FRONTIER CORPS COMMANDER'S CONCERNS FOR COUNTER-INSURGENCY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PESHAWAR 000142 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/7/2019 TAGS: MOPS PGOV EAID PTER PK SUBJECT: FRONTIER CORPS COMMANDER'S CONCERNS FOR COUNTER-INSURGENCY STRATEGY CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate Peshawar, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Frontier Corps (FC) Commander General Tariq Khan expressed concerns in a July 1 conversation with Peshawar Principal Officer (PO) about the competing and inefficient authorities between the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that hampers prompt action on issues such as IDPs. General Khan warned against premature mainstreaming of FATA and said that the immediate/near term focus should be on stabilization of tribal society and existing institutions. He recommended focusing international assistance on Bajaur to create a model and to avoid diluting the political impact. The FC Commander's worries about the pace of bringing in resources to rehabilitate and reconstruct are well-founded. However, there are few easy or fast answers for "hold" -- the most complicated aspect of counter-insurgency in the NWFP and FATA. End Summary. NWFP-FATA Leadership Troubles -------------- ¶2. (C) PO met with General Khan on July 1 at his request. The FC Commander opened the conversation on a positive note, commenting that developments, particularly military operations in the NWFP and FATA, finally appeared to be turning in the government's favor. General Khan tempered that optimism, however, by expressing concern over the lack of a single point of civilian authority with cross-cutting jurisdiction over the NWFP and FATA. ¶3. (C) The NWFP Governor's position, the FC Commander continued, was a natural choice for this combined authority given the Governor's constitutional oversight of the FATA and access to the NWFP. (Note: The NWFP Governor's responsibilities on provincial matters are largely ceremonial; real authority rests with the Chief Minister and other members of the elected government.) IDPs and other issues, requiring prompt action, he said, were crossing political/administrative boundaries between the NWFP and FATA and would continue to do so. ¶4. (C) PO noted reports of plans to replace current NWFP Governor Ghani. General Khan believed those reports to be out of date. Ghani had recently told the FC Commander that President Zardari had decided against making a change in the Governor's slot. General Khan viewed this as a sound move, characterizing Ghani as familiar with the issues and commanding the respect of the military. He derisively commented on one prospective candidate -- a personality from Orakzai (NFI) -- who was essentially "a taxi driver with no standing." General Khan found it difficult to imagine working with someone of that caliber and background. Everyone Has a "Plan" -------------- ¶5. (C) With the military's progress in Swat and operations in South Waziristan, the FC Commander said that "all the worms have come out of the woodwork." Every one has a "plan" for the future of the FATA. Some voices (NFI),he continued, are calling for the immediate absorption of the FATA into the NWFP by converting the tribal areas into provincial districts. This was a dangerous path that would be perceived among tribesmen as a Punjabi imposed action at the behest of the United States -- a surefire recipe for revolt in the FATA. ¶6. (C) The FC Commander advocated stabilization of existing institutions and the tribal systems for the near to medium term. At the same time, longer-term planning for mainstreaming FATA could take place but in clear consultation with tribal communities about the future governing arrangements, including the Frontier Crimes Regulation. (Note: This is essentially the view of Additional Chief Secretary of the FATA Secretariat Habibullah Khan and a number of other Peshawar observers who caution against repeating the mistake of Swat which was a tribal area that was absorbed into the NWFP with no grassroots PESHAWAR 00000142 002 OF 002 preparation.) ¶7. (C) PO asked the FC Commander about extension of the Political Parties Act (PPA) in the near term. General Khan feared that extension of the PPA in advance of stabilization would create an immediate advantage for the Islamist parties that have used the mosques and madrassas to cultivate supporters in the FATA. Additional elected seats under the control of the Islamist parties could complicate government objectives for the FATA. Focused Stabilization -------------- ¶8. (C) General Khan recommended focusing international stabilization assistance on Bajaur to create a model. Trying to do too much in too many places would dilute the political impact. Spillover benefits, he said, could accrue to neighboring Mohmand and Dir. Education, General Khan emphasized, had to be one of the highest priorities. Without an alternative to madrassas, FATA would remain isolated and vulnerable. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) General Khan's concerns about competing and stove-piped NWFP and FATA authorities are well-founded. There is merit to a single point of authority for NWFP/FATA civilian issues. Ghani, however, is not favored by either the Awami National Party or the PPP, and Zardari is unlikely to strengthen the Governor's position while Ghani is there at the expense of presidential political allies in the provincial government. And, while the military may prefer a single point of authority on civilian issues, General Khan did not envision a Governor with real authority over the military. While we have seen some initial planning from NWFP authorities aimed at dismantling and streamlining the patchwork of political arrangements within the province, weak and inefficient bureaucracies, particularly for the FATA, remain a problem. The FC Commander is almost certainly worried that the resources for "building" in an agency like Bajaur are not following fast enough on the heels of operations. This concern exposes the most complicated pillar in counter-insurgency for the FATA and the NWFP -- a fast-track and effective "hold" force. Bio Note -------------- ¶10. (C) General Khan told PO that his oldest son who recently graduated from an Islamabad university with a business degree is now working for a UN agency (NFI). Khan warned his son that his UN employer should not expect any special favors or access because of the family relationship. In a separate conversation with PO, Khan blamed his son's decision not to enter the military on entrance questions on religion that appeared aimed at weeding out anyone with a secular orientation. TRACY