PESHAWAR CONVENES EAC ON JULY 17, 2009 REGARDING RECENT

S E C R E T PESHAWAR 000148 NOFORN DEPT FOR: SCA/EX; DS/EX; DS/IP/SCA; DS/TIA/ITA E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/17/2019 TAGS: ASEC PTER PK CASC SUBJECT: PESHAWAR CONVENES EAC ON JULY 17, 2009 REGARDING RECENT THREAT REPORTING AND ATTACKS REF: A. PESHAWAR 145 ¶B. TDX-315/046510-09 CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate Peshawar, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (c),(d) ¶1. (S//NF) Post convened an Emergency Action Committee (EAC) meeting on July 17, 2009 to assess recent militant attacks and other security incidents, Peshawar-specific threat reporting and the al-Zawahri (al-Qaeda) video statement. The EAC concluded that the security situation in Peshawar remained tenuous with clear indications of active, well coordinated hostile surveillance against US-interests and known al-Qaeda and Taliban groups operating in close proximity to Peshawar with significant capabilities and an intent to target Consulate facilities, personnel and movements. Although security resources are being established to mitigate many of the threats present in Peshawar, continued deficiencies in securing Consulate staff and facilities remain. Pending RSO Peshawar initiatives were discussed by the EAC and will be re-prioritized accordingly. Principal Officer (PO),Regional Security Office (RSO),Regional Affairs Office (RAO),Office of Defense Representative Pakistan (ODRP) and Management Office (MGT) were represented. ¶2. (S//NF) RSO initiated the EAC by providing an overview of the following recent events: (a) International Carriers Suspend Operations on July 15, 2009: For the third time in two months, operations at the Peshawar International Airport (PEW) were suspended. Reports indicate this suspension, limited to non-Pakistani carriers, was in response to increased open source reporting on Peshawar's security situation. RSO sources believe most carriers will resume services within one week. Post is coordinating with Embassy Islamabad to issue a revised Warden message. (b) Rocket Attack on July 15, 2009: Seven (7) rockets were fired from an unknown direction into the Old City of Peshawar impacting at least three different locations between 3 and 6 miles from the Consulate. (c) Assault on Police Station on July 15, 2009: Militants conducted an infantry-style, smalls arms attack against a Frontier Police Station in Chamkani, Peshawar (5 miles east of Consulate). Police repealed the attack and reported no injuries. (d) UNHCR Official Killed on July 16, 2009: A United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) was killed in an apparent kidnapping attempt from the UNHCR Office in Hayatabad, Peshawar (5 miles west of Consulate) near the Kacha Gari internally displaced persons (IDP) camp. One guard may also have been injured in this attack. (e) Armed Robbery Outside Consulate on July 15, 2009: During daylight hours an armed robbery occurred adjacent to one of the Consulate's entrances and was witnessed by RSO security elements. ¶3. (S//NF) RSO provided an assessment of these incidents as they relate to Consulate operations in the extent that although reports indicate adversaries believe that most Consulate personnel have relocated to Islamabad, the security environment remains critical and that any changes that increase the Consulates activities would correspondingly raise risk. Initiatives that will mitigate some of the threats against Peshawar's operations were outlined; but RSO reiterated that those without any immediate actionable countermeasures, such as home/work travel between University Town and the Consulate would remain critical vulnerabilities. Measures that are underway include: establishment of a Worldwide Personal Protective Services (WPPS) contract for protection and emergency response teams (pending legal review); rotational painting and acquiring lower profile vehicles; physical security upgrade projects at the Consulate and Khyber Club Residential Complex; hardening of residential safe havens; additional security checkpoints in University Town; and establishing a sub-station for police providing direct support. These measure are assessed as critical in securing Consulate facilities/residences and lowering the profile of Consulate operations, though in the interim, all potential measures available to RSO Peshawar have been implemented. ¶4. (S//NF) PO noted threat reporting that had accurately identified the Consulate's use of two (2) vehicle movements to/from the housing cluster. Single vehicle movements for all Consulate personnel will only be possible once the WPPS contract is fully operational in Peshawar. The advantage of single vehicle movements with appropriate drivers/security staff is an enhanced ability to blend into local traffic. ¶5. (S//NF) Lastly, Peshawar RSO reported that an increase in surveillance detection reporting had been witnessed over the past several weeks. Although this rise could be related to increased intelligence reporting indicating surveillance, that greater SD deployments may be a factor in the uptake in reporting. RSO will continue to monitor the security situation and report any anomalies to the EAC. ¶6. (S//NF) Discussion regarding the status of PEW international flights reiterated the findings from REFTEL A. Post remains prepared to support Islamabad re-routed flights and will coordinate with all arriving/departing personnel as necessary. The EAC considered a Post policy to restrict Consulate personnel using flights between PEW and Islamabad International Airport (ISB) but determined that no changes were required due to a lack of routine flights, advantages of ground travel and weighed risk to all forms of travel. ¶7. (S//NF) RAO provided the EAC a review of several recent reports and the overall situation in Peshawar. Key reports discussed by the EAC include REFTEL B that reaffirmed the presence of al Qaeda groups in Peshawar conducting active--and often very accurate--reporting on the Consulate operations, namely movements to/from University Town. RAO assessed that al-Qaeda and Taliban groups have demonstrated increasingly brazen and new modus operandi that includes remaining in populated areas for protection despite raids, increasing numbers and movements of foreign fighters in/around Peshawar and conducting surveillance for attacks in spite of increased Government of Pakistan (GoP) offensive efforts. The EAC agreed with the assessment that the most likely form of attack would target the Khyber Club Complex or movements in/out of University Town, but that key adversaries are seeking high value/impact attacks. RSO concurred and highlighted these two targets remain the most vulnerable. ¶8. (S//NF) The EAC then discussed potential impact from the al Qaeda video statement released on July 15th by senior al Qaeda commander Ayman al-Zawahri. The EAC noted the Pakistan centric content of the video, namely calling upon all Pakistani's to join the Jihad and statements linking key GoP institutions with corruption and US collaboration. Although no reaction has been seen in Peshawar related to this video, the EAC will continue to monitor the atmospherics and make additional adjustments to the Consulates profile as warranted. ¶9. (S//NF) The PO re-affirmed the EAC's decision to relocate Consulate personnel to Islamabad. Relocated Consulate personnel will remain in Islamabad until these measures are in-place but increased day trips for key political interactions would be allowed. ¶10. (S//NF) The EAC concluded that all appropriate measures within Post's capability were being taken to respond to Peshawar's security environment and threats. ¶11. (SBU) The Point of Contact for this information is Acting Regional Security Officer Stephen J. Marquette. TRACY