MALAKAND UPDATE AND WAZIRISTAN PLANNING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PESHAWAR 000110



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/25/2019

TAGS: MOPS, PTER, PREF, EAID, PK

SUBJECT: MALAKAND UPDATE AND WAZIRISTAN PLANNING



REF: ISLAMABAD 947



CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate

Peshawar, Department of State.

REASON: 1.4 (d)

Summary

--------------



1. (C) According to Awami National Party (ANP) Senator Afrasiab

Khattak, Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) officials expect to

secure Mingora by June 1 and complete Swat operations in 4-6

weeks. Militant presence in Dir and Buner still pose some

challenges for security forces although rehabilitation issues

such as electricity in Buner appear to be looming larger as

obstacles to the return of displaced populations to cleared

areas. Post-conflict planning for Malakand Division may include

a "state of emergency" order to help keep detained militants in

custody. The NWFP government intends to recruit early retires

from the army to accelerate the build up of the police as a

credible back up force for the military.

Khattak said that an operation in South Waziristan may be

accelerated to June because of counter-measures that

Tehrik-i-Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud is already putting in

place to impede military action. The government estimates that

the operation could create another 500,000 IDPs and is looking

at establishing a logistical hub in Punjab's Mianwali. While

some IDPs will go to families, suitable camp sites have been

difficult to find for those who do not have this option. ANP

continues to oppose Anwar Saifullah as a candidate to replace

NWFP Governor Ghani and have threatened to walk out of the

coalition if President Zardari names him.



2. (C) ANP's post-conflict transition proposals create a number

of legal and constitutional questions. It is not clear that the

NWFP government has thought through how to reconcile these

issues. The projected timelines for operations in Swat and

South Waziristan conveyed by Khattak are ambitious and perhaps

overly optimistic -- pressure from Baitullah notwithstanding.

Other military contacts characterize Swat as a "hard fight" of

3-6 months. Even with additional military resources, it is

unclear whether the army can take on two major operations in the

area simultaneously. While NWFP plans for post-conflict

planning are welcome, civilian capacity to execute at the

district level and lower is a missing key ingredient to

successful IDP re-integration and rehabilitation of

conflict-damaged areas. End Summary.



"Apex Committee" Meeting

--------------



3. (C) Khattak provided Peshawar PO with a readout of the May 23

meeting of the "Apex Committee" attended by NWFP Governor Ghani,

11th Corps Commander General Masood, 1st Corps Commander General

Nadeem, Frontier Corps Commander General Khan, NWFP Chief

Secretary Iqbal, and Khattak (representing NWFP Chief Minister

Hoti). Topics discussed included operations post-conflict

transition in the Malakand Division as well as future operations

in South Waziristan.



Swat

--------------



4. (C) The military, Khattak said, expects to secure Mingora by

June 1, and the entire district within the next 4-6 weeks.

(Comment: Military contacts in the Special Services Group are

characterizing Swat as a "hard fight" and estimating 3-6

months.) Army forces, he said, had launched operations in

Mingora on May 23 after encircling the city and securing several

key points near the city where militant presence had been a

problem (Qambar, Takhtaband, and Angoraday). Mopping up

operations were continuing in the Peochar valley. Some

militants had managed to escape from Peochar into Upper Dir.

Mullah Fazlullah and other Tehrik-i-Taliban (Swat) leaders were

still on the run and had stopped using their phones about two

weeks ago.



5. (C) Some relief supplies had arrived on May 23 in northern

areas of Swat that had been cut off because of fighting in

central parts of the district. (Note: Communities in northern

Swat had successfully kept militants at bay since late 2007.

These communities had come under increasing pressure because of



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growing shortages and had agreed to a "truce" within the past

week to allow supplies into the area.)



Dir and Buner

--------------



6. (C) Operations in Lower Dir, Khattak said, are largely

completed although some pockets (NFI) of militants remain.

Southern Buner, he continued, had been cleared. The militant

presence in northern Buner, particularly the road from Sultanwas

to Barikot (Swat),still posed a challenge. Electricity in

Buner, Khattak noted, was the key obstacle to bringing back

displaced residents to cleared areas. (Note: Buner's power

supply originates in Swat and was damaged as operations in Swat

commenced. SOC-FWD reports that the generator that NAS procured

is supplying electricity to Daggar, Buner's capital.)



Post-Conflict Planning

--------------



7. (C) The NWFP government, Khattak said, is developing plans

for transition to a post-conflict stage in Malakand Division

(NWFP Chief Secretary Iqbal has the lead). One aspect of the

plan would be to impose a "state of emergency" order on

Malakand. A key effect would be to suspend some constitutional

rights, particularly the ability of the High Court to hear

petitions for bail. The government, Khattak explained, is

worried that without this measure many who have been detained

will be back on the streets. (Comment: Separately, we hear

from other Peshawar contacts that the issue of bail is a problem

for the government. One senior local official commented to PO

that he had no confidence that judges could withstand targeted

violence by militant groups to gain bail for their comrades.)



8. (C) To build up the police as a credible back up force for

the military, Khattak continued, the police will take in

recruits who are retiring early from the army. These recruits

will receive a basic re-orientation course and then go directly

into their postings. PO asked whether these recruits would fill

key leadership positions such as Station House Officers (SHO).

"No," Khattak replied, the army recruits would be fill rank and

file police positions. (Comment: While this move may be

helpful in shoring up the police, we are increasingly hearing

that leadership, especially at the SHO level, is sorely

lacking.) Members of the Provincial Assembly will be tasked to

organize committees at the village level to coordinate with

police.



South Waziristan Operation

--------------



9. (C) Khattak commented that the military may not wait for the

Swat operation to be completed before taking on South Waziristan

and that military action there could commence as early as June.

11th Corps Commander General Masood had made it clear that

Baitullah Mehsud will be the focus of the campaign in the

Waziristans rather than Mullah Nazir, the Haqqanis, or Gul

Bahadur.



10. (C) There was deep concern, Khattak explained, because of

counter-measures that Baitullah already appeared to be taking to

impede military action. Baitullah, Khattak said, has called a

jirga of the Mehsud tribe to rally support from tribal elders.

Support, Khattak observed, that Baitullah has not felt he has

needed in the past. Hakimullah Mehsud, one of Baitullah's key

commander, has been recalled from Orakzai with 800 fighters.

Baitullah had contacted South Waziristan's Political Agent "to

talk to" Islamabad. He had also approached Fazlur Rehman

through Merajuddin Qureshi for help in stalling the impending

operation. Baitullah was putting in place "defensive measures"

in North Waziristan to stop military movements into South

Waziristan and was building bunkers and tunnels.



11. (C) The government, Khattak said, intends to tell the Mehsud

tribe to either hand over Baitullah or be declared a "mutinous"

tribe. Under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, Khattak continued,

the government has the authority to impose a blockade and even



PESHAWAR 00000110 003 OF 004





pursue Mehsud businessmen in Karachi under collective

responsibility. The government, he said, has banned the

shipment of cement and fertilizer into South Waziristan.

Security has been beefed up around the Gomalzam dam where

several hundred Chinese workers are based.



12. (C) The government, Khattak said, was also expecting further

attacks in the larger cities of the settled areas. There was a

report, he noted, that 18 vehicles loaded with explosives had

been organized by Mohmand militant Abdul Wali Shah and militants

in the Darra Adam Khel area south of Peshawar.



13. (C) Khattak estimated that the South Waziristan operation

could displace approximately 500,000 people. Baitullah, he

noted, has told Mehsud families send out the elderly, women, and

children. (Note: We continue to see press reports that Mehsuds

are leaving the area, but numbers remain unclear. Mehsud

tribesmen own substantial properties in the adjacent Dera Ismail

Khan district and many spend the winters there. When the

military blockaded the Mehsud territory in late 2007, there were

approximately 200,000 displaced residents. About half stayed

with family, and half were in camps in the Tank area.)



14. (C) Mianwali in Punjab province just across the Indus from

Dera Ismail Khan, Khattak said, is under consideration as a

logistical hub for moving relief supplies into the area.

However, the government was having difficulty identifying

suitable camp sites close to South Waziristan-Dera Ismail Khan

border. The Tank area was like a desert, and the summer heat

was brutal. Possible sites further east were being

investigated.



ANP-JUI-F Dust Up

--------------



15. (C) Turning topics outside of the Apex Committee meeting,

Khattak commented on a recent acrimonious meeting hosted by

President Zardari between representatives from ANP and Fazlur

Rehman's Jamaat-i Ulema-i Islam. The meeting descended into a

shouting match, he said, when ANP representatives from Swat

became incensed over JUI-F comments opposing military action.

Khattak termed the presence of only ANP and JUI-F at the meeting

as a "mistake." JUI-F, he pointed out, while in coalition at

the federal level is in the opposition at the NWFP provincial

level. All parties should have present, Khattak said. JUI-F is

dangerous because it is good at "deceit." At least Jamaat-I

Islami, he observed, is consistent in its support for militants.



Governor's Replacement?

--------------



16. (C) PO asked if there was any update on plans to replace

NWFP Governor Ghani. ANP, Khattak said, is still advocating for

former NWFP Chief Secretary Azam Khan. ANP leader Asfandyar

Wali Khan, Khattak said, had told Zardari that ANP will leave

the coalition at the federal level if alternate candidate Anwar

Saifullah was named as Governor (reftel). Saifullah, Khattak

continued, had been the author of a plan to form an NWFP

government in February 2008 of PPP and independents, leaving ANP

out.



17. (C) Khattak expressed dissatisfaction with Zardari's

leadership. He singled out Interior Minister Rehman Malik for

criticism and complained that Zardari had failed to surround

himself with "good political people." Zardari, he said, had

also not learned from "past mistakes" and was continuing to

amass assets through pressure tactics on Karachi businessmen.

While relations with Zardari had become more strained and the

PPP leadership in the NWFP was relatively weak, ANP and PPP,

Khattak said, continued to enjoy good relations at the

provincial level.



Comment

--------------



18. (C) ANP's post-conflict transition proposals create a number

of legal and constitutional questions. It is not clear that the



PESHAWAR 00000110 004 OF 004





NWFP government has thought through how to reconcile these

issues. The projected timelines for operations in Swat and

South Waziristan conveyed by Khattak are ambitious and perhaps

overly optimistic -- pressure from Baitullah notwithstanding.

Other military contacts characterize Swat as a "hard fight" of

3-6 months. Even with additional military resources, it is

unclear whether the army can take on two major operations in the

area simultaneously. While NWFP plans for post-conflict

planning are welcome, civilian capacity to execute at the

district level and lower is a missing key ingredient to

successful IDP re-integration and rehabilitation of

conflict-damaged areas.

TRACY