Although no reaction has been
seen in Peshawar related to this video, the EAC will continue to
monitor the atmospherics and make additional adjustments to the
Consulates profile as warranted.


9. (S//NF) The PO re-affirmed the EAC's decision to relocate
Consulate personnel to Islamabad. Relocated Consulate personnel
will remain in Islamabad until these measures are in-place but
increased day trips for key political interactions would be
allowed.


10. (S//NF) The EAC concluded that all appropriate measures
within Post's capability were being taken to respond to
Peshawar's security environment and threats.


11. (SBU) The Point of Contact for this information is Acting
Regional Security Officer Stephen J. Marquette.


TRACY